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Abstract
With the huge growth of information and communication systems, as well as the com-
puting power, privacy has become a main concern for Internet users. Certainly, nowa-
days users tend to prefer privacy respectful systems and, consequently, companies pro-
viding software solutions also need to worry about it. Nevertheless, the privacy pro-
vided by current systems many times reduces to the need of placing too much trust
into legal protections. Conversely, the contributions by the research community in this
directionmany times fail to produce realistic enough solutions, hardly flexible, scalable
or deployable in current systems, and thus, impractical.
In this thesis, we attempt to bridge this gap between the practical but barely ro-
bust systems in the “real world” and the robust but barely practical ones of the “aca-
demic counterpart”. Specifically, we base our proposals in currently deployed pro-
tocols and systems, but extend them for making them suitable to implement privacy,
mainly through fair anonymity. Moreover, our approach for incorporating privacy-
by-design grows from addressing less complex tasks towards tackling more complex
issues based on the composition of the simple ones. This also allows us to establish a
flexible framework from which solutions applicable for contexts other than those ex-
plored here may be derived. In turn, this helps to reduce the complexity of deploying
new systems from scratch which, as stated, is our initial objective.
In more detail, in order to ease the design and deployment of privacy respectful
systems, we proceed as follows. We first propose a methodology for designing proto-
cols and systems and verifying that they meet the required security properties. This
methodology is used to create and verify the protocols and systems proposed after-
wards. On the other hand, since we make important use of group signatures for pro-
viding privacy through anonymity, and we aim to ease the costs of deploying new sys-
tems, we describe an extensible C library that we have implemented and released in an
alpha stage, offering a unified API for group signatures. Subsequently, we make use of
these global building blocks for creating technology that would most probably be nec-
essary in every privacy respectful system. Specifically, given that the initial problem in
any online platform requiring personalized interaction or some kind of authentication
is to actually distribute digital identities, we propose SEBIA, a protocol based on EBIA
(the typical email-based registration system) that ensures a reasonable level of security
for many contexts. Specifically, it allows the distribution of anonymous identities like
the ones that are used as a base to create privacy systems in subsequent chapters, and
that are based in group signatures. Once having addressed the distribution problem,
we extend the widely deployed X.509 PKI in order for it to be suitable for managing
anonymous identities. Specifically, we propose extensions to the OCSP and CRLmech-
anisms, and create a new X.509-like protocol for communicating evidences of misbe-
havior (which, regrettably, is a problem sometimes derived from anonymity). With this
contributions, we allow the creation of advanced privacy respectful systems based on
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anonymity. In fact, with the aim of showing it, we design two systems. First, a compre-
hensive online shopping system that allows anonymous purchases while being also
compatible with typical e-commerce benefits, like customer-specific marketing tech-
niques. Secondly, we define an extension to the Tor network which, also based on the
same mechanisms for managing anonymity, would allow to shift from full anonymity
to fair anonymity.
Moreover, for several of the proposals made in this thesis, we have implemented
actual prototypes that have enabled us to perform initial profiling tasks. Despite being
preliminary versions lacking optimization, the results indicate that our proposals incur
in acceptable costs.
viii
Resumen
Con el gran auge de los sistemas de la información y las comunicaciones, junto con la
capacidad de cómputo, los usuarios han empezado a preocuparse por su privacidad.
Por ello, cada vez prefieren más los sistemas que son respetuosos con su información
personal, lo cual está llevando a las compañías desarrolladoras de software a preocu-
parse también por la privacidad de los usuarios. No obstante, las garantías de pri-
vacidad en los sistemas actuales normalmente se reducen a mecanismos de protección
legal, en los que los usuarios deben confiar. Por el contrario, las contribuciones hechas
desde la comunidad académica normalmente consisten en sistemas poco prácticos o
realistas y poco adaptables a las infraestructuras actuales.
En esta tesis, intentamos reducir esta brecha entre los sistemas prácticos pero poco
robustos del “mundo real” y los sistemas robustos pero poco prácticos del “mundo
académico”. Para ello, nos basamos en protocolos y sistemas actualmente utilizados
en la industria, pero adaptándolos de forma que sean respetuosos con la privacidad
a través de primitivas criptográficas avanzadas, proporcionando anonimato justo. En
concreto, empezamos abordando tareas más sencillas para luego crear sistemas más
complejos. Esto nos permite crear un marco de trabajo flexible, a partir del cual se
pueden derivar soluciones aplicables a contextos distintos de los que aquí se muestran.
Al mismo tiempo, esto ayuda a reducir la complejidad de desplegar nuevos sistemas
desde cero, cumpliendo con nuestro objetivo.
Con algo más de detalle, para facilitar el diseño e implementación de sistemas
respetuosos con la privacidad, procedemos de la siguiente manera. Primero, pro-
ponemos unametodología para diseñar protocolos y sistemas, verificando que cumplen
los requisitos de seguridad establecidos. Esta metodología la utilizamos para crear y
verificar los protocolos y sistemas propuestos más adelante. Por otro lado, dado que
hacemos un uso importante de firmas grupales para proporcionar privacidad a través
de anonimato, y nuestra intención es facilitar la creación de nuevos sistemas, presen-
tamos una librería para firmas grupales, escrita en C. Esta librería, aún en fase alfa,
es fácilmente extensible, de forma que se pueden añadir nuevos esquemas en caso de
ser necesario, manteniendo una API unificada. A continuación, hacemos uso de estos
pilares básicos para crear componentes tecnológicos que cualquier sistema respetuoso
con la privacidad probablemente requerirá. En concreto, dado que en toda plataforma
online la primera operación necesaria es registrarse en la misma, proponemos SEBIA,
un protocolo basado en EBIA (el típico sistema de registro basado en emails), pero
que proporciona un nivel de seguridad suficiente para muchos escenarios. Este proto-
colo, concretamente, permite la distribución de identidades digitales anónimas como
las usadas en los siguientes capítulos y basadas en firmas grupales. De hecho, una
vez distribuidas las identidades, es necesario disponer de mecanismos eficientes para
gestionarlas. Para ello, extendemos la infraestructura de clave pública X.509 con el
fin de adaptarla para la gestión de identidades anónimas. En concreto, extendemos los
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mecanismos OCSP y CRL, además de crear un nuevo protocolo que, siguiendo los mis-
mos principios de diseño de X.509, permite la distribución de evidencias de compor-
tamientos ilegítimos (lo cual, desgraciadamente, es un problema que suele acompañar
al anonimato). Con estas contribuciones, facilitamos la creación de sistemas avanzados
y respetuosos con la privacidad, basados en el anonimato, y al mismo tiempo compati-
bles con tecnologías actuales. Para mostrarlo, diseñamos un sistema de compras online
que permite la realización de compras anónimas y que es además compatible con las
técnicas de marketing actuales. Además, proponemos una extensión para la red Tor
que, también basándose en los mecanismos presentados, podría permitir la migración
de dicha red a un sistema de anonimato justo.
Por último, para varias de las propuestas hechas en esta tesis, se han implementado
prototipos que nos han permitido realizar un análisis inicial. A pesar de ser versiones
preliminares sin optimizar, los resultados indican que nuestras propuestas introducen
sobrecostes aceptables.
x
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CHAPTER 1
Thesis overview
In software engineering it is frequent to focus verification efforts in the search for im-
plementation bugs aiming to validate a system or protocol. This kind of defects cer-
tainly have severe impact in the affected product, fact that has been corroborated by
recent events, like the Shellshock1 bug in Bash or the Heartbleed2 vulnerability affect-
ing OpenSSL. However, while looking for these bugs is necessary, these problems may
generally be fixed by applying software patches to the vulnerable components.
In addition, design flaws are another type of defect that typically receives less at-
tention from the computer science security community, when compared with their im-
plementation counterpart. Quoting the 2014 IEEE Report “Avoiding the top 10 software
security design flaws”3 by the Center For Secure Design:
A bug is an implementation-level software problem. Bugs may exist in code but
never be executed. A flaw, by contrast, is a problem at a deeper level. Flaws are
often much more subtle than simply an off-by-one error in an array reference or use
of an incorrect system call. A flaw might be instantiated in software code, but it is
the result of a mistake or oversight at the design level.
For instance, a typical design flaw may be just assuming that a certain entity in-
volved in the system is trustworthy, when it is not. Such a improperly-trusted entity
could endanger the whole system even in the remote case that no implementation bug
exists, resulting for example in a massive information leak. According to the men-
tioned report, some of the top 10 security concepts that are typically ignored and lead
to design flaws, are:
• “Earn or give, but never assume, trust”.
– That is, you should never just assume that some entity is trustworthy.
• “Use an authentication mechanism that cannot be bypassed or tampered with”.
• “Authorize after you authenticate”.
– Specifically, an already authenticated user may not be authorized to perform
certain operations.
1http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2014/q3/649. Last access: March 28th, 2015.
2http://heartbleed.com/. Last access: March 28th, 2015.
3http://cybersecurity.ieee.org/center-for-secure-design.html. Last access: March 28th,
2015.
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• “Use cryptography correctly”.
• “Identify sensitive data and how they should be handled”.
• “Always consider the users”.
– Users are almost always the weakest link in the security chain.
All these design principles, when not applied during the design stage, may be the
cause of severe over-costs at the development stage (and even worse, at the production
stage, when they may have even been exploited), as shown in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Costs of addressing software problems, depending on the stage in the Soft-
ware Development Lifecycle in which they are applied. Source: [179].
This comes in line with the security by design practice. Indeed, in the same way than
the application of an appropriate Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) helps producing
software of high quality, the application of Security Development Lifecycle helps produc-
ing secure software [168]. In turn, secure software means higher quality software. In
this work we further develop the security by design concept towards the more recent
trend privacy by design4. Privacy is indeed a complex matter that has many subtleties.
On one hand, directly applying conventional computer security or cryptographymeth-
ods does not automatically guarantee privacy. The typical misconception in this case
4See the Privacy by Design resolution, where privacy is recognized as an essential foundation upon
which free societies are built, at http://www.ipc.on.ca/site_documents/pbd-resolution.pdf (last ac-
cess on March 28th, 2015).
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is assuming that just by applying encryption over private data actually ensures its pri-
vacy: but, for instance, the mere leakage of the existence of that encrypted data may ac-
tually violate someone’s privacy. A representative example is that of a whistle-blower
communicating with the police: if the criminal organization he belongs to realizes he is
exchanging information with the police, even if it is encrypted, it will give him away.
Another trending example is the current big data contributions by means of which,
from what a priori many people consider “harmless” information, sometimes highly
private knowledge may be extracted5 [72]. For instance, click patterns, visited websites
or session duration may be used to extrapolate lifestyle, consumption habits, politi-
cal preferences, etc. Thus, privacy is a subject that needs to be dealt with in detail,
many times analyzing specifics of the application domain, but for which also general
infrastructures endorsing it are still required. The complexity of achieving privacy is
captured for the specific context of anonymous communications by the Tor infographic
shown in Figure 1.2 6. There, it is emphasized that even when applying encryption
(through HTTPS), privacy may still be violated.
Figure 1.2: Confidentiality does not necessarily imply privacy. In web browsing, even
when providing confidentiality (through the encryption of HTTPS), exter-
nal actors may break the users’ privacy. In the image, hackers, police,
NSA, etc. are shown as being able to learn, for instance the URL visited
by the user (site.com) and the user’s location. Fragment of Tor infographic
(source: EFF6).
On the other hand, applying too much privacy-enhancing technologies may not be
desirable either. For instance, irrevocable anonymity may be misused as a protection
5http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/three-paradoxes-big-
data. Last access on March 28th, 2015.
6https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
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for performing dishonest actions despite the fact that is is certainly a primary tool for
complying legitimate privacy purposes (like the whistle-blower example).
Another important principle in engineering is that a solution that nobody uses pro-
vides no real benefit, despite the many advantages it may provide. Thus, following the
common sense and coming back to the security design principles, we may enunciate a
general pragmatism principle, aimed to achieve a high acceptance rate for new systems:
If some security property or functionality may be satisfactorily achieved
through currently existing and widely deployed, accepted and tested tech-
nologies, then developing new ones should be avoided. Else, if modifica-
tion is unavoidable, the impact on both the end users and the technology
itself should be kept to a minimum, and the modifications should follow
the security design principles. If new technology is really needed, then its
design should follow the security design principles.
This does not mean that, when necessary, new systems may not be created, but that
in order to design them, we should rely as much as possible on existing technologies
and theories [98]. In a humorous manner, the vignette in Figure 1.37 from the web-
comic XKCD captures one of the problems of not following what we have called the
pragmatism principle.
Figure 1.3: XKCD7 Standards vignette .
In turn, by promoting privacy respectful systems by design through technology
directly compatible with current infrastructures, usability would also be improved
through a simplification of the resulting systems. This is an important factor to keep in
mind, since usability has been a historical drawback in security systems and software
[25, 183].
This is a relevant subject if we look into systems proposed in the academia. As we
will see throughout this work, the proposals originated at the academic world, despite
providing very interesting and robust security and privacy features, many times fail
at being suitable for the current technological context. For instance, by requiring ex-
tensive modifications into the communications model (introducing unbearable costs)
or requiring the addition of new entities that are hard to construct or emulate in real
systems. Specific examples will be given in the related work sections of Chapter 7 and
Chapter 8.
7http://xkcd.com/927/. Last access on March 28th, 2015.
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In this work, we adhere to these guidelines for enabling the creation of practical,
privacy respectful and secure by design systems through the construction of a complete
framework allowing the distribution and management of private identities and infras-
tructures suitable for many contexts, using fair anonymity as a core privacy-endorsing
component and based on currently existing technologies. A complete instantiation of
this framework is described through an e-commerce setting, which exemplifies the sub-
tle issues that need to be consideredwhen creating application-specific privacy respect-
ful systems. Moreover, to further illustrate the flexibility and practicality of our frame-
work, we apply a similar construction for defining an extension to Tor [91], the most
popular anonymizing network.
1.1 Objectives
In general lines, we aim to ease the task of creating privacy respectful but realistic
systems through the application of cryptographic primitives, using existing infrastruc-
tures as much as possible. For achieving this, we identify the following key elements:
1. An intuitive design methodology that helps extracting formal security require-
ments from informal ones, enabling their verification.
2. Facilitate the complex task of actually implementing privacy respectful systems
based cryptographic primitives for fair anonymity.
When addressed this issues, we would have eased the task of designing and imple-
menting new systems and verifying their security in an intuitive manner. With this, our
next task would be to actually create a framework for creating these systems. Specifi-
cally, in the context of privacy respectful systems, where privacy is achieved through
anonymity, we identify the following core components:
3. A means for a secure, yet usable, distribution of identities in an online scenario.
4. Flexible enough mechanisms for managing the kind of identities that would be
required in a privacy respectful settings.
Indeed, in the context of online applications, once generated the identities, we need
to be able to distribute it with security guarantees adequate to the application. Fur-
ther, managing anonymity is a complicated issue, but it is key for producing systems
suitable in the real world. With the ability of distributing and managing anonymous
identities, we attempt to:
5. Create systems that are compatible with the previous mechanisms.
Moreover, our focus will be in creating systems that are as much compatible as
possible with the current infrastructures and technologies, with the aim of facilitating
their deployment in the real world.
1.2 Outline
We first dedicate some pages for introducing related work in Chapter 2, which also
explains some important concepts and definitions that will be used afterwards. The
central chapters are distributed in three main parts.
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The first part, spanning Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 contains two components that
have been used as a base for the works presented in the subsequent parts. Specifi-
cally, in Chapter 3, we introduce the methodology that we have used for designing
protocols and systems and verifying the security properties that they aim to achieve.
Applications of this methodology to existing protocols and systems are included in
order to show its functioning. Moreover, it is also applied to the protocol in Chapter
5 and the system in Chapter 7. Rather than committing to a specific theory or tech-
nology, this methodology proposes a (cyclic) sequence of tasks to perform in order to
achieve the desired security level and properties. In Chapter 4 we outline a C library
for group signatures, providing a unified API and extensibility through the addition of
new schemes. This library has been used extensively during the subsequent chapters,
in order to implement prototypes of the protocols and systems therein proposed.
In the second part, we describe the concrete protocols designed during this thesis.
In Chapter 5 we propose a registration protocol for online systems, based on the typi-
cal email-based registration protocol [102], but improving its security properties while
keeping its usability. Moreover, the security properties of this protocol are verified us-
ing the methodology proposed in Chapter 3. This protocol is a suitable alternative for
distributing anonymous identities that may be employed in privacy respectful systems.
However, while anonymity is probably the most used means to achieve privacy, there
are (to the best of our knowledge) currently no solutions for effectively managing it. In
order to fill this gap, we propose in Chapter 6 extensions to X.509 [150] that allow per-
forming the main tasks for identity management (i.e. obtaining status information and
revoking validity) over anonymous identities, plus adding support for new features
intrinsic to them (like anonymity and unlinkability revocation).
These protocols allow an effective management of privacy through anonymous
identities inmore complex systems. In order to show it, in Part IVwe describe an online
shopping system (in Chapter 7) of independent interest, which using fair anonymity
as a core, achieves a functionality set comparable to that of existing online shopping
solutions, but having user-controlled privacy as its cornerstone. Finally, Chapter 8 pro-
poses an extension to the Tor network for shifting from its full anonymity towards a
fair anonymity model, preventing misuses of the network. Anew, this extension may
benefit from the identity distribution and management protocols and mechanisms of
previous chapters. Moreover, the cryptographic construction employed for this exten-
sion follows the same principles (based on group and blind signatures) than those used
in the system designed in Chapter 7.
Additionally, in order to show feasibility in terms of additional costs, we include
performance analysis based on initial prototypes that we have implemented for several
of our protocols and systems.
To graphically summarize what we will see in the next chapters, Figure 1.4 depicts
the relationship between the different contributions included in this thesis.
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Chapter 3
Methodology for secure design
Chapter 4
C library for group signatures
Part II
Base components
Chapter 5
SEBIA Registration protocol
Chapter 6
X.509 anonymity extensions
Base protocols
and mechanisms
Chapter 7
Caduceus: online shopping
Chapter 8
Fair Tor
Privacy respectful
systems
Part III
Part IV
Figure 1.4: Diagram of relations between the different contributions of this work.
9

CHAPTER 2
Background
In this chapter, we make a summary of general concepts for computer security and
applied cryptography systems, and define the notation used throughout this thesis.
Additionally, we introduce the main tools and building blocks used as a base for our
proposals. Namely, we introduce security verification techniques, focusing on formal
methods for automated verification that will be applied for checking the security of
our proposals. Subsequently, we introduce group and blind signatures, as well as other
important primitives that are employed as core cryptographic primitives for building
privacy respectful protocols and systems.
2.1 Security properties
Next, we give informal definitions of several important security properties which are
key for understanding and reaching secure and privacy respectful systems and proto-
cols.
While the properties within the CIA triad (Figure 2.1) are typically the base for
any security system, many times it is necessary to use more specific definitions. In
this work, we mainly refer to the properties defined below. Note however that precise
definitions of these same properties may vary depending on the source. For instance,
in [147], confidentiality and privacy are considered equivalent, and the base CIA triad
includes authenticity within integrity.
Definition 1 (Confidentiality). Means that the information will be learned only by those who
are authorized to do so.
Definition 2 (Integrity). Ensures that the information is not altered, either consciously (and
perhaps maliciously) or accidentally.
Definition 3 (Authenticity). Guarantees the legitimacy of the information. It can be fur-
ther divided in entity authentication, i.e., that an entity is who it says it is; and data origin
authentication, i.e., that the information comes from the expected source.
When dealing with privacy issues, we first find that privacy itself is a more abstract
property than the ones above, since its requirements vary depending on the specific
context. Many times it suffices with guaranteeing confidentiality of the information
being transmitted. In other contexts, leaking that Alice is talking to Bob is in itself a
privacy violation, for instance, if Alice is a victim of blackmailing and Bob is a police
agent. In that case, even if they encrypt their communications, if the blackmailer spots
them talking, Alice’s privacy would be broken. More examples have arouse in the past
11
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CIA Triad
Confidentiality Integrity
Availability
Figure 2.1: The CIA triad.
couple of years, related to massive espionage incidents. Following these guidelines, a
(possibly incomplete) definition of privacy may be:
Definition 4 (Privacy). The quality of a system or protocol ensuring that no private infor-
mation, nor information that may be processed for inferring otherwise private data, is leaked to
other parties than the intended ones.
One of the main mechanisms for creating privacy respectful systems is anonymity.
Anonymity, in turn, may be further classified in subcategories. In this subject, we will
use the following related concepts or variations from [163]:
Definition 5 (Anonymity). The state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, the
anonymity set [163].
Definition 6 (Pseudonymity). The use of pseudonyms as identifiers, mainly for authentica-
tion [163].
Pseudonymity is typically used for obtaining relaxed types of anonymity. For in-
stance, when the real identity of the participating entities must be preserved, but mes-
sages originating from the same entity may be linked between them. This leads us to
the unlinkability property:
Definition 7 (Unlinkability). The property guaranteeing that an adversary cannot do better
than random guessing for determining whether or not two or more elements are linked in some
predefined way.
When implementing these different types of anonymity, it is frequent to resort to
anonymous communication networks. That is, networks with a special configuration
that provide some type of anonymity. Concretely, the most known networks of this
type are mix networks and those based in onion routing (concepts that may be combined
too). Generally speaking, these approaches can be defined as follows.
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Definition 8 (Mix network). A mix network [63] provides anonymity for the communica-
tions routed through it by making each intermediate proxy, known as mix, shuffle randomly
all the (encrypted) packets it receives from multiple recipients. By routing the packets through
several mixes, tracing them is made harder.
Definition 9 (Onion routing). Onion routing [107] is an anonymity enhancing communi-
cation model by means of which a packet is routed through several intermediate proxies known
as onion routers. The origin encrypts each packet with the public key of each of these onion
routers, who then decrypt it upon its reception and forward it to the next router.
Finally, the use of anonymitymay create situations inwhich this protection is abused
in order to perform dishonest or even illegitimate actions1. This has led to the creation
of systems preventing this misuse, or providing fairness, which, following the guide-
lines in [132], may be defined as follows.
Definition 10 (Fairness). A system is said to be fair if it guarantees that dishonest or illegiti-
mate actions would be somehow penalized or prevented.
This property acquires importance in systems where the trusted authorities have
too much power (which occurs frequently), where fairness mechanisms may be em-
ployed to prevent abuse of power; and in anonymous systems, since its users may take
advantage of this anonymity in order to act dishonestly. Fairness may be actually re-
lated to accountability, which ensures that the entity responsible for some action would
be unavoidably held liable for it.
Certainly, there are other important principles that appear less frequently in this
thesis (or do not appear at all), like availability (of a resource or of some information),
uniqueness of information or freshness, but are also important in certain scenarios.
2.2 Notation
General notation. We use two sets of notation throughout the thesis. One for listings,
containing pseudocode and code snippets intended to facilitate the understanding of
the code and formalmodels referenced during this thesis; and another formore abstract
descriptions of processes, focusing on the cryptographic details and leaving aside the
“programmer point of view”. This notation, for general primitives such as encryption
and decryption, is summarized in Table 2.1. The notation used for more advanced
primitives, such as group and blind signatures, is introduced in Section 2.4 for the
general setting, and in Appendix B for the specific abstraction used for the automated
security analysis introduced in following sections.
Notation for cryptographic protocols. Specially in Chapter 7, we make use of ad-
vanced cryptographic protocols, such as group signatures or partially blind signatures.
These are schemes composed by protocols involving complex computations, many
times requiring the interaction of several entities. For describing these interactions,
and some of the most common operations executed within them, we use the following
specific notation.
For a set S, we let x ← S denote choosing x uniformly at random from S. For an
algorithm A, we let A(x1, . . . ; r) denote the output of A on inputs x1, . . . and random
1We discuss this subject further in Chapter 6.
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Program Abstract
Description
notation notation
senc(m,k) enck(m) Symmetric encryption of m (resp. m) with k (resp. k).
sdec(c,k) deck(c) Symmetric decryption of c (resp. c) with k (resp. k).
aenc(c,k) encpk(m) Asymmetric encryption of m (resp. m) with k (resp. pk).
adec(c,k) decsk(c) Asymmetric decryption of c (resp. c) with k (resp. sk).
sign(m,k) signsk(m) Signature of m (resp. m) with k (resp. sk).
verify(s,k) veri f ypk(s) Verification of signature s (resp. s) with k (resp. pk).
Table 2.1: General notation. The column “Program notation” shows the notation used
for pseudocode and code listings. The column “Abstract notation” shows
the notation used for abstract cryptographic descriptions. Note that for pro-
grams we use teletype font, while for abstract definitions, we use math
font. The column Description gives a brief description of each function.
coins r; in addition, y ← A(x1, . . . ; r) means choosing r uniformly at random and set-
ting y to the result of A(x1, . . . ; r). We use the notation 〈OA,OB〉 ← Pro(IC)[A(IA), B(IB)]
to describe a two-party process Pro between parties A and B, whereOA (resp. OB) is the
output to party A (resp. B), IC is the common input, and IA (resp. IB) is A’s (resp. B’s)
private input; when party B does not have output, or both parties obtain the same one,
we sometimes writeO ← Pro(IC)[A(IA), B(IB)]. Single-party processes are denoted by
O ← Pro(I), with input I and output O. For instance, a Diffie-Hellman key exchange
between entities A and B could be denoted with k ← DH(g, p)[A(rA), B(rB)], where k
is obtained by both A and B as grArB (mod p). This notation will be mostly employed
for systems with high cryptographic load, mostly in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.
Notation for sequence diagrams. Finally, throughout the chapters of this thesis we
include sequence diagrams for depicting the different high level communications pro-
tocols that are either presented here or used as examples. In this sequence diagrams,
we use the notation in Figure 2.2 for representing the different types of communication
channels.
Note that the channels depicted in Figure 2.2 are also accompanied with a literal no-
tation. This notation will also be used throughout the following chapters when giving
written descriptions on the channels employed for our protocols and systems. Specifi-
cally:
Definition 11 (Public channel (P)). A public channel, denoted with P, is an unauthenticated
(for both ends) and unencrypted channel.
Definition 12 (Confidential channel (C)). A confidential channel, denoted with C, an en-
crypted channel (we do not differentiate between the possible types of cipher).
Definition 13 (Origin/sender authenticated channel (Ao)). A channel in which the origin
(or sender) authenticate herself by some mean.
Definition 14 (Receiver authenticated channel (Ar)). A channel in which the receiver au-
thenticates herself by some mean.
Sometimes, we also use the term server authenticated channel when, independently
on who starts the communication (thus, on who is the origin/sender and who is the
14
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>
Notation: P
Unauthenticated origin and receiver
Public channel
>
Notation: Ao
Authenticated origin
Unauthenticated receiver
Public channel
>
Notation: A
Authenticated origin and receiver
Public channel
>
Notation: C
Unauthenticated origin and receiver
Confidential channel
>
Notation: AoC
Authenticated origin
Unauthenticated receiver
Confidential channel
>
Notation: AC
Authenticated origin and receiver
Confidential channel
Figure 2.2: Basic notation used for sequence diagrams.
receiver), one of the communicating entities is acting as a server. This is specially rel-
evant in practice, since it is the most frequent configuration for SSL/TLS [89] sessions.
Therefore:
Definition 15 (Server authenticated channel (AS)). In client-server communications, a chan-
nel in which the server authenticates herself.
All these channels address just one property at a time (authenticity or confiden-
tiality). However, it is also possible for them to provide more than one property. In
these cases, we combine the notations in a natural manner. For instance, a mutually
authenticated and confidential channel is denoted with AC, and a server authenticated
and confidential channel is denoted with ASC(the same combinations apply to the rep-
resentations in Figure 2.2).
This notation will be mostly used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, where we analyze
and design communication protocols.
Finally, wemany times state that, for our systems, the communications are assumed
to be routed through some anonymizing network. That is, we assume that the em-
ployed channels provide anonymity. Note that this may be achieved by employing the
previously defined mix networks or onion routing networks, such as Tor [91].
2.3 Security verification
Verifying that the required security properties are achieved is crucial when designing
protocols and systems. Therefore, suitable techniques must be applied as a core com-
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ponent of security-by-design methodologies, which are a key component in this thesis.
Focusing at the design level, there are two main subdivisions, which we call here the
computational approach and the formal approach, following the terminology used in [6].
Security models. First, and independently on the chosen approach, adopting an ap-
propriate security model is a crucial task. A main component of the security model is
the attacker model, which specifically defines what the attacker can and cannot do in the
context under analysis. Consequently, it has direct influence when it comes to prove
if the final system complies with those security requirements. This model defines the
attacker capabilities that are necessary to conduct the threat analysis [15, Chapter 11].
Depending on what can the attacker do, a designer/developer may need to protect
different resources or take one approach or another. There exist several classifications:
• An attacker can be said to be internal or external, depending on whether it is one
of the entities which take part in the protocol/system, or a third party that is not
included in it.
• An attacker can also be categorized as passive if the related attacks consist in
observing the messages and a subsequent information inference, or as active if
he/she actually inserts and/or modifies information on any communication link.
• There are local attackers only threatening a subset of an information/communica-
tion system elements, versus global attackers that can access every component of a
system [75].
• Major threats are determined by the so-called Byzantine attacker, commonly used
as reference when designing fault tolerant systems, and in the context of anony-
mous communication systems [1, p. 78]. This model considers internal attackers
behaving randomly in order to corrupt the system output [136].
The attacker model can be further refined and aligned with the formal and compu-
tational verification families by considering the attacker computing capabilities. The
Dolev-Yao attacker [93], has proven to be a very powerful abstraction when used in con-
junction with methodologies for the formal verification of protocols. It assumes an
omniscient attacker who monitors and can modify the messages sent through all com-
munications channels, but cannot break cryptographic primitives. That is, a Dolev-Yao
attacker can insert new messages into any channel, block messages sent by any entity,
etc., but she cannot decrypt or sign messages unless she learns the appropriate key. In
contrast with this attacker model, there is the computational attacker [28], which assumes
that attackers are Probabilistic Polynomial Time Turing Machines (sometimes written
PPTM or just PPT) having their computing capabilities consequently determined. This
implies that the cryptographic primitives are not assumed to be perfect and thus any
breakable primitive in a PPTM scenario is vulnerable.
Computational approach. In computational verifications, information tokens are trea-
ted as bitstrings. Both functions and security are defined using these strings, being se-
curity usually probabilistic in terms of the computational complexity needed to break
the underlying algorithms. Thus, a deep knowledge of the algorithm details, formal
security definitions, cryptographic reduction techniques and complexity theory, is re-
quired, as well as specific models compatible with this new context. Typical models are
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the standard, random oracle or ideal cipher models; usual methods for defining security
are the game-based definitions [175], or the Universal Composability framework [60] ; and
frequent reduction techniques ormethods to proof security are the hybrid argument [106,
Chapter 3, Section 2.3], game hopping [175], the constructive cryptography approach [143]
and of course, information-theoretic proofs [144]. An example of this type of analysis is
given in [22].
For instance, probably one of the most basic examples may be the Diffie-Hellman
(DH) protocol, used for negotiating symmetric keys [90], which runs as depicted in
Figure 2.3. In this protocol, all operations are done under a cyclic group G of prime
order p, generated by g. In Section 2.3.1, we will see how to model this same protocol
using the formal approach.
Alice Bob
pick random α from G
gα (mod p)
✲
pick random β from G
✛
gβ (mod p)
k = (gβ)α (mod p) k = (gα)β (mod p)
Figure 2.3: Basic DH in which Alice and Bob derive a symmetric key k. G is a cyclic
group of prime order p, generated by g.
In a typical computational verification, security of this protocol (in this case, confi-
dentiality of k) would be directly proved based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman
(CDH) assumption, which states that no PPTM attacker is able to compute gxy from g,
gx and gy when using a cyclic group as described above (plus some additional proper-
ties to make it secure). Given the CDH assumption, an attacker that is able to derive k
is also an attacker to the CDH assumption, which is believed to be secure. For instance,
more evolved versions of this protocol including password-based authentication for
the Alice and Bob are described in [29], and verified by means of game-based proofs
under the ideal cipher and random oracle models in [49].
Formal approach. This approach for security verification uses symbolic logic to create
formal models of systems and protocols. Cryptographic functions like encryption or
hashing are thus treated as functions over symbolic expressions, abstracting out the
inner details of the underlying algorithms. For instance, encryption is assumed to be
perfect (and an attacker cannot obtain the plaintext from the ciphertext, unless she
also gains knowledge of the corresponding key) and so on: this is again the Dolev-
Yao model [93] described above. An attractive point of this model is the fact that it
is easily adaptable to automated tools that allow for reasonably easy (but powerful)
verifications. Such tools are able to consider thousands of alternatives in a few seconds
and even provide soundness on their conclusions. Some of these formal tools are [17,
26, 39, 41, 74, 159]. Some of the important theories and languages in which these tools
are based are the Spi Calculus [4], BAN logic [51], equational theory [118] or inductive
definitions [160]. An specific example and more insight into this approach is given in
Section 2.3.1.
Some examples of important theories and techniques of each approach are depicted
in Figure 2.4.
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Security Verification
Design phase Development phase
Formal model Computational model
Dolev-Yao
Spi calculus
Equational theory
· · ·
Ideal cipher
Random Oracle
Game-based
· · ·
Figure 2.4: Branches of security verification theories and techniques.
2.3.1 Automated verification with ProVerif
During this work, we mostly use the tool ProVerif 2 [39] to verify the security properties
of several protocols and systems. The reason behind adopting Proverif is that it pro-
vides a computer-based (and thus automatic) approach for the verification of security
properties. Furthermore, the use of appropriate abstraction models of the protocols be-
ing verified allows to apply Proverif to analyze the information flow in order to achieve
acceptable security guarantees. However, we emphasize that there exist many other
theories and tools for security verification and, many times, rather than choosing one
among them, a combination of several would be necessary in order to obtain maximum
security.
ProVerif is an automated tool for verifying security properties of communication
protocols. More precisely, it verifies these properties over symbolic models of protocols
written in a variant of the applied pi calculus [3, 148, 149]. Upon receiving a model of
the protocol under perusal in this variation of applied pi calculus, a set of rules (named
constructors and destructors) abstracting the equational theory used to compose pro-
tocol, and a set of queries, ProVerif applies a resolution process until a point is reached
where no more clauses may be added nor removed. Internally, the received clauses are
converted into Horn Clauses [117]. Then, from these clauses, ProVerif tries to derive
the statements in the previously defined queries.
Among themain properties of ProVerif, stands out the fact that it provides soundness
and that it supports an unbounded number of protocol sessions. The former implies cer-
tainty when ProVerif says that a specific security property is satisfied for a givenmodel.
Supporting an unbounded number of protocol sessions means in practice that, for in-
stance, ProVerif may simulate the fact that the attacker launches (or forces to launch)
several copies of a given process within the protocol, concurrently. This is important
since, in that manner, not only sequential executions are taken into account, which is
precisely the case in the real world. However, ProVerif does not ensure completeness,
meaning that it may sometimes be unable to prove properties that hold.
With the help of constructors and destructors, equational theories may be defined
as abstractions of cryptographic operations. For instance, Equation 2.1 allows ProVerif
to reason about symmetric encryption and decryption. Specifically, it means that using
2Specifically, version 1.86.
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the same key k in a symmetric decryption function sdec over the result of symmetrically
encrypting with senc the message m with the same key k, yields the original message
m. Or Equation 2.2, which captures the core of the Diffie-Hellman problem, stating that
(gx)y (left-hand side of the equation) equals (gy)x (right-hand side of the equation).
Both examples are depicted with block diagrams in Figure 2.5.
sdec(senc(m, k), k) → m (2.1)
exp(exp(g, x), y) → exp(exp(g, y), x) (2.2)
senc(m, k) sdec(c, k)
k k
m c m
exp(exp(g, x), y)
gx
exp(exp(g, y), x)
gy
=
g, y g, x
Figure 2.5: Block diagram representation of symmetric encryption and decryption
equations, and the Diffie-Hellman equations in ProVerif.
Basic protocol modeling with ProVerif. The relevant parts of a protocol may thus be
represented using constructor and destructor rules. The submission and reception of
messages between the different entities of the system is represented with the primitives
out and in. These primitives receive as first argument the channel to be used for the
communication and, as second argument, the message to be transmitted which may
be, for instance, a variable, a name (constant), or the result of applying a constructor.
Additionally, in order to verify specific properties, ProVerif must be queried about
them. This implies that ProVerif applies its reasoning model to find attack traces given
the defined rule set. Among the security properties ProVerif may be asked about, we
can find secrecy queries for proving confidentiality, taking the shape attacker(x), which
may be read as “Can the attacker derive x?”. Correspondence assertion queries for prov-
ing authenticity properties, which are basically rules like eventB(· · · ) → eventA(· · · ),
meaning that each time eventB is executed, then eventA must have been executed be-
fore. By definition, events cannot be executed by the attacker in ProVerif. Therefore,
if they occur, it must have been a legitimate process who has invoked it, which makes
this a suitable technique for proving authenticity. Finally, ProVerif can also be asked
about observational equivalence, which serves to prove indistinguishability properties.
This is done by including within the code instructions such as out(network, [term1,
term2]), which roughly asks if the attacker can differentiate a protocol run in which
term1 is sent out via the network channel from one inwhich term2 is sent instead. Table
2.2 summarizes the main keywords and “constructions” used for protocol modeling in
ProVerif, giving informal descriptions of their meaning.
For instance, Figure 2.6 models the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, as depicted in
Figure 2.3, using ProVerif typed variation of pi-calculus. Note that we make use of the
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Instruction Informal description
new t:T Create a new term t of type T
A|B Run processes A and B in parallel
fun f(I1,I2):O
Define constructor function f receiving terms of
type I1 and I2 and producing a term of type O
reduc forall t1:I1, t2:I2; Define destructor d for recovering t1 as
d(f(t1,t2),t2):t1 processed by constructor f with t1 and t2
out(c,m) Send message m through channel c
in(c,m) Receive message m through channel c
let t = f(a,b) in
In what follows, process t as if it was produced
by running f with parameters a and b
attacker(x) Secrecy query: Can the attacker obtain x?
eventX(a,b) Run eventX, which depends on terms a and b
eventX(a,b) → eventY(a)
Authenticity query:
Is eventY(a) always preceeded by eventX(a,b)?
out(network, [term1, term2])
Observational equivalence query:
Can the attacker distinguish term1 from term2?
Table 2.2: Main keywords and operations for protocol modeling with ProVerif.
symmetric encryption operation as described in (2.1) and the exponentiation equations
as defined in (2.2). The convert_G_to_key function is just a special type of function
allowing to convert terms of custom type G into terms of custom type key.
In line 2 of Figure 2.6, we ask ProVerif to try to obtain (i.e., derive from the defined
set of rules) newly created msg terms. That is, we are asking whether or not secrecy
is kept for msg. However, since this is an unauthenticated version of Diffie-Hellman,
the active Dolev-Yao attacker assumed by default by ProVerif is able to impersonate
the receiver processB. In fact, the output produced by ProVerif, shown in Figure 2.7,
indicates that an attack has been found (note the A trace has been found message in
line 33). Specifically, it states that RESULT not attacker(msg) is false. This means
that the attacker does learn msg (the token queried about in line 2 of Figure 2.6). The
trace described by ProVerif basically states that the attacker receives ga, generated by
processA, and obtains gay for some random y (denoted with y_110 in Figure 2.7) cre-
ated by the attacker herself. Then, the attacker sends gy, which is received by processA,
who produces gya. Thus, when finally msg is sent encrypted under gya, the attacker can
just decrypt it and obtain the plaintext. This is basically the well-known man in the
middle attack to unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman.
ProVerif is distributed as a free tool3, and besides several publications in the lit-
erature showing the theory behind it [37–39], a comprehensive user manual is also
available [42]. Throughout this thesis, we have used the version 1.86 of the software.
3http://proverif.inria.fr.
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1 (∗ Queries ∗ )
2 query a t t a cke r (new msg ) .
3
4 l e t processA =
5 new a : exponent ;
6 out ( net , exp (g , a ) ) ;
7 in ( net , gb : G) ;
8 l e t k = convert_G_to_key ( exp ( gb , a ) ) in
9 new msg : b i t s t r i n g ;
10 out ( net , senc (msg , k ) ) .
11
12 l e t processB =
13 new b : exponent ;
14 in ( net , ga : G) ;
15 out ( net , exp (g , b ) ) ;
16 in ( net , c : b i t s t r i n g ) .
17
18 process
19 processA | processB
Figure 2.6: Diffie-Hellman key negotiation modeled with ProVerif. Types G, exponent
and key are used to define group elements, exponents and symmetric keys,
respectively.
2.3.2 Joint verification with formal and computational appÂa˛roaches
The previous examples based on the Diffie-Hellman key negotiation, while quite sim-
ple, reflect the benefits that may be obtained by applying both the computational and
formal verification approaches. In the computational case, the protocol was evaluated
as secure based on the CDH assumption. However, with the formal approach, we saw
that it is trivial for an active attacker to impersonate one of the parties, thus breaking
confidentiality. Conversely, a formal verification may dictate that a protocol is secure,
but performing a computational verification may find design flaws because, e.g., an
incorrect complexity assumption has been made.
That is, while the computational model is useful to guarantee the security of the
underlying primitives, the formal model becomes fundamental for ensuring that there
is no possible attack based on arbitrary compositions of the protocol operations. For
instance, applying the formal model is easy to check that the good practices endorsed
in [5, 16] are kept, as well as many other advanced features, assuming the Dolev-Yao
model [93] and including complex combinations of message replays, impersonations,
etc. Moreover, it can be done with the help of automated tools. Once this has been
analyzed, we can apply computational verification techniques in order to prove that
the Dolev-Yao requirements are actually met. Additionally, it is also of independent
interest the efforts to bridge both approaches [6, 126].
Considering this, a clear context in which we can take advantage of the features of
both approaches is in the design of communication protocols with strong dependence
on cryptographic systems, which is the case of this work.
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1 1 . We assume as hypothesis tha t
2 a t t a cke r ( y_110 ) .
3
4 2 . The message exp (g , a [ ] ) may be sent to the a t t a cke r a t output { 2 } .
5 a t t a cke r ( exp (g , a [ ] ) ) .
6
7 3 . By 2 , the a t t a cke r may know exp (g , a [ ] ) .
8 By 1 , the a t t a cke r may know y_110 .
9 Using the funct ion exp the a t t a cke r may obta in exp ( exp (g , y_110 ) , a [ ] ) .
10 a t t a cke r ( exp ( exp (g , y_110 ) , a [ ] ) ) .
11
12 4 . Using the funct ion g the a t t a cke r may obta in g .
13 a t t a cke r ( g ) .
14
15 5 . By 4 , the a t t a cke r may know g .
16 By 1 , the a t t a cke r may know y_110 .
17 Using the funct ion exp the a t t a cke r may obta in exp (g , y_110 ) .
18 a t t a cke r ( exp (g , y_110 ) ) .
19
20 6 . The message exp (g , y_110 ) tha t the a t t a cke r may have by 5 may be
21 rece ived at input { 3 } .
22 So the message enc (msg_115 , exp ( exp (g , y_110 ) , a [ ] ) ) may be sent to the
23 a t t a cke r a t output { 6 } .
24 a t t a cke r ( enc (msg_115 , exp ( exp (g , y_110 ) , a [ ] ) ) ) .
25
26 7 . By 6 , the a t t a cke r may know enc (msg_115 , exp ( exp (g , y_110 ) , a [ ] ) ) .
27 By 3 , the a t t a cke r may know exp ( exp (g , y_110 ) , a [ ] ) .
28 Using the funct ion dec the a t t a cke r may obta in msg_115 .
29 a t t a cke r (msg_115 ) .
30
31 [ . . ]
32
33 A trace has been found.
34 RESULT not attacker(msg[gb = v_44]) is false.
Figure 2.7: Attack trace found by ProVerif for unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman ex-
change.
2.4 Cryptographic primitives
Next, we give a high level overview of the main cryptographic primitives that we have
resorted to for implementing privacy in the the protocols and systems described Part
III and Part IV of this thesis. Probably, the most omnipresent one are group signatures,
for which we also provide an open source library in Chapter 4. However, we also
make use of other schemes, like partially blind signatures, zero-knowledge proofs, and
commitments.
2.4.1 Group signatures
As stated, group signatures are a cryptographic primitive that takes a central role for
ensuring privacy in the systems we propose. Group signatures, first described in [65],
are like conventional digital signatures in that they are used to prove that the owner
of a specific secret has been the source of some information. However, unlike their
conventional counterpart, group signatures hide this owner among a set (group) of
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possible owners, hence providing anonymity.
Around this central property, several variations of group signatures have been pro-
posed, enabling additional features. For instance, typically, there is a Group Manager,
who controls some secret information that allows him to revoke this anonymity, and
fetch the identity of the issuer of a group signature (this is called opening a group sig-
nature). But there also exist schemes, like ring signatures [170], that provide uncon-
ditional anonymity, meaning that the open functionality cannot be performed. Other
schemes, like the ones proposed in [67, 132], add an extra trapdoor besides the one
used for opening group signatures so that an authority (either the Group Manager or
some subsidiary authority) is able to link signatures made by the same group member,
but instead of using his/her identity, a tracing trapdoor used solely for this task. This is
called tracing, and this type of signatures are consequently named traceable signatures.
[132] also adds the functionality to claim, in zero-knowledge, having issued a specific
group signature. Even though the term is not used in the original paper, we could
name variations supporting this functionality claimable group signatures. In [32], the
trust placed in the Group Manager is divided across several authorities, which need to
combine their secrets in order to be able to open some group signature. The authors
call the result fair signatures or, rather, fair traceable signatures, since their proposal is
based on traceable signatures (and also supports tracing). Besides these extensions to
their functionality, their efficiency has also been refined. A detailed overview of the
evolution of the computational and communication costs of the different schemes of
group signatures is available at [137, Sec. 1.1].
According to the previous introduction to group signatures, for different schemes
the different operations may imply subtle differences, e.g., in the way they are per-
formed or their implications with respect to the privacy of the group members; or they
may just implement a subset of the mentioned functionality. However, it is possible to
abstract the functionality from the study of the main primitives. In Figure 2.8 we sketch
an abstraction of all the operations provided by group signatures, mostly matching the
ones described in [132] that we will use hereafter. Each operation is described as fol-
lows:
Setup. Generates and initializes the group and manager keys for any arbitrary group.
All operations below are always related to a group initialized with this operation.
This operation is denoted with:
(pkG, skG) ← GS.Setup(1k). Creates group public key pkG and private Group
Manager key skG for group G.
Join. The process by means of which new members join the group. It is typically di-
vided in a phase run by the newmember, who obtains a member key, and a phase
run by the groupmanager, who updates the GroupMembership List (GML). This
operation is denoted with:
〈mki, ℓ′〉 ← GS.Join(pkG)[M(si),GM(ℓ, skG)]. Allows member M provid-
ing secret si to join group G, generating the private member key mki and
updating the Group Membership List ℓ to ℓ′.
Sign. The process of issuing a group signature. This operation is denoted with:
̺← GS.Signmki(msg,mki). Issues a group signature ̺ onmsg usingmember
key mki.
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Verify. The process for verifying a group signature. This operation is denoted with:
GS.VerifypkG(̺,msg). Verifies whether ̺ is a valid group signature on msg
and group G.
Claim. The process for claiming ownership of a group signature. This operation is
denoted with:
π ← GS.Claimmki(̺). Allows amember of groupG to create a (zero-knowledge)
claim π of the ownership of ̺.
• Equality proving. The process bymeans of which the issuer of a set of group
signatures proves that she has issued all the signatures within the set. This
may be seen as a generalization of the claiming process, and is specially
interesting in schemes allowing zero-knowledge claims, like [67, 132]. The
notation for this generalization is shown in Section 2.4.3.
Claim Verify. The process of verifying a claim of a group signature. This operation is
denoted with:
GS.ClaimVerifypkG(π, ̺). Verifies if π is a valid claim over ̺.
• Verification of equality. The verification counterpart for equality proving.
The notation for this generalization is shown in Section 2.4.3.
Open. Used for extracting the identity of the issuer of a specific group signature. This
operation is denoted with:
i ← GS.OpenskG(̺). Opens group signature ̺, returning the identity i of the
member of G who issued it.
Reveal. Employed for extracting the tracing trapdoor of a group member.
t ← GS.RevealskG(̺, ℓ, r). Using the Group Membership List ℓ and the
group manager key skG, produces the tracing trapdoor t associated with the
issuer of ̺. If required, t may be added to a revocation list r.
Trace. Checks whether a group signature has been issued by a group member who has
been somehow revoked, e.g., included in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
0/1 ← GS.Trace(̺, r). Using the Revocation List r outputs whether the
member key of the issuer of ̺ has been revoked (1) or not (0).
2.4.2 Partially blind signatures
Blind signatureswhere introduced by Chaum in [64]. Basically, a blind signature scheme
allows a userU to obtain a signature from a signer S over any arbitrary message m, but
without S learning anything about m. This idea has been used since then for creating
privacy respectful systems, like e-cash based e-commerce. However, since the signer
does not learn any information about the message, systems based on them can easily
be abused. For solving this issue, fair blind signatures were proposed in [176]. In this
variant, an authority has privileged information allowing the signer to link message
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(a) Setup.
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ℓ r
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Figure 2.8: Main operations in group signatures. Incoming arrows depict inputs and
outgoing arrows depict outputs.
and signature pairs. Restrictive blind signatures [47] allow issuing blind signatures, but
only choosing among messages that comply certain rules. Finally, an also important
alternative is given by partially blind signatures [7]. In a partially blind signature the
messages are divided in two parts: a common message to which the S has complete ac-
cess; and the blinded message, of which S does not learn anything. Thus, the common
message may be employed to implement misuse prevention mechanisms. As always,
several schemes have appeared improving the overall efficiency, reducing the size of
the final signatures, or based on different number theory problems [43, 66, 129, 156].
In general, a partially blind signature scheme supports the following operations
(note that a blind signature may be seen just a special case of a partially blind signature,
where no common message is sent):
Setup. Creates the signer’s public and private keys. This is denoted with:
(pkS, skS) ← PBS.KeyGen(1k). Creates a public key pkS and a private key skS
for issuing partially blind signatures.
Blind. The user creates a blinded version of the message to be signed (the blinded
message). The public key of the signer is required for this action. This is denoted
with:
(m˜,π) ← PBS.Blind(m, r). Run by a user U, it blinds the message m using
a secret value r. It produces the blinded message m˜ and a correctness proof
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π of the produced blinded message.
Sign. Upon receiving the blinded and common messages, the signer runs any neces-
sary verification and creates a blinded signature using its private key. This is
denoted with:
˜̺ ← PBS.SignskS(cm, m˜,π). Signer S verifies proof π and issues a partially
blind signature ˜̺ on (cm, m˜), where cm is the common message.
Unblind. The user receives the blinded signature and unblinds it, probably using some
random secret value generated during the blind process. The result of this oper-
ation is the final signature. This is denoted with:
̺ ← PBS.UnblindpkS( ˜̺, m˜, r). Run by the user U, who verifies ˜̺ and then
uses the secret value r to produce a final partially blind signature ̺.
Verify. Any entity runs this operation to verify the signature. For this, it is necessary
the common and blinded messages, and the public key of the signer. This is
denoted with:
PBS.VerifypkS(̺, cm,m). Verifies if ̺ is a valid partially blind signature on
(cm,m).
2.4.3 Additional primitives
There are also other cryptographic primitives that are typically used as the core of cryp-
tographic protocols and systems for the fair management of privacy. Specifically, we
make use of commitments and zero-knowledge proofs.
Definition 16 (Commitment). Commitments [48] allow entities to commit to some value
such that they may operate with it without revealing it until it is required, but being able to
prove that they have not modified the value (i.e., they have been committed to it).
For instance, given a cyclic multiplicative group of order p, with generator g, send-
ing c = gx is a commitment to x and subsequently revealing x proves the commitment
(revealing x is called decommit). If hiding any information about x that may be learned
from the commitment is necessary, then c = gxhr may be used instead, where h is an-
other generator of the group, and r is a random value. This is an example of a Pedersen
commitment [161]. Commitments will be denoted with comm ← Com(m; rm), where
comm denotes a commitment to a message m in which the sender uses uniform random
coins rm; the sender can open the commitment by sending (m, rm) to the receiver.
Definition 17 (Zero-knowledge proofs and Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge). Zero-
knowledge proofs [108] allow an entity A to prove to another entity B that certain statement
is true, but without revealing any other information than the truth of the statement. Of partic-
ular interest for privacy systems are zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, i.e., A proving
to B that she knows something, but without revealing it (for instance, proving knowledge of a
password).
Figure 2.9, from Wikipedia 4, depicts the concept of a zero-knowledge proof as ex-
plained in [166]. Alice wants to prove to Bob that she knows the password for opening
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge_proof. Image uploaded by user Dake. Last ac-
cess, March 29th, 2015.
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the secret passage connecting the tunnels in a cave. Alice enters in the cave, randomly
choosing which branch to follow. Bob then shouts which exit he wants her to take,
and sees whether she is able to come out correctly or not. After Alice succeeds in n
attempts (with certainty increasing with n), Bob will be convinced that Alice knows the
password, but without learning it.
(a) The prover chooses ran-
domly the input path.
(b) The verifier chooses ran-
domly the exit path.
(c) The prover returns. Af-
ter repeating the exper-
iment n times, the ver-
ifier will be convinced
that the prover knows
the password.
Figure 2.9: Pedagogical example of zero-knowledge proofs. Source: Wikipedia4.
We use π ← ShowZK(x;w) and VerifyZK(x,π) to refer to creating non-interactive
proof π showing that the statement x is in the language (which will be determined by
the context) with the witness w, and to verifying the statement x based on the proof π.
Specifically, as stated in Section 2.4.1, we use zero-knowledge proofs for showing that
multiple group signatures have been issued by the same group member. This would
be denoted with π ← ShowZK(̺1, ..., ̺n,mki), and the corresponding verification with
VerifyZK(̺1, ..., ̺n,π).
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Base components
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In this second part, we describe two important components that have been em-
ployed for designing and implementing the protocols and systems in Parts III and IV.
Specifically, Chapter 3 describes a design methodology including the general verifi-
cation principles described in Section 2.3 within a design lifecycle for protocols and
systems, aimed to ease the task of creating secure designs. In Chapter 4, we describe
an open source, easily extensible, C library for group signatures that has been imple-
mented with the aim of easing the use of this powerful primitive in privacy respectul
systems. As such, it has been integrated as a core component in the prototypes imple-
mented for evaluating the efficiency of the proposals in Parts III and IV.
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CHAPTER 3
A methodology for designing secure
protocols and systems
Chapter based on and supported by references [22, 82, 83].
Security vulnerabilities have a severe impact on computer and communications
systems and the companies maintaining them. In our society, many critical compo-
nents (some known as critical infrastructures after our dependence on the services they
provide) depend on information and communications security, and are put at risk if
their components are not properly secured: energy infrastructures, health care systems,
military communications, banking transactions, etc. For users, and independently on
what security property is weakened or broken (e.g. confidentiality, authenticity, in-
tegrity or availability), the result many times reduces to a threat to their privacy. But,
as pointed out in [8], privacy compromises may also yield important economic losses
for the companies (or data holders, as called in [8]).
In [105], the authors analyze the financial effects of software vulnerabilities, and
propose an alternativemethodology to the CommonVulnerability Scoring System (CVSS1)
in order to take this factor into account when evaluating the urgency to solve bugs.
They produce an estimation of the average response costs, depending on the severity
class of the vulnerability. Their estimations are partially reproduced in Table 3.1.
Severity class Average response costs (EUR)
Low 700
Medium 1.5K
High 3K
Critical 7.5K
Table 3.1: Average response costs. From [105].
The above mentioned costs mostly correspond to implementation problems. These
issues are almost always solvable, despite the additional costs. On the other hand,
design-level errors, which are the focus of this chapter, are usually harder to address.
Specifically, a design flaw requires modifications in the system’s design, which may
not be applicable if the system is already deployed. Thus, a design error leaves just
two bad choices: either do not fix it and assume the related security risks; or fix it and
1http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-guide.html. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
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probably assume enormous costs (in economic and re-deployment terms). Examples
of important design errors are present in the WEP Shared Key Authentication protocol
[119], which allowed passive attackers to circumvent authentication in wireless net-
works (more on this in Section 3.3.2) and was one of many factors leading to a depre-
cation of WEP; the Bitcoin malleability issue2 which allowed flawed implementations
to accept transactions that could later be invalidated despite being fundamentally cor-
rect, e.g. allegedly causing the closure of Mt. Gox3, one of the most important Bitcoin
exchangers; or the Email Based Identification and Authentication (EBIA) [102] which
ignores the fact that conventional email messages use insecure communication chan-
nels and thus are not suitable, by themselves, to guarantee a secure authentication.
Still, even simple design errors are present in many wide-spread systems. This may
be due to yet extended ignorance on security-aware design methodologies, or in the
unsuitability of the already existing ones. Therefore, applying a comprehensive proce-
dure that helps to avoid design flaws is necessary. Actually, this should always be kept
in mind when designing a new system or protocol and is what the security-by-design
endorses through the introduction of security verification techniques as a core compo-
nent of the design process, instead of just an optional step at its end. In this chapter,
we present a methodology for analyzing whether the security properties of newly de-
signed protocols and systems are met. The proposed methodology analyzes the given
system or protocol in an iterative manner and with increasing complexity as the analy-
sis goes on. If design flaws are found, feedback is obtained for knowing which specific
part(s) is (are) involved. Additionally, it gives guidelines for the formalization of the
properties important for security, therefore easing any necessary formal verification by
means of any existing theory or tool. This is also important, since despite the fact that
many tools and theories exist for performing formal security verification and proofs,
sometimes it is not clear what properties should be checked at a high level.
2https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction_Malleability. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mt._Gox#February_2014_shutdown_and_bankruptcy. Last access
on March 31st, 2015.
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3.1 Related work
There exists plenty of previous work in the subject of security verification and proofs
of security of systems and protocols, and many classifications could be made. In this
section, we summarize some of the existing work, at a very high level, starting with
the point of the in which this verification can be made and following with the different
techniques that may be applied.
Concerning the moment in which verification techniques are applied, there are two
main types of frameworks aimed to the task of creating secure systems and protocols:
frameworks applied at the design phase [2, 115, 130, 142, 174] and frameworks applied
at the development phase [34, 178]. On this point it is highly relevant the effort in [14] to
bridge both frameworks. In that work the authors propose a method to design security
protocols, to verify the underlying security properties, and to derive in a automatic
way Python and/or C++ implementations of the corresponding systems.
Frameworks applied at the development phase are used, for instance, for checking
specific code implemented in concrete programming languages [11, 12, 30, 34, 61, 111,
134, 146]. For this task, there also exist many industry tools, like Coverity4, HP Fortify5,
IBM AppScan6, Klockwork7, Parasoft8 or Veracode SAST products9. Other tools allow
verifying runtime errors and test the security of the produced applications by observ-
ing their behavior (this is called dynamic analysis) and interacting with them. Some
of the previous tools also allow this behavior. Among this last type we may find tools
like Veracode’s DAST products, vulnerability testing frameworks like Metasploit10, or
the so called fuzzy testing tools, like Codenomicon11 or Peach12. Obviously, all these
tools are essential for creating secure and quality software products. However, they are
inescapably linked to the underlying technology.
In the field of design-level verification theories and techniques, a summarized re-
view of them was made at Section 2.3. In this case, one of their disadvantages is that,
while obtaining a design that is secure for the desired purpose, implementation errors
may still occur. Thus, the combination of both frameworks is necessary. In addition,
as mentioned in Section 2.3, sometimes it is hard to translate a set of informal secu-
rity requirements into formal ones. For instance, taking into account the security risks
that may be posed by some external and probably hard to foresee facts is many times
ignored.
There are plenty of tools applied to the automatic verification of security properties.
In Figure 3.1, we show a summary of the such tools according to our taxonomy (tools
focused on the systems design phase versus tools dealingwith the development phase).
In the specific area of the verification of protocols design, it is hard to determine
the security requirements of each specific component. For instance, looking into the
STRIDE methodology [115, 174], it sets general threats (specifically: spoofing, tam-
pering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privi-
lege) and associates security properties to each of them (authentication, integrity, non-
4www.coverity.com. Accessed on December 25th, 2014.
5www.fortify.com. Accessed on December 25th, 2014.
6www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/appscan. Accessed on December 25th, 2014.
7www.klocwork.com. Accessed on December 25th, 2014.
8www.parasoft.com. Accessed on December 25th, 2014.
9www.veracode.com. Accessed on December 25th, 2014.
10www.metasploit.com. Accessed on December 25th, 2014.
11www.codenomicon.com. Accessed on December 25th, 2014.
12www.peachfuzzer.com. Accessed on December 25th, 2014.
35
CHAPTER 3: A METHODOLOGY FOR DESIGNING SECURE PROTOCOLS AND SYSTEMS
Secure systems
and protocols
Design
phase
Formal
model
Avispa
Dolev-Yao
Isabelle
Pi calculus
ProVerif
Computational
model
Game-based
Hybrid proofs
Ideal/Real world
Universal composability
Development
phase
Static
analysis
Coverity
Klockwork
Dynamic
analysis
Metasploit
Peach
Static and
dynamic
analysis
AppScan
Codenomicon
Fortify
Parasoft
Veracode
Figure 3.1: Frameworks and tools for secure design and development.
repudiation, confidentiality, availability and authorization). Then, during the design
phase, if it is found that a certain resource may be affected by a threat, STRIDE advises
to apply specific procedures like encryption or hashing (depending on the threat, of
course). However, just applying cryptographic primitives may not guarantee the de-
fined security requirements. Certainly, we have to bear in mind that systems security
is an overall properity that is affected by additional aspects as the timing of crypto-
graphic tokens or the procedures to generate and distribute such tokens. On the other
hand, methodologies and tools like [14, 130] provide detailed guidelines or means on
how to model cryptography into final protocols or systems, and verify the security
requirements. Nevertheless, these tools deal with the application or abstractions of
cryptographic primitives, which calls for a formal definition of the protocols from the
very beginning of the security analysis. Consequently, too much effort is demanded
even to detect the more simple flaws.
With themethodology described next, we attempt to ease this task of producing for-
mal security requirements from informal ones, also taking into account elements that
may imply threats to the security of the system, while not being part of it. The method-
ology begins with an initial informal verification approach, that reduces the costs of
identifying trivial flaws, while improving the overall knowledge about the protocol or
system under analysis. Moreover, it is not intended to substitute any existing frame-
work or tool for the verification of security properties, but to complement it. Indeed, it
is aimed at allowing an easier and less costly transition from an informal definition and
verification of security systems/protocols to their formal definition and verification.
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3.2 A methodology for designing secure protocols
In this section, we describe an adaptive and recursive process for designing secure
information protocols. This methodology is built upon evaluation tools for verifying
the achievement of the defined goals, based on predefined and detailed attacker and
communication channel models. Any threat or flaw identified at any point is handled
as feedback to further improve the system design or implementation in subsequent
iterations of the methodology. Moreover, the methodology is divided in two main
stages of increasing complexity. This twofold methodology enables the detection of
simple flaws with less effort, proceeding to more consuming tasks only when (most
probably) just complex flaws may be present.
The first stage of themethodology comprises a context andmodel definition, and an
informal verification of an initial design. If this initial analysis is passed, the method-
ology then proceeds with a procedural analysis13, which may either follow the formal
or the computational approaches. During this work, we mostly make use of the for-
mal approach. However, we emphasize that the computational approach is perfectly
compatible with the methodology.
We first give some insight on the main aspects of the methodology, and subse-
quently proceed to define the steps that compose it. A former version of this methodol-
ogywas completely described in [79, 82]. In what follows, we describe themain aspects
that our methodology takes into account.
3.2.1 Context analysis
Defining what can and cannot attackers do within our systems, the assumptions that
we make concerning the entities that take part in it, and the communication channels
used to exchange information between them, are essential for producing realistic de-
signs. Otherwise, any conclusion reached through either formal or informal analysis
will not successfully adapt to the scenario in which our system will run.
Attacker capabilities. Typically, in security proofs, only general attacker capabilities
are taken into account. For instance “the attacker has PPT-like computational power”
or “the attacker may use an encryption oracle”. However, there are other capabilities
that need to be taken into account during the design, in order to create realistic proto-
cols. For example, which information tokens can be easily accessible to an attacker by
alternative means, like Facebook pages or public databases, or the fact that an active
attacker may easily find the information required to impersonate an arbitrary user dur-
ing a signup process (e.g., through social engineering techniques). While these details
are probably too fine-grained for them to be considered in the abstractions of cryp-
tosystems used for security proofs, the effects that they could have on the security of
the final system may be devastating. Yet, they can already be detected and considered
at the design stage. Consequently, our proposal includes a finer control on the attacker
capabilities during the design of the protocol, and sets explicit control points that pro-
vide feedback when security errors are found, easing their correction in subsequent
iterations. Also, our proposal supports the application of procedural (either formal
or computational) verification methods to reach the highest assurance levels of other
methodologies.
13We use the term procedural analysis to avoid confusion with the formal approach for security verifica-
tion, although, when it is clear from the context, we may use formal analysis instead.
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Entities assumptions. In the same way that modeling the attacker capabilities is a
necessary task, specifying the expected behavior of each entity taking part in the pro-
tocol is also mandatory. That is, it is needed to state whether we expect all entities to
behave honestly, semi-honestly or dishonestly. Specifically:
Definition 18 (Honest entity). A honest entity is one that follows the protocol without
performing any action that is outside the “rules” specified within it, and does not leak any
information to the attacker
Definition 19 (Semi-honest entity). A semi-honest entity, while follows the protocol and
does not leak any information to the attacker either, will try to learn anything it can from the
received information.
For instance, a mail provider considered as a semi-honest entity may be assumed
not to share the contents of the emails it manages (and to follow the protocol of send-
ing/receiving emails), but use it for business/marketing intelligence techniques in or-
der to increase its benefits offering targeted advertising.
Definition 20 (Dishonest entity). A dishonest entity tries to subvert the protocol and is
assumed to share all its information with the attacker (hence, it may be considered as part of the
attacker).
Communication channels abstraction. Communication channels also play a key role
in secure protocols. Therefore, they must be considered during the design stage. For
instance, common sense dictates that if you have a piece of information that needs to
be authenticated, you either have to send it through a channel guaranteeing authentic-
ity, or you have to use a Message Authentication Code (MAC) or equivalent function
to transmit it over an insecure channel. This is a verification simple enough to be per-
formed by hand in many cases, but still can help detect common flaws. Moreover, by
getting rid of these simple flaws at the beginning of the design process, subsequent
phases may focus on the analysis of more complex issues. In the proposed methodol-
ogy, this preliminary analysis is done during the first half of the design process.
3.2.2 Verification
As we have discussed in Section 3.1, the formal approach for the verification of cryp-
tographic systems is prone to be included in automated tools. Even though there are
many of those tools, in our studies we havemainly applied ProVerif (see Section 2.3.1)14
[39]. Therefore, most of what we explain below concerning the analysis of real proto-
cols is focused on the application of ProVerif. However, we emphasize that any other
tool may be equally applied in stead of ProVerif.
Finally, our methodology is compatible with any computational approach verifica-
tion. Even though we find that automated proofs in the formal model are usually more
engineer-friendly, and thus may bemore suitable for a first procedural analysis, the com-
putational variant certainly increases the security guarantees by further endorsing the
obtained results. Moreover, computational analysis complements the formal one with
additional considerations that are otherwise not taken into account, like the hardness
of executing specific attacks. Specially, those that take advantage of the algebraic prop-
erties of the underlying cryptosystems.
14http://proverif.inria.fr/ (accessed April 23rd, 2014)
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With all this taken into account, our methodology, when applied in its totality,
would provide the assurance level PAL3 (PAL stands for Protocol Assurance Level) as
defined in [142] (and even the PAL4 level, qualification therein suggested for protocols
also verified in the computational model).
With these considerations, we say that a design flaw occurs when any security prop-
erty required to a given protocol under analysis, as stated in the protocol goals, cannot
be satisfied given the defined security context derived from the attacker capabilities,
communication channels abstraction, entities assumptions and protocol candidate.
3.2.3 Description of the methodology
The proposed methodology is divided in two main phases. The first one initiates an in-
formal definition of the security model, attacker capabilities, communication channels
abstraction and protocol, including a manual verification. The second phase formal-
izes the previous informal definitions, and proceeds with a formal verification. These
two phases are executed iteratively, until no flaw is detected. By making a division
in the mentioned stages and applying an iterative flow, we allow for easier problems
to be detected with less effort and in the early steps, thus saving costs in the process
(a simple flaw going unnoticed until an advanced verification stage incurs in higher
costs than in the case of being detected earlier, just because the time lost during the ad-
vanced verification). Themethodology steps are depicted in Figure 3.2, and are defined
as follows.
1. Protocol goals
2. Security model
Attacker capabilities
3. Design candidate
Entities assumptions
Channels abstraction
4. Informal
requirements
5. Informal
verification
6. Pseudocode 7. Formalization
8. Procedural
verification
END
Informal stage
Formal stage
OK
Error
OK
Error
Coding
error
Design
error
Figure 3.2: Proposed methodology for designing secure protocols. First, it runs an
initial informal verification, setting the goals and requirements. Secondly,
it formally verifies the security requirements.
Phase I: Analysis of security context and informal verification. This first part is
mainly intended to avoid incongruences related to security requirements that are un-
39
CHAPTER 3: A METHODOLOGY FOR DESIGNING SECURE PROTOCOLS AND SYSTEMS
achievable or inappropriate for some reason. It also allows us to perform several in-
formal checks to our first design candidates, and improves our understanding of the
protocol. This part is depicted in the first phase of Figure 3.2. Namely, here we face the
following matters:
Step 1. Goals of the protocol. Within this step we have to create an informal specifi-
cation of what we intend to achieve with our protocol, something like “Complete
certainty that the person being registered in our website is who he/she says he/she is”.
This step might seem too basic to be needed, but specifying the security expecta-
tions for the protocol will help to improve its understanding and will be useful
for the third and fourth steps.
Step 2. Attacker capabilities and security model. This step is essential, because de-
pending on the capabilities the attacker has, some security requirements might
or might not be attainable. Moreover, the type of attacker we choose will de-
termine what tools or methods we are going to need in the next steps. First we
have to take into account all the different general capabilities that our attackers will
have. We have to determine whether we are only worried about internal/exter-
nal attackers, Dolev-Yao/computational models, etc. Once we have established
these general capabilities, we have to add or remove any finer level capability
that may influence in the system. As a result, with this step we will get a speci-
fication of the attacker model, e.g. the Dolev-Yao or computational model, along
with a list of specific capabilities added or subtracted to it, like “Knows the home
address of everyone that may be involved in the protocol” or “Cannot eavesdrop wired
communications”. Henceforth, we will refer to this list as the “+/- capabilities” list.
Finally, note that in case we are not in the first iteration of the methodology, the
output of both steps 5 and 8may be used as input to this step. Indeed, verification
failuresmight cause us to reconsider the attackermodel, in case it was not realistic
(either too optimistic or too pessimistic).
Step 3. Design candidate, Entities assumptions and channels abstraction. Oncewe have
pointed out the goals of our protocol, the attacker capabilities and security model
we adopt, we can cast a design candidate. A sequence diagram or a description
using the informally known as security protocol notation15 may be suitable alterna-
tives.
At this point, we also need to consider here what do we expect from the entities
that will take part in the protocol. That is, which entities will always behave
honestly, semi-honestly or dishonestly. This will affect the security measures that
need to be taken in order to prevent attacks on our model.
We also produce here a detailed list of the communication channels that our de-
sign candidate makes use of (for instance, following the definitions given in Sec-
tion 2.2). That is, for each of them, we have to specify the security properties it
provides, and howdoes it provide them. Of course, using a hypothetical perfectly
secure channel would trivially give place to a perfectly secure protocol. However,
the optimal choice is almost always to place the less restrictive requirements on
the employed channels.
15http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_protocol_notation. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
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Like in step 2, for iterations of the methodology other than the first, we should
consider here the informal or formal requirements that failed in the previous it-
eration, in order to propose a solution to the encountered problems.
Step 4. Informal requirements. This step of the methodology is the first part of an in-
formal verification procedure. Before undertaking the time consuming formal
verification task, it is worth making a simpler manual verification in order to
detect simple mistakes. For that purpose, we analyze the design candidate thor-
oughly (but manually) by assigning informal requirements to each component of
the sequence diagram obtained in the previous step. Note that we use the term
informal requirement since the evaluation produced at this stage is also informal.
The procedure is as follows: for each step of the sequence diagramwe note down
the informal requirements we expect from each of its elements to keep. If within
a specific step we apply some function to merge/disassemble several elements,
we may have to require additional informal requirements (e.g., a message contain-
ing the a priori unauthenticated elements x1, x2 along with MACK(x1, x2) can be
considered authenticated by the holder of a key K, if the MAC verification suc-
ceeds provided that the key K is trusted)16. Since the properties we require from a
specific element may change through the protocol, we will revise them for every
step, even if the element has already been processed previously. This process is
summarized in Algorithm 3.3. For instance, we may use as requirements: Au-
thenticity, Confidentiality, Integrity, Uniqueness, or None (when an item does not
require any specific informal requirement).
Data: The sequence diagram of the protocol.
Result: A set of informal requirements for each protocol step.
for s = first step; until s = last step do
for e = first element until e = last element of step s do
Set reqs[s][e];
end
reqs[s] += Additional informal requirements for step s;
end
Figure 3.3: Algorithm for assigning requirements to protocol elements and messages.
With elements we refer to any component calculated or sent within each
specific step.
Therefore, as output of this step we get a list of informal requirements. Optionally,
this list can be depicted jointlywith the sequence diagram to create a requirement-
tagged sequence diagram of our protocol design candidate.
Besides, we also have to decide in this step which verification tool or process we
will apply in the second phase. Now that we know our specific informal require-
ments, we can choose an appropriated tool (depending on the security properties
we want to verify).
Again, if this is not the first iteration of the methodology, we would be required
16Typically, this kind of rules are formally specified inside formal verification tools (e.g., Cryptyc [17]
is based in type deduction rules). However, since this step is intended to be a preliminary informal ap-
proach, common sense and experience are enough.
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to reconsider the points in the design where our (informal or formal) model of
the protocol failed.
Step 5. Informal verification. Nowwe have to process the +/- capabilities list and secu-
rity model produced at step 2, the design candidate and communication channels
abstraction obtained at step 3 and the informal requirements of step 4. If any of the
informal requirements enters in conflict with any of the capabilities we granted
to the attacker, and the channel used to transmit the element that has that re-
quirement does not provide that security property either, then we have a security
failure and we need to redesign our protocol. Specially, if for a given message
exchange, any of the involved tokens has an informal requirement that cannot be
met given the corresponding channel abstraction and attacker capabilities, there
is a security flaw and it is necessary to go back to the initial steps and fix it. Oth-
erwise, we have informally verified the design candidate and we can continue.
However, this does not guarantee that the design will also pass the next phase of
the methodology. In case we find a failure, we will feed back a list of informal
requirements that have failed, in order to reconsider them in the next iteration of
the methodology.
After applying our methodology up to this point, and assuming we passed the step
5, we would have reached the assurance level PAL1 defined in [142].
Phase II: Procedural verification of security. This part of the methodology is devoted
to the procedural verification of the security requirements established before. It is de-
picted in the second phase of Figure 3.2. With procedural verification we refer to the
fact that widely approved theories, methods or procedures should be applied here.
Again, we can apply either the formal or the computational model. Nevertheless, we
have found that the application of automatic (formal) tools (like ProVerif [39], Cryptyc
[17], etc.) allows to detect many flaws with little effort, so it may be a good choice to
first apply formal methods, and then use the computational model for a more concrete
evaluation. Therefore, the steps we have included in this phase are as follows:
Step 6. Protocol pseudocode. In the same way that writing pseudocode is useful be-
fore coding a program, writing an informal narration of a protocol in the shape
of pseudocode helps to reach a higher concretion level before properly formal-
izing it. As output of this step we get a written representation of the sequence
diagram, with one process for each principal, which depicts the internal compu-
tations performed by each of them to generate the messages components along
with the messages sent to the other principals.
Note that coding errors detected in step 8 might cause to come back to this step
and modify the protocol’s pseudocode (which will in turn induce changes in the
code produced in the next steps).
Step 7. Formalization of the protocol. From the protocol pseudocode it is typically
easy to produce a formalization in the language or definition model required by
the chosen tools for verifying the protocol (the ones we decided to use in step
4). This formalization must include the entities taking part in the protocol, the
communication channels and the attacker capabilities. Specially, two important
aspects are worth to be emphasized in order to produce a reliable formal model.
First, the channels that are employed in the model must be consistent with the
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abstraction given in step 3. Second, the attacker and participating entities must
also follow the assumptions made in steps 2 and 3, respectively. More concretely,
if some entity is expected to behave dishonestly, it is necessary to model the at-
tacker as if it would be able to act as/control that entity during the protocol. This
may be simulated by a side-channel that leaks to the attacker all the private in-
formation known to the dishonest entity.
Step 8. Procedural verification. Using the formalization obtained in the previous step,
we use it as input for the chosen procedural verification model or tool. Addi-
tionally, depending on the tool that we have chosen, we will need to determine
which verifications we want to perform. For this purpose, we use the informal
requirements produced at step 4. Specifically, in Algorithm 3.3 for each e subindex
within the variable req we look for the last sub-step in which it appears (the one
with greater s subindex). The value in req[s][e] contains the formal security prop-
erties that we need to verify for the protocol element e (note that there may be
elements with no requirements). Additionally, if the verification tool supports it,
we can convert the informal requirements that are required to each element when it
first appears in the req variable as a condition that needs to be ensured when that
element is created in our formalization of the protocol. Note that even though the
specific tool we use may not support this type of check, the system designers can
always forward this requirements to the development team. That is, if the devel-
opment team receives a requirement for an element t stating that it needs to be
random and authenticated, they will easily deduce that they need to fetch it from
a randomness source and digitally sign it. The process for obtaining the formal
security requirements to be verified in this last step is shown in Algorithm 3.4.
The properties required to each element when it is created can be obtained us-
ing a similar algorithm, but going through the informal requirements in increasing
order.
Data: The informal requirements of Step 4.
Result: Formal security requirements.
forall the e in reqs do
sreqs[e] = NULL;
s = last step;
while s >= first step AND sreqs[e] == NULL do
if reqs[s][e] not empty then
sreqs[e] = reqs[s][e];
else
s = s - 1;
end
end
end
Figure 3.4: Algorithm for assigning the final security requirements to be verified dur-
ing the formal verification of the protocol. An entry to NULL in sreqs
means that the corresponding element does not have any security require-
ment.
Finally, if the tools or procedures followed in this step “output” that all require-
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ments are fulfilled, we can conclude. Otherwise, we have to go back to the first
step and correct errors in our design, checking also for errors in the formalization.
Like with the informal verification, if we find a security failure, we will feed back
a list of the security properties that have failed, in order to reconsider them in the
next iteration of the methodology.
Note that if a failure is detected during the first phase of the methodology, all the
related information is fed back to be adequately treated in the first stage of the next
iteration. However, when the failure is due to a coding error in the protocol formaliza-
tion, the protocol designer would need to go back to the 6th step and revise the code
without affecting the previous steps of the methodology.
As final comments on themethodology, wemust point out that, by itself, themethod-
ology does not give as output an explicit measure of security of the analyzed protocol
other than checking whether the specified security requirements are held. That will de-
pend on the tools or the models used to verify the protocol. In any case, we will obtain
an answer to whether or not the protocol meets the requirements specified in step 4
of our methodology. According to [142], any protocol successfully verified using our
methodology would reach an assurance level equivalent to PAL2 or PAL3, depending
on whether the used tool provides bounded or unbounded verification17. Moreover,
even the PAL4 level, still under consideration in [142], can be achieved if we use a com-
putational model verification tool or method. Also, it is important to emphasize that,
for protocols where several different execution sequences are possible, the methodol-
ogy should be applied separately to each one of them. This includes error sequences,
where the security properties of each element should be kept up to the point where the
protocol has been executed. Note however that, if two different sequences share the
same sub-sequence up to a certain point, and we have already verified that sub-sequence,
it can be safely skipped. This may indeed be time-saving for the informal verification
performedmanually during the first phase of the methodology. Possibly, a good option
(if the alternative sequences do not include additional factors, like new communication
channels or special tokens) could be to only verify manually and formally the longest
sequence. Once available its formalization, it would probably be easy to derive from it
the alternative flows and formally verify them.
To summarize, the inputs and outputs of each of the different steps of our method-
ology are shown in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, corresponding to the first and second phases
of the methodology. The acronyms used in the tables for the different outputs are ex-
plained in Table 3.2.
3.3 Example analysis of real protocols
In this section we apply the different parts of the methodology to real life protocols.
To show examples where flaws are found in both phases, we analyze two different
protocols. The chosen protocols are EBIA’s registration protocol, which presents a flaw
detectable in the first stage, and the Shared Key Authentication of the WEP protocol,
with a flaw that is detected in the second stage. For the latter, and for readability, we
assume that the first phase has succeeded.
For a detailed application of the complete methodology to a protocol that succeeds
in both phases, we refer to [85]. This system is analyzed using the present methodology
17Aswe saw in Section 2.3.1, unbounded verificationmeans that themethod is able to simulate attackers
launching several instances of the protocol concurrently.
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O1: Informal list of goals.
O2: Security model and +/- capabilities list.
O3: Sequence diagram, channels abstraction and entities assumptions.
O4: List of informal requirements / Requirement-tagged sequence diagram.
O5: List of failed informal requirements or Success.
O6: Pseudocode.
O7: Formalization.
O8: List of failed security properties or Success.
Table 3.2: Definition of the different outputs of the methodology.
Goals
Attacker model Design Trust Informal
and capabilities candidate requirements verification
Input
None [O5 or O8]
a [O5 or O8]a [O5 or O8]a
O2 and O4
and O1 and O3
Output O1 O2 O3 O4 O5
aOnly when we are not in the first iteration.
Table 3.3: Inputs and outputs of each step of the first phase of the methodology.
Pseudocode Formalization
Procedural
verification
Input: O8a and O4 O2, O3 and O5 O4 and O6
Output: O6 O7 O8
aOnly when we are not in the first iteration.
Table 3.4: Inputs and outputs of each step of the second phase of the methodology.
in [83], and we discuss the main results of this analysis in Chapter 5.
3.3.1 Informal analysis: Email-Based Identification and Authentication
In this section, we apply the methodology to the protocol known as Email Based Identifi-
cation and Authentication (EBIA), which is almost certainly the technique that stands out
among the set of alternatives for online registration[102]. As we will see, the method-
ology warns about a design flaw at the first stage (informal verification).
EBIA’s popularity is due to its high usability and ease of deployment [103]. Briefly,
EBIA works as shown in the sequence diagram in Figure 3.5 (recall the notation used
for these diagrams, in Section 2.2). When a user wants to sign up in a web site in
which she does not have a user, she sends the information required by the server to
create a new one. In EBIA, this information contains at least the user’s email address.
The server responds to this request by sending an email containing an activation link.
Upon receiving this email, the user accesses the link, fact that is interpreted by the
server as a proof of ownership of the email address. Finally, in order to complete the
registration process, the server creates an account for that user with the received infor-
mation (typically, a username & password pair). In the best case, the first connection
is a server authenticated SSL session; the second message is an unauthenticated, unen-
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crypted email; and the third and fourth messages are both sent through a new server
authenticated SSL session.
User WS
4. activatlnk
?
= activat′lnk
email
?
= email′
>
1. email
<
2. activatlnk = http://activation.link
>
3. email’, activat′link = http://activation.link
<
5. ID
Figure 3.5: Sequence diagram of the typical EBIA protocol.
In summary, EBIA uses email addresses as identifiers and, as initial authenticators,
the fact of accessing to URLs contained within email messages sent to those addresses.
As we will see next, this process has major security problems, basically due to the
fact that email addresses are an insecure means to send sensitive information. In this
section, we apply the proposed methodology to EBIA, showing that this flaw in the
assumption concerning email messages.
Step 1. Goals of the protocol. The aim of EBIA is to authenticate the registering user
by means of her email address. Thus, the email address must be set as an identi-
fying element unique and solely owned by the new user. Therefore, we set two
goals:
1. Verify the ownership of the received email address.
2. Create a new identity associated to the received email address.
Step 2. Attacker capabilities and security model. In this initial and informal analysis,
we start from a typical Dolev-Yao attacker. As such, she can arbitrarily intercept,
block, replay messages, etc; but she cannot break cryptosystems, although may
make use of them for creating keys, encrypting/decrypting arbitrary messages,
etc. Besides this standard capabilities, we grant the attacker the ability to learn
all the necessary information required in order to start a registration process in
stead of any possible user. That is, in an hypothetical (but frequent) scenario
in which, in order to sign up in a new website, users are required to provide
their email address, birth date and real name, the attacker can obtain all those
data. Note that this is a quite reasonable assumption nowadays, mostly due to
the huge amount of information available from social networks and equivalent
platforms18. As a result, our +/- capabilities list is in this case composed by just
one element, namely: + The attacker can obtain all the necessary information to start a
registration process on behalf of any user.
18The OpenData initiative, dumps of private data after security compromises, or even the documents
published in the Spanish BOE (www.boe.es) are other interesting sources.
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1 . User ← WS : enckSSL ( email )
2 . WS ← User : email , activatlnk
3 . User ← WS : enckSSL′ ( ( email ’ , activat
′
lnk ) )
4 . WS : email ?= email ’ and activatlnk
?
= activat′lnk
5 . WS ← User : enckSSL′ ( ID )
Figure 3.6: Definition of the EBIA protocol using security protocol notation. WS
stands for Web Server, and User represents the registering user.
Step 3. Design candidate, channels abstraction and entities assumptions. In a typical
design process, we would have to come up with a design candidate at this step.
However, in this example we already have a protocol to verify (the one depicted
in Figure 3.5), which we depict with more detail using security protocol notation
in Figure 3.6. We specially note that the email message (third message exchanged
between the parties) is not encrypted.
As for the communication channels, we can distinguish the following types:
ASC. This is the channel used for exchanges initiated by the new user. In particu-
lar, we assume that this are server authenticated SSL sessions, which is the
most common case. Therefore, this channel offers confidentiality and server
authentication.
P. This channel is used only once per protocol run, and it is implemented as an
email channel. Specifically, the web site employs it to send the new user the
activation link (activatlnk in Figure 3.6). It is well known that (conventional)
emails do not offer point-to-point encryption, and no authentication at all.
Thus, we consider this channels as potentially insecure.
Concerning the entities taking part in the protocol we assume that the web server
is a trusted entity. This seems reasonable in the general case, since we consider
that a web server would not obtain any benefit in allowing the creation of fake
identities, since it would probably cause a reduction in the quality of its service,
and an evident loss of reputation19. For users, we assume that they will not will-
ingly allow the creation of illegitimate identities linked to their email addresses,
since this would also damage their reputation (or worse). For that matter, we
may see users as honest-but-unwary entities, who may leak personal information
(like their email address, but not their credentials) by thinking that revealing this
information does not pose any risk to them.
Step 4. informal requirements. Applying Algorithm 3.3 to the elements shown in Fig-
ure 3.6, we obtain the informal requirements specified in Table 3.5.
Step 5. Informal verification. We process now the previous informal requirements,
taking into account the +/- capabilities list and security model produced at step
2, and the channels abstraction and design of step 3.
Message 1: The email address sent by the User to WS has “none” as informal
requirement. Thus, this does not pose any requirement. Note that this as-
19Besides, very probably, being subject to legal risks.
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Step in Figure 3.6 email activatlnk email’ activat′lnk ID
1. User→WS : senc(email, kSSL) none
2. WS→ User : email, activatlnk none AWS
3. User→WS : senc((email’, activat′lnk), kSSL′ ) none C, AWS none none
4. WS : email ?= email’ and
none C, AWS none none
activatlnk
?
= activat′lnk
5. WS→ User : senc(ID,kSSL′ ) AUser C, A AUser C, A C, A
Table 3.5: The rows under column Figure 3.6 reference the corresponding step in Fig-
ure 3.6. AE stands for tokens authenticated by entity E. A depicts tokens
authenticated by all the entities involved in their transmission. C denotes
a confidentiality requirement. none means that the token has already been
sent, but without any assumption on its security properties. An empty cell
informs that the token has not been sent yet.
sumption is due to the fact that the attacker may be the one initiating the
registration (as stated in the capabilities list).
Message 2: The email address sent at the previous step is not modified. As for
the activation link sent by the WS, it is assumed to be authenticated by the
WS, since the SSL session established was server-authenticated, and confi-
dential (it is a ASCchannel). At this point, we already find two security flaws
since the channel used to transmit the link is insecure. We could stop the
analysis here, since this directly contradicts the expected informal require-
ments. However, for a better explanation of the issue, we continue until the
last step.
Message 3: In this message, two additional tokens are sent email′ and activat′lnk.
At this point, they are not required any property, since may not be related at
all with the previous ones.
Check 4: After this verification, if both the emails and activation links are the
same, WS will consider that the user is the owner of the email address.
Message 5: As stated in check 4, when a match occurs, WS expects the email
address to be authenticated by the user. Moreover, the activation link is
interpreted as mutually authenticated by both the user and WS, since the
latter was assumed to have been sent confidentially to the former. Conse-
quently, WS trusts that only the legitimate user would have been able to
access it. Again, due to the properties of the email channel (a Pchannel),
these requirements do not hold.
In summary, the wrong assumption has the following implications.
1. The activation link does not satisfy the confidentiality requirement, given
that it is sent through an insecure channel (a Pchannel, as defined in Sec-
tion 2.2).
2. Therefore, an attacker with enough capabilities (e.g., in a privileged po-
sition) may, for instance: (1) initiate the registration on behalf of its vic-
tim, providing her email address, (2) intercept the activation link, and
(3) complete the registration with the victim’s identity by accessing the
activation link. This attack is shown in Figure 3.7.
Consequently, the goal of “verification of ownership of the specified email
address” cannot be satisfied since the activation link needs to be kept, con-
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fidential, but it is being sent through an insecure channel. As we have seen,
this is quickly detected as a design flaw during the informal verification of
our methodology.
User Attacker WS
>
1. email
<
2. http://activation.link
>
3. email, http://activation.link
<
4. ID
Figure 3.7: Sequence diagram of an active attack to the EBIA protocol. The attacker
intercepts the email message containing the activation link. Even in the
case in which the email is not blocked and is received by the user, she will
most probably ignore it.
As consequence of this issue, the methodology forces to go back to the first step,
and take this finding into consideration for the next design candidate. In Chapter
5 we propose a protocol following the same design principles than EBIA and
keeping its usability, but that satisfies the expected security requirements.
3.3.2 Formal analysis: WEP Shared Key Authentication
We dedicate this subsection to the procedural analysis of the Shared Key Authentica-
tion of the WEP standard (WEP-SKA from now on), as defined in [119]. Applying the
proposed methodology, we show how a well-known flaw is detected in the second
phase (formal verification). For that matter, let us assume that the protocol successfully
passes the first phase of our methodology. Also, in this case, we apply the automatic
formal verifier ProVerif [39] for the formal verification.
The WEP-SKA protocol is one of the two authentication methods supported by the
WEP standard. A normal execution consists of four messages between two stations:
the Wireless Device (WD), and the Access Point (AP). In a typical protocol run the WD
is authenticated by the AP as it is depicted in Figure 3.8.
Nevertheless, as pointed out in the WEP standard [119] sending both the challenge
and its encrypted version may produce a security problem. This is due to the fact
that WEP uses an encryption algorithm (the RC4 cryptosystem) that is a stream ci-
pher which generates a pseudorandom sequence and XORs it to the plaintext in order
to create the ciphertext. Therefore, if we know the ciphertext and the plaintext, we
can obtain the keystream straightaway. However, in the standard it was only advised
(but not required) to change the key and/or IV (Initialization Vector) frequently. As
observed in [46], the fact of not being required to change the key/IV indirectly forces
every receiver to accept repeated key/IV’s, or risk otherwise not being compatible with
someWEP compliant devices. That allows an attacker to successfully impersonate any
station after having observed one single authentication. In [46] they call this attack
Authentication spoofing.
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Wirless Device
4. Compute senc(Chal, K)
Access Point
2. Generate 128-bit
challenge Chal
6. b = (senc(Chal, K) ?= c)
1. Authentication request
3. Chal
5. c
7. b
Figure 3.8: Message sequence of the WEP-SKA protocol [119]. (1) The WD requests to
be authenticated using WEP-SKA. (2-3) The AP generates a challenge and
sends it, in plaintext, to WD. (4-5) The WD encrypts the challenge with a
preshared key K, and sends the result to the AP. (6-7) The AP checks the
received encrypted challenge and informs WD of the result.
Let us now forget for a moment that this flaw is known, suppose that we are asked
to verify the security of WEP-SKA, and that it successfully passes the first part of our
methodology. Since we will need it in order to include it as a query for the formal
verification, assume also that we have reached the conclusion that the informal require-
ment (produced as output of step 4) for the element c shown in Figure 3.8 is authenticity
(which is inherited from the fact that the key K used to obtain c is a shared secret).
Moreover, there is only one communication channel that is used during the whole pro-
tocol, and it is completely insecure (i.e., it is a Pchannel according to Section 2.2). The
steps for the formal verification of the protocol are are as follows:
Step 6. Protocol pseudocode. The pseudocode for the WEP-SKA protocol is given in
Figure 3.9.
Step 7. Formalization of the protocol. ProVerif has a problem here, because it does
not support the XOR operation20. Nevertheless, since we do not need to apply
complex derivation rules, we can get around this problem with a simple reduc-
tion rule simulating the XOR. This workaround can be seen in the code of the
program available online 21. It is a rule stating that if the attacker knows both the
challenge c and its encryption (through a XOR function) with the key k, then she
can apply the XOR function to recover the key k.
Step 8. Procedural verification. Wehave now formalized the protocol. Moreover, given
that one of the informal requirements is for c to be authentic, we add an authentic-
ity query within our ProVerif model. It is represented as a correspondence as-
sertion stating that, each time the AP confirms having received a valid challenge
response, a WDmust have previously sent it. When we run ProVerif (the code for
this example is available online21,we observe a trace like the one shown in Figure
3.10, which informs that the attacker may authenticate to the AP as if it were a
legitimate WD.
Consequently, the goal of establishing an authenticated session only between
20Although there are approaches for XOR-aware modifications of ProVerif. See [135].
21http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz
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Process WD :
send (MA,AUTH, ( id , ’ shared key ’ , 1 ) ) ;
r e ce ive (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 2 , info , r e su l t ) ) ;
i f r e s u l t == succe s s fu l then
chal = in fo ;
send (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 3 , senc ( chal , k ) ) ) ;
f i
r e ce ive (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 4 , r e s u l t ) ) ;
Process AP :
r e ce ive (MA,AUTH, ( id , ’ shared key ’ , 1 ) ) ;
i f su c ce s s fu l then
r e su l t = succe s s fu l ;
chal = new pseudorandom ;
send (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 2 , chal , r e s u l t ) ) ;
r e ce ive (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 3 , senc ( chal2 , k ) ) ) ;
i f senc ( chal2 , k ) == senc ( chal , k ) then
send (MA,AUTH, ( ’ shared key ’ , 4 , suc ce s s fu l ) )
f i
f i
Figure 3.9: Pseudocode for the WEP-SKA procedures. WD stands from the Wire-
less Device to be authenticated, AP stands from Access Point and k is the
shared key. The field info conveys information dependent on the authen-
tication algorithm, and result stores the result of the requested authentica-
tion. MA, AUTH, ’shared key’ and the numbers used in the messages are
fields specified in the standard, see [119].
WEP-SKA between legitimateWD1 and AP :
WD1 → AP : WD1
AP →WD1 : Chall1
WD1 → AP : enck (Chall1 )
Attacker : k = Chall1 ⊕ enck (Chall1 ) =⇒ Attacker gains k
AP →WD1 : OK
WEP-SKA between illegitimate f akeWD2 and AP :
f akeWD2 → AP : f akeWD2
AP → f akeWD2 : Chall2
f akeWD2 → AP : enck (Chall2 )
AP → f akeWD2 : OK
Figure 3.10: An example attack trace found by ProVerif for the Authentication spoofing
attack over WEP-SKA introduced in [46]. In the first block, the attacker
eavesdrops on a WEP-SKA run between a legitimate WD and the AP. As
a result, the attacker obtains the preshared key k. In the second block,
the attacker uses the key k in order to successfully complete a WEP-SKA
execution with the AP.
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legitimate Wireless Devices and the Access Point22 cannot be satisfied, given
the fact that the attacker may obtain the preshared key K guaranteeing the au-
thenticity of the exchange. Therefore, this is a design flaw that has been detected
during the formal analysis of the methodology.
Since we have found an attack during the procedural verification with ProVerif,
the requirements are not fulfilled. Therefore, we must go back to the first stage
of the methodology after checking that no coding errors have been made, and
re-design the protocol to avoid this attack. Moreover, since the specific security
requirement that has failed is the authenticity of the challenge c, this is the com-
ponent that we need to revise (along with everything interacting with it). For
instance, we could proceed like it is suggested in [46], namely, we could disallow
the reuse of IVs.
3.4 Chapter conclusion
In this chapter, we have pointed out the necessity of procedures to formally define a
security context from a set of informal requirements and properties enabling a formal
verification of communication protocols. We also pointed out the need to reduce the
gap between a theoretical level design and the practical level equivalent.
For the first task, we have defined an iterative methodology that starts with an
informal definition of each component that needs to be taken into account, and then
converts those informal definitions into formal ones. Additionally, by performing first
an informal verification, and subsequently a formal one, the methodology detects sim-
ple flaws at the early stages, thus saving costs of having to formally redefine everything
for issues that can be easily detected.
For the second task, aimed to reduce the gap between theoretical designs with prac-
tical ones, our methodology incorporates fine-grained capabilities for the attacker. As a
result, the produced security model may be adapted as needed to any possible context
that may arise in the real world, hence producing veracious models.
We emphasize once again that, even though we have shown here how to apply
the methodology using automated verification tools (and more specifically, ProVerif),
it is perfectly compatible with any other tool and with proofs of security based on the
computational model. Moreover, the application of the methodology in conjunction
with other tools and techniques will certainly offer deeper insight into what additional
features need to be taken into account. Indeed, the methodology presented in this
chapter has been refined over time by applying it to several protocols and systems
(among them, the ones in the following chapters of this thesis). Therefore, further
applications of it will undoubtedly help in further improving it. Specially, applying
different tools and theories in the second stage would provide useful insight as to what
aspects are necessary to take into account, informally, during the first stage in order to
produce better design candidates and ease the task of subsequently formalizing them.
In addition, the work of [96] may be pointed out as a notable future line of work,
in the sense of further expanding our methodology towards easing the task of formal-
izing security requirements that are otherwise hard to state in a formal manner. This
proposal differs from the rest in that it takes into account the human factor at the time
of formally verifying the security properties of a system. Indeed, this is usually ig-
22Even the goal has not been explicitly stated in this example, since we just analyzed the second phase
of the methodology, it is straightforward that this would be the main goal of the protocol.
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nored, while on the other hand it is the main source of security problems. With the
concept of ceremonies, and by representing users as separate entities in the protocol, the
work in [96] allows to include them into a formal model, suitable for the previously
mentioned verifications. For instance, the concept of ceremonies allows modeling social
engineering attacks.
Finally, besides the examples given in this chapter, we show how the methodology
is employed in subsequent chapters. Namely, in Chapter 5 we apply it to SEBIA, our
secure alternative proposal to the already studied EBIA protocol. Also, the system
described in Chapter 7 is verified in Appendix B with this methodology, including
formal and computational approaches in the second stage.
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CHAPTER 4
libgroupsig: An extensible C
library for group signatures
Chapter based on and supported by references [21, 23, 86].
While the general principles of cryptographic primitives may be clear to program-
mers, their internal details are not usually so well understood [101]. In addition, most
theoretical proposals in cryptography are oriented to very specific scenarios which
makes difficult their inclusion in a wider set of practical contexts. Certainly, in most
cases where a software implementation is provided to backup a theoretical contribu-
tion, it is very difficult to adapt it and (re-)use it in more complex systems demanding
the functionality that this software provides. An example of this situation is depicted
by the creation and use of group signatures schemes [65].
In order to overcome this problem, we have adopted the recommendations in [153],
and thus we have analyzed the most relevant works in the field of group signatures
to extract the underlying principles and the involved functionality. Correspondingly,
we have designed an Application Programming Interface (API) and implemented a
prototype using C programming language. Regarding the implementation, we have
used three group signature schemes as bottom line. Nevertheless, in the API design we
have taken into account that specific group signature schemes may bear only a subset
of the functionality associated to the group signature primitive. As a result, our library
supports the addition of new schemes without the need of modifying the existing code.
This library has been actually used for implementing the prototypes of the different
proposals that have been described in this work. Specifically, those in Chapter 6 and
Chapter 7. But, more importantly, on the basis of the main conclusions in [116], we
have made our implementation open source1 in order to enable its use in advanced
privacy respectful systems, and to promote its revision and improvement through the
collaboration of the whole PETs community.
In Section 2.4.1 we made an overview of previous work in group signatures prim-
itives, including a summary of the main operations present in these schemes. These
main operations are what we have used as a base for constructing the API of our li-
brary, which is described in the following sections.
1Available at https://bitbucket.org/jdiazvico/libgroupsig/.
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4.1 Related work
Group signatures have been standardized by the ISO/IEC: [120], defines the general
setting and main operations of group signatures2; [121], defines a total of 7 schemes
with opening and linking capabilities. In [31, 82], extensions to the X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure [185] are proposed in order to be able to deal with identities based on
group signatures (as we will see in detail in Chapter 6).
Several implementations of group signature schemes are currently available on-
line. BBS04 [44] is implemented in C within the PBC_sig library3 and using Python
within the Charm framework4 [13]; BCLY08 [32] is implemented in C in the FTMGS li-
brary5; CG04 and ACJT00 are implemented in the libgs library using Java, as part of
the PP2db project6. Finally, the framework in [164] is intended to analyze and com-
pare the performance of different schemes. The framework is written in Java, and also
implements CSST06 [59], BCC04 [50] and IMSTY06 [124].
As we describe in the following sections, our libgroupsig library7 implements
BBS04 [44], KTY04 [132] and CPY06 [67]. But more importantly, it allows the addi-
tion of new group signature schemes through the same API. This would certainly ease
the use of group signatures as a building block of larger systems, since the costs of
changing from one scheme to another would be reduced to a minimum.
4.2 Group signatures API
Next, we briefly describe the general interface that we have defined for interacting
with the functionality provided by the libgroupsig library, according to the main op-
erations introduced in Section 2.4.1. Figure 4.1 shows an UML-like class diagram, that
depicts the described API in a component-wise manner. The main component is the
one aimed to the interaction with group signature schemes, named groupsig in Figure
4.1. The functions defined within this component are:
groupsig_init. Initializes the library environment, including the internal Pseudo Ran-
dom Number Generator.
groupsig_clear. Frees the internal variables initialized in the previous function.
groupsig_setup. Initializes the scheme with the specified code, filling the group key,
manager key and GML. Uses the input parameters contained in the specified
configuration structure for controlling the generation process.
groupsig_join_mem. Executes the join member part of the scheme. The member key
will be updated with the member side generated keying information. Note that,
in most schemes, there is typically a member side and a manager side of the join
process, whichmay be used to prevent the manager from learning private tokens.
If, nevertheless, the manager runs all the joining functionality, this function could
just be left as a stub.
2The document differentiates between group and ring signatures, using the general term anonymous
signatures to refer to both of them.
3http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/sig/. Last access: January 2nd, 2015.
4https://code.google.com/p/charm-crypto/. Last access: January 2nd, 2015.
5http://www.lcc.uma.es/~vicente/swprj/index.html#libftmgs. Last access: January 2nd, 2015.
6http://www.ing.unibs.it/ntw/tools/pp2db/. Last access: January 2nd, 2015.
7https://bitbucket.org/jdiazvico/libgroupsig
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*..*
*..*
groupsig
+ groupsig_handles [ ]
+ init(seed)
+ clear()
+ setup(code, grpkey, mgrkey, gml, config)
+ join_mem(memkey, grpkey)
+ join_mgr(memkey, mgrkey, grpkey)
+ sign(sig, msg, memkey, grpkey, seed)
+ verify(ok, sig, msg, grpkey)
+ claim(proof, memkey, grpkey, sig)
+ claim_verify(ok, proof, sig, grpkey)
+ open(id, sig, grpkey, mgrkey, gml)
+ reveal(trap, crl, gml, index)
+ trace(ok, sig, grpkey, crl, mgrkey, gml)
+ prove_equality(proof, memkey, grpkey, sigs)
+ prove_equality_verify(ok, proof, grpkey, sigs)
gml
+ gml_handles [ ]
+ init(code)
+ free(gml)
+ insert(gml, entry)
+ remove(gml, index)
+ get(gml, index)
crl
+ crl_handles [ ]
+ init(code)
+ free(crl)
+ insert(crl, entry)
+ remove(crl, index)
+ get(crl, index)
Figure 4.1: UML-like class diagram for the libgroupsig API. For readability, we omit
variable types.
groupsig_join_mgr. Runs the manager side of join of the scheme. With it, the member
key is completed, and a new entry related to the new member is added to the
GML.
groupsig_sign. Runs the signing algorithm of the scheme and stores the resulting
group signature in sig. The seed parameter is useful when reseeding the internal
Pseudo Random Number Generator is necessary.
groupsig_verify. Verifies the given signature with the received message and group
key.
groupsig_claim. Issues a zero-knowledge proof claiming having issued the specified
signature for the given group and member keys.
groupsig_claim_verify. Verifies whether the given claim is correct for the specified
group signature and group key.
groupsig_open. Returns the real identity of the issuer of the given signature. In our
library, this may imply the addition of the identity into a CRL for members with
revoked anonymity.
groupsig_reveal. Reveals the tracing trapdoor of themember in position indexwithin
the given GML. In our library, this may imply the inclusion of the tracing trap-
door into a CRL for members with revoked unlinkability.
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groupsig_trace. Determines whether or not the issuer of the specified signature has
been revoked according to the given CRL.
groupsig_prove_equality. Creates a proof of equality of all the group signatureswithin
the given set, using the specified member and group keys.
groupsig_prove_equality_verify. Verifies the given proof of equality, associated to
the specified set of group signatures.
Note that our API is basically equivalent to that of [120] (our reveal function is equiv-
alent to their revoke process, and our trace function is equivalent to their link process).
However, we also include the claim and equality prove actions, which allow operations
not directly supported by the ISO/IEC standard, but that are certainly important in
many contexts.
Besides the core functionality for group signatures, the library also includes two
components formanagingGroupMembership Lists (GMLs) and Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs). Also, for the sake of achieving a uniform API for all the schemes, we have
not been completely strict on some matters. The following subsections summarize this.
4.2.1 GMLs and CRLs
The modules gml and crl are intended for the management of Group Membership
Lists (GMLs) and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), respectively. GMLs are lists of
members, typically set up during the group initialization and updated each time a new
member is added (or permanently removed). They contain important information that
may be used when either anonymity or unlinkability revocation is required. CRLs are
named after their equivalents in the X.509 infrastructure [185], but in this case they are
employed within the extended setting created by group signatures [82]. That is, they
are intended for keeping a list of member keys for which either their anonymity or their
unlinkability properties (or both) have been revoked (see Section 2.4.1).
The main operations provided within the gml and crl components are the ones
typical of a list-like structure. Therefore, we allow the creation and liberation of these
structures, the insertion (resp. removal) of new (resp. existing) elements through the
insert (resp. remove) action, and the access to elements in the list through the get action.
4.2.2 Implementation notes
In the library, we have followed the abstraction outlined in Section 2.4.1. However,
not all group signatures actually provide the same functionality set. For the sake of a
more unified API, we have been slightly loose when assigning names to each function,
and simultaneously we have been cautious to avoid misleading potential users of our
library.
For instance, in KTY04 and CPY06 there are two revocation functions: open, which
given a group signature and (part of) the join transcript of a group member (stored
within the Group Membership List in libgroupsig), returns the real identity of the
signer; and reveal, which given (part of) the join transcript of a specific group member,
returns his tracing trapdoor. In the library, we refer to the respective parts of the join
transcripts as open trapdoor and tracing trapdoor. However, BBS04 does not natively
provide the same revocation options like that of KTY04 or CPY06, since it does not
contain what we call tracing trapdoors. Nevertheless, tracing is still possible in BBS04,
although in a less privacy respectful way. Indeed, what it is called tracing in BBS04
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implies executing the open procedure (thus obtaining what we named open trapdoor)
and looking for the signer’s identity within a list of revoked members. Thus, it is not
actually precise to use the term revealwith BBS04 to refer to the procedure defined with
this name in KTY04 or CPY06. Nevertheless, in libgroupsig we use the term reveal to
name a procedure that, given the part of the join transcript of a specific group member
used as tracing trapdoor, includes it within a CRL, which will be subsequently used for
tracing. This allows us to create a unified API for similar functionality, although the
inner cryptographic details (and privacy implications) may not be equivalent.
The library also contains additional modules for implementing functionality not
directly related to group signatures, GMLs, or CRLs. This code is basically divided in
mathematical functions (mostly some number theory algorithms) in a module named
math; the sys module, which defines system-wide functions such as memory man-
agement functions, global constants and environment variables; and the misc module,
which implements functionality for reading and printing information, type conver-
sions, etc. There is also a component of the library for the management of group mem-
ber identities in an abstract manner, i.e., for making GMLs independent on whether the
programmer wants to include full names, job positions, etc. within the data stored in
each GML entry.
libgroupsig is available under GNU LGPL at Bitbucket8. We have tested and ap-
plied it in our prototypes, but its development is still in an alpha stage and, by opening
its source to the community, we expect to receive useful feedback to improve it.
4.3 Experimental evaluation
The acceptability of a software library is very dependent on the functionality achieved,
but also on the efficiency of the final implementation. Therefore, after defining the
interface, we have implemented it using the C programming language in order to an-
alyze the costs associated to each of the supported actions explained in Section 4.29.
Since BBS04 and CPY06 use elliptic curve cryptography while KTY04 is RSA-based,
we show the costs associated to key sizes providing roughly the same security level.
Specifically, according to the NIST10, the equivalences are as shown in Table 4.1. All the
measurements have been obtained with a desktop PC (Intel Core i7-2600, 16GB DDR3
running Debian Wheezy), iterating 1000 times for each operation and using different
keys in each iteration.
RSA key size ECC key size
1024 160
2048 224
3072 256
7680 384
Table 4.1: Approximate key sizes providing equivalent security for ECC and RSA
schemes.
8https://bitbucket.org/jdiazvico/libgroupsig/.
9We do not include measurements for the prove equality functionality (and its verification counterpart),
which is a generalization of the claim action (resp., claim verify action). Thus, the specific cases give a
good idea of the costs related to their more general counterparts.
10http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
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Figures 4.3 through 4.6 depict the costs associated to each of the main operations
excluding tracing, for each of the implemented group signature schemes in our library.
In all cases, the evolution starts to differ notably for keys larger than 3072 bits (for
KTY04) and keys larger than 256 bits (for BBS04 and CPY06), with differences of at
most a few tenth of seconds for smaller keys. Specifically, for keys of size 7680 bits the
costs of KTY04 increase abruptly, while the equivalent in BBS04 and CPY06 (384 bit
keys) maintain a reasonable growth. The increase in KTY04 is most probably due to
the costs associated of operating with larger numbers. Indeed, the three schemes rely
on GNU GMP11 (KTY04 uses it directly, while BBS04 and CPY06 through Ben Lynn’s
PBC library12). To verify this, we performed a profiling of GMP, based on the size of the
employed numbers. Figure 4.2 shows the result. The profiling of GMP was performed
in the same system as the one used for the analysis of libgroupsig. The tests involved
1000 iterations of GMP numbers ranging from 1000 to 10000 bits, increasing 100 bits per
iteration (X-axis). Each iteration includes the basic operations: addition, multiplication,
exponentiation and random number selection. The values in the Y-axis are the average
running time for each iteration. It can be seen that the evolution of the CPU time in the
profiling of GMP and that of the group signature schemes confirm our hypothesis.
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Figure 4.2: Profiling of the GMP library. The increase in the costs of computing with
GMP, depending on the size of the numbers is reflected in KTY04 in the
Join operation (as well as in the operations shown below
For analyzing the costs of tracing, we need to consider both the size of the Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs) and the keys. The graphs in Figure 4.7 show the evolution of
the associated costs, given these parameters. BBS04 is by far the most efficient one
(nevertheless, consider the observation made in Section 4.2.2), with costs always less
than 0.008 seconds; KTY04 is also quite efficient up to keys of 3072 bits, but increases
steeply from less than 5 seconds per tracing operation to more than 20 seconds when
using keys of 7680 bits; finally, CPY06 is the most expensive in this operation, growing
uniformly depending on the key and CRL size from 2 seconds to 18 seconds per tracing
operation.
Besides the tests summarized here, libgroupsig has also been employed in other
research works where group signatures play a central role. Namely, we have used it
for implementing a proof of concept of the extensions to X.509 in [78, 82] described
in Chapter 6, and to build up a prototype of the privacy respectful online shopping
11https://gmplib.org/. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
12http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
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Figure 4.3: Costs of Join in KTY04, BBS04 and CPY06 (the lines for BBS04 and CPY06
mostly overlap).
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Figure 4.4: Costs of Sign and Verify operations in KTY04, BBS04 and CPY06 (the lines
for BBS04 and CPY06 mostly overlap).
platform in Chapter 7
4.4 Chapter conclusion
We have presented libgroupsig, a C library that provides a uniform API for different
group signature schemes. Moreover, the library supports the addition of new group
signature schemes without needing to modify the already implemented code. This
offers very interesting possibilities. For instance, new schemes may be seamlessly in-
corporated into our library (see Appendix C); or complex systems where privacy is
of concern may use our library with a group signature scheme A, but switch to an-
other scheme B if needed with just updating a few tenths of lines of code at most (see
Appendix C). To the best of our knowledge, no existing open source library provides
equivalent possibilities.
Given the usefulness of group signatures as a building block for providing pri-
vacy, and the features of our library, we consider that our contribution may help in
61
CHAPTER 4: libgroupsig: AN EXTENSIBLE C LIBRARY FOR GROUP SIGNATURES
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
160/1024 224/2048 256/3072 384/7680
Ti
m
e
(s
)
Key size (bits)
KTY04
CPY06
(a) Claim.
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
160/1024 224/2048 256/3072 384/7680
Ti
m
e
(s
)
Key size (bits)
KTY04
CPY06
(b) Claim Verify.
Figure 4.5: Costs of Claim and Claim Verify operations in KTY04, BBS04 and CPY06
(the lines for BBS04 and CPY06 mostly overlap).
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Figure 4.6: Costs of Open and Reveal operations in KTY04, BBS04 and CPY06 (the
lines for BBS04 and CPY06 mostly overlap).
the development of advanced privacy respectful systems. In the past, open source li-
braries corresponding to advanced cryptographic primitives have served as catalysts
for prototypes and complex cryptographic systems (see, e.g., the PBC library and all
the projects that depend on it13). Keeping in mind the future work still pending we
expect that our library might thus help in the creation of new advanced privacy re-
spectful systems. The possibilities are many. For instance, we have already employed
our library to implement the prototype of a comprehensive and privacy respectful on-
line shopping system, suitable for current e-commerce infrastructures. Also, one of the
final applications we have in mind for this library is to conform the basis for X.509 ex-
tensions like the ones proposed in [31, 82]. This would undoubtedly suppose a great
improvement of the X.509 PKI [185] towards supporting privacy respectful systems
and applications. In [78, 82] we already applied this library for implementing a proto-
13http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/who.html. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
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Figure 4.7: Costs of Trace in libgroupsig, for increasing key and CRL sizes. The color
gradient depicts time in seconds.
type of the mentioned extensions.
Nevertheless, as with every programming project, despite the library has reached
a fully functional state, more work is required to improve it. First, the library is still in
an alpha stage, and much testing is necessary for guaranteeing its correct functioning,
including tests in as many different platforms as possible. In addition, the implemen-
tation of the currently supported schemes could probably be improved (through code
optimization) towards achieving better efficiency, and the inclusion of more schemes
in the library will help in testing and refining its extensibility, and also help creating
a richer range of schemes to choose from. For instance, schemes where revocation
is based on accumulators [55], in which tracing is more computationally efficient (at
the cost of higher communication costs); or the more efficient schemes in [137]. Also,
adapting our library to suit the testing framework in [164] would help in automating
the comparison of the implemented schemes. Finally, given that the final aim of this
library is to be employed within cryptographic systems, a source code security audit is
mandatory. In this regard it is relevant to underline that the publication of the library
as open source contributes not only to its inclusion in more complex projects, but also
its evaluation through the open source community.
Finally, note that with this library, we aim to provide practical means to implement
63
CHAPTER 4: libgroupsig: AN EXTENSIBLE C LIBRARY FOR GROUP SIGNATURES
actual privacy preserving systems. As stated, anonymous identities like those man-
aged in Chapter 6 could actually be implemented through our library, but also any
other token based on group signatures, like the ones employed in Chapter 7.
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Protocols
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Part III includes two protocols and two mechanisms that are essential for any sys-
tem requiring robust authentication, which have also been created with the help of
the methodology and group signatures library in Part II. It is worth to be noted that
these contributions are based in the most widely used technologies for the tasks they
address. Specifically, in Chapter 5 we describe a registration protocol based on the
Email Based Identification and Authentication protocol (EBIA). Our proposal allows,
assuming that new users own email addresses in trusted email providers, to create
cryptography-based identities with security guarantees that are reasonable for many
general contexts. This protocol has been designed through the specific application of
the methodology described in Part II. Chapter 6 includes extensions to the OCSP (On-
line Certificate Status Protocol) and CRL (Certificate Revocation List) mechanisms for
managing anonymous X.509 identities based on group signatures. Additionally, given
that providing evidence of illegitimate actions is a critical task in systems providing
fair anonymity, we also propose a protocol for this purpose. These mechanisms have
been tested through a prototype implemented using the group signatures library de-
scribed in Part II. Standard-like definitions of these mechanisms are given in Appendix
A. Finally, these protocols are completely compatible with the systems proposed in Part
IV.
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SEBIA: Secure Email Based
Identification and Authentication
Chapter based on and supported by references [77, 83, 85].
The first step that every user must perform in order to start using any web-based
system is to register in it. These registration protocols have as main objective the cre-
ation of some type of credential, which will subsequently be responsible for ensur-
ing that no unauthorized user accesses restricted information. Therefore, the security
properties that may be provided by the service are directly dependent on the security
properties of these credentials. This is, by itself, enough reason for justifying addi-
tional efforts into the development of secure registration protocols. Additionally, the
huge volume of users that Internet services handle nowadays, along with the increas-
ing amount of information stored within them and its sensitivity, claims for further
security guarantees at this point. To show some miscellaneous data, Dropbox reached
the barrier of 275 million users1, Facebook has approximately 680 million active users2
and Twitter about 289 million3. Each of these users has registered using the EBIA pro-
tocol studied in Chapter 3. Moreover, we note that systems that use mobile phones
as authenticators, instead of email addresses, follow exactly the same guidelines. In
this variant, instead of sending an email to the specified email address, a Short Mes-
sage Service (SMS) message is typically sent to the given mobile phone. However,
the channel used to send SMS messages, if mobile phones are used as the unique au-
thentication mechanism, provides roughly the same security level than an email since
SMS messages are not protected by point-to-point encryption [97]. This observation is
important, since given the increasing presence of smartphones4 this variant is gaining
impulse (although mobile-based authentication schemes and mobile-based two-factor
authentication still need some refinement [92]).
Thus, secure registration protocols are required. Nevertheless, usability must be
guaranteed too or, given the dynamic nature of the Internet, an unfriendly protocol
will just be ignored. As stated, probably the most currently widespread registration
protocol in online systems is EBIA, which is also known to be insecure (see Section
3.3.1). Thus, the identities generated by means of this protocol, are also fundamentally
1http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/09/dropbox-hits-275m-users-and-launches-business-
product-to-all/. Accessed on March 31st, 2015.
2http://www.statisticbrain.com/facebook-statistics/. Accessed on March 31st, 2015.
3http://www.statisticbrain.com/twitter-statistics/. Accessed on March 31st, 2015.
4www.technologyreview.com/news/427787/are-smart-phones-spreading-faster-than-any-
technology-in-human-history/page/2/. Accessed on March 31st, 2015.
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insecure from the perspective of their authentication guarantees. In this chapter, we
propose Secure Email Based Identification and Authentication (SEBIA), a secure alter-
native maintaining the same design principles than EBIA (specially, its usability) but
also providing a security level that would be enough for many Internet-based appli-
cations. With this proposal, we place an additional piece in the puzzle for composing
secure online systems. Concretely, this protocol is designed and verified using the
methodology proposed in the previous chapter and is perfectly suitable for the gener-
ation of the robust cryptographic identities used for implementing fair anonymity in
the next chapters.
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5.1 Related work
Several alternatives have been proposed to solve or reduce the impact of EBIA’s secu-
rity limitations, typically by incorporating some kind of multifactor and/or multichan-
nel method [184]. In [182] single use authenticators provided through a multichannel
technique are employed with the aim of reducing the effect of possible attacks. The
security of the scheme is claimed to improve the performance of EBIA by adding a to-
ken sent via SSL during the same session established when the registering user initiates
the authentication request. Besides sending this token via SSL, an extra token is sent
unencrypted via email. The related digital identity is only generated if the user sends
back to the server both tokens. The intuition behind this approach is that, by using SSL,
only the user who started the authentication request receives the SSL token. Thus, if
this user also proves knowledge of the token sent via email, it is assumed that the user
who started the session is the owner of the email account. However, even with SSL in
use, this approach is vulnerable to the attack on EBIA illustrated in Figure 3.7 (attack
initiated with step 1b). Although it is an attack that assumes that the attacker takes
an active role (i.e., it is not limited to just observing the communications), it shows
that the protocol’s security is not higher than that of classic EBIA. In detail, an active
attacker starting the registration process would just have to eavesdrop the activation
email to obtain a legitimate activation code, and then use it. For the sake of clarity, the
code used for showing this attack is available online5 This shortcoming is addressed
in [182] by combining several email accounts. In this new setup, the challenge for an
attacker is more complicated, since she has to break into several mail servers. Nev-
ertheless, this also erodes the scheme’s usability as users have to manage more than
one email address, and thus they can be reluctant to adopt this alternative. As a result,
a third possible implementation is proposed in [182] consisting first of the encryption
of the email using a key sent jointly with the SSL token, and secondly by routing the
resulting message via an anonymizing network. Therefore, even though the attacker
can start the SSL session and get the SSL token plus the key used to encrypt the email,
allegedly she cannot gain possession of the email because it is sent via an anonymiz-
ing network. However, if the communications with the exit (entry) point from (to) the
anonymizing network are not protected, this option is still insecure.
In [9] EBIA takes an important role in a method to avoid phishing attacks6. The
method is a two-factor authentication procedure based on browser bookmarks and
fragmented identifiers. However, the setup of these bookmarks relies directly on a
verification code sent to the registering email address. To secure this step, the author
states that this email should be “secure in authentication and in content” (hence, signed
and encrypted). Otherwise, it would also be vulnerable to the same attacks as EBIA.
Indeed, encryption and sender authentication in the activation email is a valid option
(in fact, it would probably be the best one). Nevertheless, we prefer to avoid it, mainly
because of two reasons: first, because users seem reluctant to use email encryption [104,
173, 183]; and second, if the emails can be sent in such a way then the authenticating
token can be sent straight away within the email. Certainly, only the legitimate owner
of the email account is going to be able to read it (this is guaranteed by encryption),
and thus any extra step to provide her with a valid token seems unnecessary.
5http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz.
6As defined in [167], phishing attacks are “malicious emails that victims receive effectively convincing them
to visit a fraudulent website at which they are tricked into divulging sensitive information”.
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5.2 The protocol
We proceed to explain the proposed protocol, introducing its main objective and the
entities that take part in a normal protocol run.
5.2.1 Protocol description
This protocol is intended to establish a mutually authenticated channel between users
and a Web Server (this would be a Achannel, according to Section 2.2), suitable for a
subsequent distribution of digital identities. In particular, the users’ identities will be
associated to their email addresses. Indeed, this is what the protocol must actually
ensure: that the user claiming to be the owner of a given email address is actually its
owner. This will subsequently enable the distribution of a digital identity associated to
that email address.
Entities. There are three different entities in our proposal:
• Users. The entities who start the registration process. Each one is assumed to
own an email account with a trusted email provider.
• Mail Server (MS). A Mail Server of the domain where the user owns an email
account. The Mail Server is assumed to own a digital identity trusted by the Web
Server.
• Web Server (WS). The Web Server providing the registration service.
Protocol sequence. The process starts when a user requests to be registered in a web
site. In our protocol (as usual) this is done by establishing a server-authenticated SS-
L/TLS session with the WS and having the user send her email address. Then, the WS
uses the same SSL/TLS session to send back an SSL registration ticket (which must be
unique to this request) and a nonce, named email registration nonce (henceforth, email
nonce). Furthermore, the WS sends the same email nonce to the user through the MS
as an unencrypted email message. Subsequently, the user securely connects with her
MS and waits for the email. When it arrives, she verifies that the nonce received via
email matches the one received via SSL/TLS. If so, the user sends the MS a request
to acknowledge the receipt of the message. Consequently, the MS digitally signs the
ACK, and sends it to the WS. At this point, the WS has the certainty (because it trusts
the MS) that the legitimate owner of the email address has received and acknowledged
the email with that concrete nonce. Finally, when the user sends back the SSL/TLS
registration ticket, the WS issues the new user’s credentials.
A general view of the protocol, using the protocol notation for sequence diagrams
described in Section 2.2, is shown in Figure 5.1. In the next section we proceed with an
in-depth security analysis of the proposed protocol.
Note that, in short, there are twomainmodifications over EBIA. First, the token sent
via SSL and the fact that the email token is also sent within the same SSL session. The
second modification is the explicit endorsement made by a trusted entity (in this case,
the Mail Server) over the identity of the user. However, it does not do it blindly, since
the user has previously authenticated against it. Intuitively, this is assumes a transitive
property in the trust relation: since MS trusts the user, and WS trusts MS, then WS
trusts the user.
72
CHAPTER 5: SEBIA: SECURE EMAIL BASED IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
User
7. nonce′eml
?
=
nonceeml
MS
5. Verify pwd
WS
11. ACK received?
Check ticketSSL
>
1. email
<
2. ticketSSL, nonceeml
<
3. nonceeml
>
4. email, pwd
<
6. nonce′eml
>
8. ACK, nonceeml
>
9. ACK, nonceeml
>
10. email, ticketSSL
<
12. ID
Figure 5.1: Sequence diagram of a normal run of the protocol. User stands for the user
requesting registration, MS stands for Mail Server and WS stands for the
Web Server providing the registration service.
5.3 Security analysis
Next, we discuss the verification of the security properties of the registration protocol
according to the methodology introduced in Chapter 3.
5.3.1 Informal verification
The five steps comprising the first stage of the methodology are as follows.
Step 1. Goals of the protocol. The main goal of the registration protocol is to es-
tablish a mutually authenticated channel between the user and WS that allows for the
distribution of a new digital identity. The security properties of this identity, that will
depend on the properties of the established channel, are:
• The new identity needs to be authentic. This requires users to be somehow au-
thenticated, and that the registration authority is also authenticated. Otherwise,
impersonation or man-in-the-middle attacks might occur.
• The new identity needs to be confidential: only the user should learn it.
Step 2. Attacker capabilities and security model. As baseline, we adopt the Dolev-
Yao model [93]. Thus, all communications are virtually routed through an attacker.
Hence, it can automatically read the contents of every non-encrypted message. On the
other hand, the cryptographic primitives are assumed to be perfect. That is, the attacker
cannot obtain the contents of an encrypted message unless she somehow obtains the
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appropriate key. Finally, the +/- capabilities list for customizing the Dolev-Yao model
is just composed by one item. Namely: “Attackers know all the information required to
start a new registration process on behalf of every possible user”. Since email addresses will
be used as identifiers and as mechanisms for proving new users’ identities, this means
that attackers at least know the email address of a meaningful set of potential users.
Step 3. Entities assumptions, design candidate and channels abstraction.
• Design candidate. In this case we start from the design given in Figure 5.1. How-
ever, in general, a new design should be created at this point, or obtained as a
modification of an existing one that has been proven to be insecure in a previous
iteration.
• Entities assumptions. The entities described in Section 5.2.1 are assumed to fol-
low the model given below.
– Users. Users are assumed to be honest. In particular, they are trusted not to
share the confidential tokens received from MS and WS.
– MS. This is a semi-honest entity (see Definition 19). More concretely, it is
trusted to correctly perform the password-based authentication of its users,
and to forward email messages (in both directions) without modifying their
contents. Even though this is a somehow strong assumption, it is reasonable
since, in the real world, modifying or blocking email messages would be a
too intrusive action that would not probably remain unnoticed by its users.
– WS. The Web Server is assumed to be a honest party. Note that this is a rea-
sonable assumption since, in particular, our protocol does not specify how
to actually generate the final identities: it is intended to create a mutually
authenticated channel through which the distribution of such identities is
possible. In this matter, WS is interested in successfully authenticating the
users registering in its service. Otherwise, its quality would undoubtedly be
reduced. In contrast, it might not be realistic to assume a honest WS for the
generation of identities, since it could use that information to (e.g.) imper-
sonate users in certain situations. However, that problem is out of the scope
of our protocol.
• Communication channels. Concerning the communication channels abstraction
and the derived practical implementation, we use three types of channels in the
candidate design:
– ASC channel. When a message between a client and a server is sent through
channels of this type, the client is certain of the server’s identity. Addition-
ally, the message is not leaked to the attacker during its transmission. In
practice, this channels can be implemented with server-authenticated SS-
L/TLS sessions.
– Ao channel. These channels ensure the authenticity of the origin/sender.
However, confidentiality is not provided. As a practical approach for im-
plementing this channels, we suggest making use of DKIM [70] as a suitable
possibility.
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– AC channel. The mutual authenticity property is actually achieved in two
ways in the current design candidate. When the User contacts MS (steps 4-6
in Figure 5.1), a server-authenticated SSL session is established. However,
when the User provides a valid username and password, she is authenti-
cated to MS. Hence, at step 6, the channel is already mutually authenticated.
In the communication between MS and WS at step 9, since both entities are
servers, both are assumed to own digital certificates and trust in their cor-
responding CAs, so they can establish a mutually authenticated session. In
both cases, the channel may be easily made confidential, by establishing an
SSL session. However, we note that for the communication betweenMS and
WS this is not required.
– P channel. That is, a channel that does not provide any security guarantee
at all. Since there is no security requirement, any real channel would be ap-
propriate. However, we make use of email messages as concrete realizations
of this channels.
Step 4. informal requirements. This step is intended to provide an initial contact
with the formal security requirements of each of the tokens involved in the protocol.
Informally, we use the term token, or element, to refer to the minimal component of a
message that may be required some security property. Every protocol step is analyzed
for defining what is expected from each involved element. We call these “expectations”
informal requirements. Table 5.1 shows the result obtained step by step (for simplicity,
only confidentiality and authenticity are considered, although other properties may be
needed [82]). For instance, when the nonce′eml value is first transmitted, at step 3, since
it is sent through an insecure channel of type P (an email message), it is not required
to provide any security property. This models the fact that email messages can be
faked and/or eavesdropped. But, when it is compared with nonceeml , transmitted in a
server-authenticated and confidential session at step 2, then the User has the certainty
that the WS initially sent the message. Similarly, the email address sent by the User
at step 1 does not provide any trust guarantee, since anyone may have sent it. But
when the User successfully authenticates to the MS using her password, then the email
address turns into a client-authenticated token. Equivalent reasoning could be applied
to other tokens. The most important one is ID. When it is transmitted, the User has
already been authenticated by using the MS as “trusted sponsor” at steps 7-8, showing
the correct credentials at steps 9-10. Hence, the channel used in step 11 seems to be
(informally) a mutually authenticated channel. This is shown by marking up the ID
token as mutually authenticated. It is also worth to be emphasized that elements that
should intuitively be required to satisfy some requirement from the beginning may not
be required that property until the following steps. For instance, the ticket element
is always transmitted through SSL channels. However, since attackers may also start
registration requests, it will only be considered confidential (and user-authenticated)
at the final step.
Finally, we also have to decide which tool to use in the formal verification. Here,
ProVerif [42] is a good candidate, since it allows the verification of the authenticity and
confidentiality requirements that we have posed.
Step 5. Informal verification. We proceed to informally verify the properties as-
signed to the message components at step 4, considering the attacker model and the
channels abstraction produced at steps 2 and 3, respectively.
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Step in Figure 5.1 email ticket nonceeml nonce′eml pwd ACK ticket
′ ID
1. U →WS : email none
2. WS → C : ticket, nonceeml none AWS AWS,C
3. WS → MS : email, nonce′eml none AWS AWS,C none
4. U → MS : email, pwd none AWS AWS,C none C
5. MS : VerifyPwd none AWS AWS,C none C
6. MS → U : nonce′eml AU AWS AWS,C none AU ,C
7. U : nonce′eml
?
= nonceeml AU AWS AWS,C none AU ,C
8. U → MS : ACK, nonceeml AU AWS AWS AWS AU ,C A,C
9. MS →WS : ACK,nonceeml AU AWS AWS AWS AU ,C A
10. U →WS : email, ticket′ AU AWS AWS AWS AU ,C A none
11. WS : ticket′ ?= ticket AU AWS AWS AWS AU ,C A none
12. WS → U : ID AU A,C A A AU ,C A A,C A,C
Table 5.1: The rows under first column reference the corresponding step in Figure 5.1.
AE depicts tokens authenticated by entity E. A depicts tokens authenticated
by all the entities involved in their transmission. C denotes a confidentiality
requirement. none means that the token has already been sent, but without
any assumption on its security properties. An empty cell informs that the
token has not been sent yet.
Message 1. email has an informal requirement of none. This is compatible with ASCchannels
and the attacker capability enabling her to start registration.
Message 2. email does not change. ticket and nonceeml must be at leastWS-authenticated.
We cannot yet require them to be confidential because the registration could have
been initiated by an attacker. Again, since we use a ASCchannel, the data is WS
authenticated, and no incompatibility occurs.
Message 3. The properties of each existing element are not modified. Additionally,
nonce′eml and email are sent via a P channel. However, since they have none as
informal requirement, this is not an inconsistency.
Message 4. All previous elements are unmodified. Now, pwd is transmitted via a
ASCchannel. Thus, the required C property is compatible.
Check 5. ticket, nonceeml and nonce′eml are unmodified, but both email and pwd now
have a client-authenticated informal requirement. However, at this step, the MS
has verified that the provided password is associated to the specified email ac-
count. Thus, whoever provided them has been completed an authentication with
theMS and it is client-authenticated. Accordingly, the associated tokens “inherit”
that property, and no incompatibility occurs.
Message 6. nonce′eml has a requirement of none, which is admissible by the ASCchannel
used to transmit it in a previous step. Note however that the channel employed
in this step is a ACchannel, since the server was initially authenticated (message
4) and the user was authenticated via a username and password pair at check 5.
Check 7. If it is satisfied, nonce′eml inherits nonceeml properties.
Message 8. If check 7 succeeds, U sends back ACK and nonceeml via a ACchannel.
Hence, no requirement is broken.
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Message 9. Just ACK is modified. In this case, the confidentiality requirement is dropped
from the informal requirements. Since we are still using a Aochannel with addi-
tional confidentiality, this is not a problem.
Message 10. The ticket′ is sent within this message. Since we do not know fromwhom
does it come, it does not have any informal requirement and no conflicts occur.
The other elements are unchanged.
Check 11. After a successful check, the WS will have the certainty that the user with
email email address has actually acknowledged the registration process. Hence,
all tokens will be mutually authenticated.
Message 12. With all the components authenticated, the WS generates the identity ID
and sends it through a ACchannel. Therefore, the authenticity and confidentiality
properties of the ID are kept. Additionally, we can now require ticket to be confi-
dential, since ID is only issued for verified users and, in that case, the initial SSL
session should have been confidential to the attacker.
We remark the special care taken in matching the informal requirements expected
from the transmitted tokens with the properties of the communication channels. Sat-
isfied the informal verification, we proceed to the formalization of the protocol. More-
over, with the insight gained after this preliminary analysis, formalizing the protocol
will be easier. Additionally, independently of the second phase, at this point we have
already reached the PAL1 assurance level defined in [142] (which includes a semifor-
mal protocol specification, informal security and attacker models, informal security
requirements and informal proofs).
5.3.2 Procedural verification of security
Having performed an informal evaluation, we apply the steps of the formal verification
phase of the methodology in Chapter 3 as follows.
Step 6. Protocol pseudocode. From the design candidate obtained in the informal
phase, and shown in Figure 5.1, we create a more detailed description in the shape of
pseudocode. In this case, the tool we chose for this formal verification is ProVerif, since
it allows to check all the required properties. Therefore, we make this pseudocode
resemble the final program for easing the subsequent coding task. The produced pseu-
docode is available online7.
Step 7. Formalization of the protocol. Using the pseudocode as starting point, we
produce the final formalization for the chosen tool/method (ProVerif in our case). The
details are given below, in terms of the communication channels and participating en-
tities. However, for the sake of readability, instead of explaining the three entities, we
center our attention on the User and MS processes and just make a few comments on
the WS logic. Certainly, given the details of User and MS, it is easy to grasp the behav-
ior of the WS. Besides this analysis, the associated source code, ready to be processed
with ProVerif, is publicly available online8. We summarize the notation employed in
the source code included in the listings below in Table 5.2. This notation includes both
native ProVerif instructions and naming conventions used in our code.
7http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz
8http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz
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Element / Instruction Description
msgX Label for the X-th message sent in a legitimate protocol run
kssluwsX X-th SSL key negotiated between U and WS
ksslumsX X-th SSL key negotiated between U and MS
msaccounts(email,pwd) Database managed by MS, containing pairs (email,pwd)
Table 5.2: Specific notation used in the ProVerif code listings for SEBIA besides the
one defined in Table 2.1. It includes both native ProVerif instructions and
naming conventions adopted in this chapter.
Communication channels. As stated, our protocol makes use of three types of com-
munication channels. The details about how does our model simulates them is given
next.
• ASCchannel. The abstraction employed for this channel must ensure the follow-
ing:
1. The transmitted information is kept secret.
2. The client must be certain of the server’s identity.
3. The server may not be certain of the client’s identity.
We first instantiate the private channels privateSSLuserchannel, privateSSL-
wschannel, privateSSLserverchannel, and the process sslkeynegotiation. This
process will be waiting for an incoming message via privateSSLuserchannel,
which is only used by the user for sending messages. Moreover, since the chan-
nel is declared as private, the attacker does not have access to it or the messages
sent through it. When the process receives a message containing a new nonce (for
avoiding mixing different sessions), it will create a key for symmetric encryption.
This key is sent back to the client via the channel privateSSLuserchannel and
to the server (who will be awaiting for it in order for the process to be activated)
via privateSSLmschannel or privateSSLwschannel (depending on whether the
server is MS orWS, respectively). Since the channels used to distribute the freshly
created key are private, the attacker does not learn the keys. Since the keys are
private, they can be used to encrypt and send messages over any publicly acces-
sible channel, which will be kept secret.
However, this actually provides mutual authentication, since the attacker can-
not make use of the employed private channels and thus cannot be the origina-
tor of any message encrypted with the created keys. Since we need just server-
authenticated channels, we create a process equivalent to sslkeynegotiation,
named sslbypass in which the private channel privateSSLuserchannel is sub-
stituted by a public channel. Therefore, the attacker can now initiate key ex-
changes, and the serverwill still receive the created keys via privateSSLmschannel
(or privateSSLwschannel).
Finally, note that this is the precise definition of a SSL/TLS channel in which
the symmetric keys have been negotiated with server-authentication. Thus, it
could be easily deployed in practice. The code for the sslkeynegotiation process
is depicted in Figure 5.2 (the code for the bypass is omitted, since it is mostly the
same).
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1 (∗∗ SSL nego t i a t ion process : used only between User and WS ∗∗ )
2 l e t s s lkeynego t i a t i on =
3
4
5 in ( privateSSLuserchannel , (u : Host , s : Host , n : Nonce ) ) ;
6
7 i f s = ws then (
8 new kssluws : Key ;
9 out ( privateSSLuserchannel , (ws , u , n , kssluws ) ) ;
10 out ( privateSSLwschannel , (u ,ws , n , kssluws ) )
11
12 )
13
14 e l s e (
15 i f s = ms then (
16 new ksslums : Key ;
17 out ( privateSSLuserchannel , (ms , u , n , ksslums ) ) ;
18 out ( privateSSLmschannel , (u ,ms , n , ksslums ) )
19 )
20 ) .
Figure 5.2: Process for establishing SSL sessions. A message is received from the
privateSSLuserchannel, if it is aimed to WS (s = WS), a new SSL key
shared between U and WS (kssluws) is created; else, the same pro-
cess occurs for creating SSL keys shared between U and MS. Since
privateSSLuserchannel is private, the attacker cannot read from/write
into it.
• Aochannel. This channel is modeled by generating public-private keypairs for
the originating entity, and distributing the public part securely to the recipient.
In the code, the originating entity will be MS, and the recipient will be WS. For
the secure distribution, the WS receives the public key as a parameter. This is
necessary since otherwise, the attacker could just generate its own keypair and
issue signed messages. In this manner, any message signed by MS will be ori-
gin authenticated and just sending it via a public channel will actually model an
origin-authenticated channel.
• Pchannel. Modeling insecure channels does not require any special consideration
other than declaring the channels as public (more precisely, not declaring them
as private).
The User process. This process represents users willing to be registered in a new site.
In our model the user has three attributes: a hostname, an email account, and a pass-
word for that email account. They are represented in the code in Figure 5.3 through
Figure 5.7 as u,e and pwd, respectively. The hostname u represents the “name” or IP
address of the machine of the user. It is not a field strictly necessary for our protocol,
but it helps to determine the messages source. Note that it is declared as a new name
and always sent encrypted, but we make it public by sending it over the public channel
net in order to model that the attacker might know the hostname (or IP address) of its
victims. The email e is the actual identifying information used by our protocol, and it
is also used to simulate the fact that each specific WS may restrict the admissible email
domains. Thus, legitimate users (i.e., users with valid emails) declare their email as a
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new name within their code, and insert it into a table named emails used by the WS
to check that it is a valid email address. The email is also inserted along with the asso-
ciated password pwd in a table named msaccounts used by the MS to authenticate its
email users. Since tables are not accessible to the attacker in ProVerif, this successfully
models our assumption that only the legitimate owner of an email account can prove
ownership to the MS. Additionally, the email address is immediately sent out via the
public network to emulate the very possible fact that an attacker may know the email
address of its victim. The code associated to all these initializations is shown in Figure
5.3.
1 l e t userprocess =
2
3 new u : Host ; out ( net , u ) ; (∗ The machine name ∗ )
4 new e : Email ; i n s e r t emails ( e ) ; out ( net , e ) ;
5 new pwd: Password ; i n s e r t msaccounts ( e ,pwd) ;
Figure 5.3: User process code: initialization.
Once all the user’s internal data has been set, the user can start an SSL/TLS session
by sending out a message through the privateuserchannel (in line 3 of Figure 5.4).
The first field of this message specifies the host initiating the session, the second field
determines the other end of the communication (ws comes from Web Server), and the
third field is a nonce to avoid mixing up keys generated for different SSL sessions (this
is possible due to a subtlety in ProVerif, that allows the reasoning engine to resend
messages sent via private channels). Once the SSL session has been established, the
user sends to the WS her email address via SSL in the the message in line 8 of Figure
5.4. Here, the second and third fields determine the sender and receiver, the last is the
email, and the first is just a tag to ease debugging the protocol (the number indicates
the order in which these messages are sent). In the last step of this SSL session (lines 11-
13 of Figure 5.4) the user receives the ticket generated by the WS, along with the nonce
that will allow the user to verify the email that the WS has already sent at this point.
Only messages with the expected format, and encrypted using the SSL key negotiated
before will be accepted at this point. Since the key has been negotiated in with server
authentication, the user has guarantees that it indeed comes from the WS.
1 (∗ Es t ab l i sh the f i r s t SSL sess ion ∗ )
2 new n1 : Nonce ;
3 out ( privateSSLuserchannel , (u ,ws , n1 ) ) ;
4 in ( privateSSLuserchannel , (=ws,=u,=n1 , kssluws1 : Key ) ) ;
5
6 (∗ Send the r e g i s t r a t i o n request ∗ )
7 event UserReqReg ( e ) ;
8 out ( net , senc ( (msg1 , u , ws , e ) , kssluws1 ) ) ;
9
10 (∗ Receive via SSL the SSL t i c k e t and the email nonce ∗ )
11 in ( net , cmsg3 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
12 l e t (=msg3 , =ws , =u , =e , t i c k e t s s l : Ticket , ne : Nonce ) =
13 sdec ( cmsg3 , kssluws1 ) in
Figure 5.4: User process code: Initial registration request.
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Once the User receives the SSL ticket and the email nonce, she waits for an email
from the WS. Thus, she establishes an SSL connection with her MS and gains access
through authenticating herself by means of email address and the associated password
(line 10 in Figure 5.5). If the MS has received the email, it sends it back to the user, also
encrypted via the same SSL session. The user receives and decrypts it (lines 11 and
15, respectively) and in case the nonce contained within the email is the same than the
nonce received via SSL (this is specified with the =ne syntax in line 15), then she sends
to the MS an instruction to send an authenticated ACK message back to theWS. This last
step is performed in line 18 of Figure 5.5.
1 (∗ Fetch from the MS the email with the t i c k e t sent by the WS ∗ )
2
3 (∗ F i r s t : e s t a b l i s h an SSL sess ion with MS ∗ )
4 new n2 : Nonce ;
5 out ( privateSSLuserchannel , (u ,ms , n2 ) ) ;
6 in ( privateSSLuserchannel , (=ms,=u,=n2 , ksslums1 : Key ) ) ;
7
8 (∗ Second : Authent icate and rece ive the email ∗ )
9 event UserAuthMS ( e ,pwd) ;
10 out ( net , senc ( (msg4 , u ,ms , e ,pwd) , ksslums1 ) ) ;
11 in ( net , cmsg5 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
12
13 (∗ I f the nonce rece ived by email matches the one rece ived
14 via SSL , i n s t r u c t the MS to send an ACK ∗ )
15 l e t (=msg5 , =ms , =u , =ne ) = sdec ( cmsg5 , ksslums1 ) in
16
17 event UserReqSendACK( e , t i c k e t s s l , ne ) ;
18 out ( net , senc ( (msg6 , u ,ms , e , ne ,pwd) , ksslums1 ) ) ;
Figure 5.5: User process code: Secure email verification and acknowledgment.
In the last step the user has to send back the SSL token to the WS in order to com-
plete the registration. To do so, the user establishes a new SSL session in lines 3 and 4 of
Figure 5.6. Indeed, this models the probable fact that the user could need to establish
a new SSL session with the WS instead of using the previous one (e.g., the user can
perform this last step the next day after initiating the registration, or after rebooting
her machine). Finally, the user sends the SSL ticket back to the WS (in line 6). When
the WS receives the ticket, it will check that it matches the ticket sent to this user and
that the ACK sent by the MS has already been received. This last check is of the utmost
importance in order to be sure that the user is the owner of the email address. Sub-
sequently, the identity is generated and sent to the user, who receives and decrypts it
in lines 7 and 9 of Figure 5.6. Again, given that the SSL session has been established
with server authentication, the user can correctly assume that the new identity actually
comes from the WS.
Therefore, Figure 5.3 through Figure 5.6 compose a realistic model of the typical
users that would take part in our registration protocol.
The Mail Server. The MS process emulates the behavior of the mail servers that take
part in our protocol. The initialization of this process just consists of receiving two
parameters: the MS private key, and the WS public key. Both keys are generated in
the “main” process that initializes the environment and launches the processes corre-
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1 (∗ Send both t i c k e t s back to the WS in a new SSL sess ion ∗ )
2 new n3 : Nonce ;
3 out ( privateSSLuserchannel , (u ,ws , n3 ) ) ;
4 in ( privateSSLuserchannel , (=ws,=u,=n3 , kssluws2 : Key ) ) ;
5
6 out ( net , senc ( (msg8 , u ,ws , e , t i c k e t s s l ) , kssluws2 ) ) ;
7 in ( net , cmsg9 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
8
9 l e t (=msg9 ,=ws,=u,= e ,= t i c k e t s s l , id : Id ) = sdec ( cmsg9 , kssluws2 ) in
10 event UserRecvId ( e , id , t i c k e t s s l , ne ) ;
11 0 .
Figure 5.6: User process code: Identity retrieval.
sponding to each entity. Indeed, this is a reasonable way of modeling the real world
scenario in which each trusted server has its own private key, certified by some Certifi-
cation Authority, and the public key is accessible to anyone else. The MS is “invoked”
by receiving a message containing a nonce, and having as final destination a certain
email address. This is performed in line 5 of Figure 5.7. Note that it is sent via the
public channel (net) without neither encryption nor digital signatures, which models
the real scenario where the MS cannot determine the email source (it could be either
the WS or an attacker) and eavesdropping is possible (since an attacker can read the
email sent by the WS).
After receiving the message with the nonce, the MS waits until a new SSL session
is established and someone provides a valid email account along with the associated
password (checked by accessing the msaccounts table). This is done in lines 11-15 in
Figure 5.7. When that occurs, the MS sends to the user (line 20 in Figure 5.7), and
through the recently established SSL session, the email previously received. Hence, at
this point the legitimate owner of the email account has received the registration email
(lines 11-15 in Figure 5.5). When the MS receives from the user (lines 24-25 of Figure
5.7) the message instructing it to send the ACK message to theWS, prepares it and sends
it along with the corresponding digital signature (in line 29).
The Web Server. For readability, we omit the WS code, since its behavior is deter-
mined by the code presented for the User and the MS (the model source code is com-
pletely available online9. However, it is worth noting that the WS is charge of a set
of verifications that should be carried out very carefully. First, it needs to verify that
the email address belongs to a trusted domain (and that this domain provides the ACK
functionality). After sending the SSL ticket and the email nonce via the SSL session,
and the email to the MS, the WS will mark the status of the current registration as mail
verification pending. It is of the utmost importance that the WS does not continue the
registration process until it receives the digitally signed ACK message from the MS. Af-
ter receiving the ACK message and the SSL ticket (and verifying that the ticket matches
the one sent during this registration), the WS has the certainty that whoever started
the registration is the owner of the email account. Thus, it can complete the registra-
tion process by creating and sending the digital identity using the same SSL session
established to send back the SSL ticket.
9http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz
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1 l e t msprocess ( kmsprv : PrvKey , kwspub : PubKey ) =
2
3 (∗ Receives an email ∗ )
4 (∗ Note tha t i t i s not encrypted nor authent i ca ted ∗ )
5 in ( net , (=msg2 , =ws , =ms , e : Email , ne : Nonce ) ) ;
6
7 (∗ Receives a SSL sess ion ∗ )
8 in ( privateSSLmschannel , (u : Host ,=ms , n2 : Nonce , ksslums1 : Key ) ) ;
9
10 (∗ Receive au then t i ca t i on via the SSL sess ion ∗ )
11 in ( net , cmsg4 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
12 l e t (=msg4 ,=u,=ms,= e ,pwd: Password ) = sdec ( cmsg4 , ksslums1 ) in
13
14 (∗ Check the password ∗ )
15 get msaccounts (=e ,=pwd) in
16
17 event MSVerifAcc ( e ,pwd) ;
18
19 (∗ Send email secure ly via SSL ∗ )
20 (∗ Note tha t a t t h i s point , the user i s authent i ca ted to MS ∗ )
21 out ( net , senc ( (msg5 ,ms , u , ne ) , ksslums1 ) ) ;
22
23 (∗ Wait fo r an i n s t r u c t i on to send ACK ∗ )
24 in ( net , cmsg6 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
25 l e t (=msg6 ,=u,=ms,= e ,=ne ,=pwd) = sdec ( cmsg6 , ksslums1 ) in
26
27 (∗ Send signed ACK to WS ∗ )
28 event MSSendsACK( e , ne ) ;
29 out ( net , ( ( msg7 ,ms ,ws , e , ne ) , s ign ( (msg7 ,ms ,ws , e , ne ) , kmsprv ) ) ) ;
30 0 .
Figure 5.7: Mail Server process code.
Step 8. Procedural verification. With the protocol formalization, all that is left is to
produce the formal security “queries” and evaluate themwith the chosen tool/method.
This is done with the help of Algorithm 3.4 in Chapter 3, which is based on the informal
requirements produced at step 4. Basically, the algorithm goes through all the informal
requirement, starting at the last protocol step, until all the elements are assigned some
requirement (or none) or all the messages/checks of the protocol are explored. In this
case, the result is straightforward, since all the elements are assigned a requirement at
the final step. We now specify the final requirements for each element, after applying
the mentioned algorithm, and how they are verified with the code along with the re-
sult produced by ProVerif. The results here shown can be reproduced with the code
available online10. Note that the ticket′ and nonce′ elements are not explicitly included
in this analysis, since after a successful execution, they must be the same as the original
ones. Hence, if the protocol is secure for the latter, it is secure for the former too.
• email (Requirements: User Authenticity). This is verified in ProVerif using the events
UserAuthMS(email,pwd) and MSVerifiesAccount(email,pwd). Events in ProVerif are
operations that can only be executed by legitimate processes, by definition. Cor-
respondence chains of these events, with variables, are used to prove authenticity
[42]. They can be injective or not injective. For simplicity, we do not make this dis-
10http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz
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tinction here, even though it is made in the provided source code. The former is
executed only by users and the latter only by the MS. Then, we ask ProVerif whether
or not the latter is always preceded with at least one of the former, to which ProVerif
answers with:
RESULT event(MSVerifAcc(email,pwd))
==> event(UserAuthMS(email,pwd)) is true.
• ticket (Requirements: Authenticity, Confidentiality). To prove user-side authentic-
ity, we use the events UserReqReg(email) and WSSendsTickets(email,ticket, nonce).
Specifically, the latter, invoked by the WS, must be preceded by the former, invoked
by the User. For server-side authenticity, we use the event UserReceivesID(email,id,
ticket,nonce), executed by theUser, whichmust be preceded by WSSendsTickets(email,
ticket,nonce) and UserReqReg(email), executed by theWS and User, respectively. To
both queries, ProVerif returns:
RESULT event(UserRecvId(email,id,ticket,nonce))
==> event(WSSendsId(email,id,ticket,nonce)) is true.
RESULT event(UserRecvId(email,id,ticket,nonce))
==> (event(WSSendsTickets(email,ticket,nonce)) &&
event(UserReqReg(email))) is true.
For confidentiality, we use a workaround. Since attackers can initiate registration re-
quests (base assumption), they can actually receive ticket tokens, even though these
tickets may not be finally used to obtain an ID. However, since ProVerif explores
the execution flow in order, once the attacker obtains a ticket, it will output that the
requirement is violated. To model this, we use an additional ticket, named acctick-
etssl , which is only created when a ticket is accepted by the WS. This ticket is also
sent to the public network, but encrypted with the SSL key negotiated for the last
message exchange. Hence, if the attacker gains this token, it is because she has suc-
cessfully completed all the previous steps. Asking ProVerif about this, it outputs:
RESULT not attacker(accticketssl) is true.
• nonceeml (Requirements: Authenticity). The reasoning made for proving authenticity
of ticket holds here, since nonceeml is covered by the same events.
• pwd (Requirements: User Authenticity, Confidentiality). Confidentiality is proved
with: query pwd:Pwd; attacker(new pwd), to which ProVerif answers:
RESULT not attacker(pwd) is true
For authenticity, the event correspondences used to prove email authenticity are
valid, since they also include the password.
• ACK (Requirements: Authenticity). This requirement is demonstratedwith three differ-
ent events, event(WSProcACK(email,ticket,nonce)), event(MSSendsACK(email,nonce)
and event (UserReqSendACK(e,ts,n)). The parameters are the ticket and nonce sent
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because they are actually what define the ACK uniqueness in the real protocol. The
first event is executed by the WS, the second by the MS and the latter by the User.
Finally, the WS event must be preceded by the other two. ProVerif responds to this
query that the correspondence is maintained:
RESULT event(WSProcACK(email,ticket,nonce))
==> (event(MSSendsACK(email,nonce)) &&
event(UserReqSendACK(email,ticket,nonce))) is true.
• ID (Requirements: Authenticity, Confidentiality). Authenticity is proved with the
events UserRecvId and WSSendsId already used for ticket authenticity. Confidentiality
is verified with: query id:Id; attacker(new id), to which ProVerif outputs:
RESULT not attacker(id) is true.
Finally, having demonstrated that all the security requirements are kept, we can
safely conclude that the model of our design candidate is actually secure. Still, in the
next section we provide a supplementary analysis, showing the necessity of all the
elements included in our approach.
5.3.3 A minimality analysis
In this section we study why are the main components of the protocol necessary. This
includes the SSL/TLS ticket, the ACKmessage and the email nonce. However, we do not
include here the general purpose message components like the message tags, which are
used for easing the debugging process, nor the sender and recipient identities, which
are a general good practice in protocol design, as stated in [5]. Additionally, we will
finish this section by making some remarks on instruction ordering issues that might
thwart the protocol’s objective, lest they are executed in the wrong order. We will
use the notation encK(·) when a message is sent (symmetrically) encrypted under the
(symmetric) key K, and signprv(H)(·) when a message is sent signed under the private
key of host H. For readability, we do not include the SSL/TLS key negotiations, and
just use the name KSSLi for the key negotiated and used during the i-th SSL session
within an attack trace. We also omit in the attack traces shown below the message
tags and the sender and recipient identifiers that were included in the messages of the
formal definition of the protocol.
SSL/TLS ticket. This element plays a key role in our protocol, since it allows us to
guarantee that the user who starts a registration request will be the only one capable to
complete it. This can be tested by removing the field ticketssl from all the messages
(and events) in the source code available online11. Once this so weakened model of the
protocol is run with ProVerif, the (naive) attack trace informally shown in Figure 5.8 is
returned.
ACK message. As we have emphasized above, the ACK message sent to the WS is
essential in our protocol. It is the message guaranteeing that the User is indeed the
owner of the email address that she specified. Without it, even with the SSL ticket, an
11http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz
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User →WS : encKSSL1 (email)
WS → User : encKSSL1 (Nonceemail)
WS → MS : Nonceemail
User → MS : encKSSL2 (email, password)
MS → User : encKSSL2 (Nonce
′
email)
User: Checks Nonce′email = Nonceemail
User → MS : encKSSL2 (ACK)
MS →WS : signprv(MS)(ACK,Nonceemail)
Attacker →WS : encKSSL3 (email)
WS → Attacker : encKSSL3 (ID(email))
Figure 5.8: Attack trace when the SSL ticket is not used. The attacker might wait until
a legitimate user starts a registration and instructs the MS to send the ACK
message. Afterwards, blocking the user’s communications and establish-
ing an “illegitimate” SSL session with the WS she would be able to retrieve
the user’s identity.
attacker would be able to obtain an identity related to any user. Again, removing the
ACK message from the provided code12,we obtain the attack trace shown in Figure 5.9
with ProVerif.
Attacker →WS : encKSSL1 (emailvictim)
WS → Attacker : encKSSL1 (TicketSSL,Nonceemailvictim )
WS → MS : Nonceemailvictim
Attacker →WS : encKSSL2 (TicketSSL, emailvictim)
WS → Attacker : encKSSL2 (ID(emailvictim))
Figure 5.9: Attack trace when the ACK is removed from the protocol. The attacker
starts from the beginning a new registration process, specifying the email
address of its victim.
In our protocol, the email nonce is used to guarantee that the ACK received corre-
sponds to a single email sent to the user, and to allow the user to check that the email
received actually corresponds to the original request. Hence, it might be tempting to
also use it to prove that the user has read the email (this is exactly what is done in clas-
sic EBIA). However, given that the email is sent unencrypted, an attacker could easily
obtain it and send it back to the WS in the last SSL session. Thus, just using the knowl-
edge of the email nonce as an implicit ACK is not enough. Indeed, this is the assumption
in classic EBIA that makes the protocol insecure.
Email nonce. If the WS does not include the email nonce in the same message where
the SSL ticket is sent, another attack is enabled, since the user is not able to link her legit-
imate registration request with the received registration email. Thus, even by sending
the ACK message, an attack is possible. By removing the email nonce from message 3 in
Figure 5.1 (and thus the check in message 5 that compares the nonce received via SSL
and the nonce in the email), we encounter the attack trace depicted in Figure 5.10, after
some polishing of the trace produced by ProVerif.
12http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz
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User →WS : encKSSL1 (email)
WS → User : encKSSL1 (TicketSSL)
WS → MS : Nonceemail
Attacker →WS : encKSSL2 (email)
WS → Attacker : encKSSL2 (Ticket
′
SSL)
WS → MS : Nonce′email
User → MS : encKSSL3 (email, password)
MS → User : encKSSL3 (Nonce
′
email)
User → MS : encKSSL3 (ACK(Nonce
′
email))
MS →WS : signprv(MS)(ACK,Nonce
′
email)
Attacker →WS : encKSSL4 (Ticket
′
SSL, email)
WS → Attacker : encKSSL4 (ID(email))
Figure 5.10: Attack trace when the email nonce is not sent jointly with the SSL ticket.
The attacker can make the WS believe that it is issuing an ID related to
an acknowledged email account, to the same user who requested to be
registered.
Note that theWS receives two registration requests related to the same email. How-
ever, this may very well be a normal situation. For instance, a user could request reg-
istration but, somehow, lose the received SSL ticket and thus, in order to complete
registration, she would need to fetch a new one. Taking advantage of this, when the
attacker sees its victim requesting registration, she sends a new request for the same
email address, and gets a valid ticket. The user may receive two registration emails.
However, she could easily think that it is a server malfunction (after all, she has actu-
ally requested registration). Furthermore, the attacker could even block one of those
two emails, in order to avoid suspicion. After the user sends the ACK, the attacker estab-
lishes a new SSL session with theWS and provides it the ticket obtained in the previous
step. Since the WS has already received the ACK, it sends the identity to the attacker.
5.3.4 The importance of a correct ordering
From the previous subsections we can already deduce that the checks performed by
the users and the WS are of the greatest importance. However, it is worth emphasizing
that not only the checks, but also the order in which they are performed with respect
to the messages reception and sending, is crucial for the protocol.
Firstly, the user must check that the nonce contained in the received email actually
matches the nonce received altogether with the SSL ticket. Once this check is success-
fully performed, and only then, the user can safely instruct the MS to send the signed
ACK to the WS. If this order is not followed, an attack similar to the one shown in Figure
5.10 is enabled.
Secondly, the WS needs to wait until receiving the signed ACK message from the MS
before completing a registration request. That is, even though the WS receives back the
SSL ticket from an already initiated registration request, it must not finalize it until the
ACK has been received. As a matter of fact, the ACK is the only token proving that the
user who is sending back the SSL ticket is the owner of the email address. If this order
is broken, an attack like the one depicted in Figure 5.9 would be possible.
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5.4 Usability, additional costs and trust assumptions
As we have shown, our protocol guarantees authenticity of the registering users and
secrecy of the created identities. Thus, it implements a correct registration protocol.
Still, it remains to analyze how usable our protocol is, and whether the introduced
modifications imply acceptable costs (both in terms of communication/computational
costs and in terms of the required modifications on the underlying infrastructure) or if
they are otherwise unrealistic.
From the design complexity perspective, and concerning the necessary modifica-
tions to the underlying infrastructure, our protocol strictly follows the properties of the
infrastructure that is currently being used by EBIA systems. Namely, we have consid-
ered the security properties provided by the available communication channels, i.e.,
confidential and server authenticated SSL/TLS sessions, and unencrypted and unau-
thenticated email messages. The only necessary addition is an authenticated channel
between two trusted servers (the Mail Server and the Web Server performing the regis-
tration). However, even though this supposes an extension to the typical functionality
of mail servers, it is not a too cumbersome functionality to be implemented. In fact,
the DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [70] method provides a very close functionality.
By means of DKIM, a signing domain digitally signs an email message, gaining some
responsibility over it. Many email providers (e.g. Gmail, Yahoo) use it to reduce spam
by signaling trusted emails Also, according to http://eggert.org/meter/dkim, it is a
widely deployed technology. For instance, an email provider could easily implement
our ACK method by adding a few email filtering rules in conjunction with DKIM13.
From the point of view of the communication costs, we show in Table 5.3 a relation
of which messages are added with respect to EBIA and with respect to the equivalent
solution of [182]. We also compare SEBIA with [182] because it is the one that most
resembles our proposal in terms of aims and construction. Note that three messages
are added when compared to EBIA, and only two when comparing with [182]. With
respect to EBIA, we add the SSL ticket, the nonce sent in the second message of our
protocol, and the messages used as explicit acknowledgment (originated by the user
and forwarded by the Mail Server). In [182] the message containing the SSL ticket is al-
ready sent, so the only addition is the set of messages involved in the acknowledgment.
Moreover, each of these extra messages would probably be just a few tens of bytes,
hence they do not imply an unacceptable communication over-cost. As for computa-
tional costs, compared to EBIA, our scheme adds the computation of an extra random
element (the SSL ticket) by the Web Server, the creation of a digital signature by the
Mail Server (the ACK), and two bitstring comparisons (steps 6 and 10 in Figure Figure
5.1); compared to [182], our proposal just adds the computation of the digital signature
and the bitstring comparison in step 6 of Figure Figure 5.1. The bitstring comparisons
are cheap operations, and there are very efficient implementations of (pseudo) random
number generation and digital signatures. Besides, considering that registrations are
not the most frequent action in web systems, the extra costs would probably be quite
acceptable.
It is also important for the feasibility of our protocol to ponder if the imposed trust
relationships are realistic. And again, they are quite bearable. Note that we are using
email addresses as primary identifiers for the users that will be registered with our
13Although special care should be taken in some intrinsic properties of DKIM, like the possibility to re-
play messages, see https://wordtothewise.com/2014/05/dkim-replay-attacks/ (accessed on March
31st, 2015).
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Scheme 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 11
EBIA YES NO YES YES YES NO NO YESa YES
[182] YES YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES
aIn EBIA, nonceemail is sent here.
Table 5.3: Relations of messages SEBIA and whether or not they are also present in
EBIA or [182]. The additional messages, if absent, enable the attacks ex-
plained in previous sections. The numbers shown in the first row represent
the associated message of our protocol as shown in Figure 5.1 (e.g., message
2 corresponds to the message where ticketSSL and nonceemail are sent). In the
column below each number, we write “NO” when the corresponding mes-
sage is not present in EBIA/[182] and “YES” if it is indeed present. Note
that messages 3-5 actually belong to the process of sending an email and
fetching it from the mail server, hence, they are always present.
protocol. Hence, we need to trust that, when an account is compromised, the user
will take the necessary measures to, at least, inform of this fact. Therefore, this trust
relation depends directly on the measures that the email provider and its users take
to protect accesses to their email accounts. Luckily, it is a common practice nowadays
to protect authentication to mail servers using SSL/TLS and other additional security
procedures, like the Google Authenticator [110]. Note also that our protocol could
be extended with additional multichannel techniques during registration, like SMS or
push notifications14, to enable verification of mobile phone numbers (although guar-
anteeing that the owner of the specified mobile phone number and email address are
the same might be more challenging than what it seems at first sight). Concerning the
servers in our protocol (i.e., the Mail Server and the Web Server), they are assumed
to be trusted entities which have publicly trusted digital identities. Thus, establishing
mutually authenticated sessions between them, and server-side authenticated sessions
with any other entity, is something trivial. Of course, we do not take into account at-
tacks in which the user ignores server side certificates, or is deceived by seemingly
legitimate, but illegitimate, ones. Therefore, it seems that all the requirements placed
by our protocol, both related to technical and trust matters, are reasonable given cur-
rent infrastructures.
Finally, from the usability perspective, everything could be done just like with clas-
sic EBIA. Following the approach taken in [182], a plugin for email clients could be
developed to perform all the user-side tasks automatically. That is, the plugin will re-
ceive and store the SSL ticket and the expected email nonce. Once the corresponding
email has been received, it would check that the nonce included in the incoming email
actually matches the nonce received via SSL/TLS. Afterwards, the instructs the Mail
Server to send the authenticated ACK to the Web Server. As a matter of fact, a prelimi-
nary version of this protocol was actually implemented and applied to theMoodle plat-
form [77] (this preliminary version did not include the explicit authentication message
although, as we have observed, this could be done without affecting usability). More-
over, we conducted a survey on its usability and concluded that it was an acceptably
usable proposal (see [80, Section 5.5] for a summary of the usability test). Hence, our
proposal achieves a high level of security suitable for many situations without eroding
usability.
14E.g., Google Cloud Messaging or Apple Push Notification Service.
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5.5 Distributing [anonymous] credentials with SEBIA
As we have seen, the proposed protocol allows to verify the identity of any user who
owns an email account in a trusted email provider. Note also that we have not specified
the concrete form of this identity. In fact, what the protocol does is to establish a mu-
tually authenticated channel between the user and WS, having the latter a reasonable
certainty that the user is the owner of the email address.
Once established a mutually authenticated channel between server and user, it is
possible to run any desired method for generating personal credentials. This creden-
tials may be a new username and password pair, a private key and the corresponding
X.509 certificate, or whichever any other type of credential. The protocols employed
for creating credentials many times involve additional message exchanges, for ensur-
ing that the server does not learn any privileged information. Note however that this
is not a problem since, as stated, any arbitrary number of additional exchanges may be
done after the authenticated channel has been established.
Specifically, and for the case that will occupy us in the following chapters, anony-
mous X.509 identities may be generated in the last step of SEBIA. This anonymous
digital identities may then be managed with the mechanisms defined in Chapter 6,
and directly employed in the systems proposed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. As for
their implementation, libgroupsig of Chapter 4 would make it much simpler.
5.6 Chapter conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a registration protocol based on the EBIA approach
for generating identities associated to email addresses. Furthermore, the security prop-
erties expected from it have been analyzed in detail using the methodology defined in
Chapter 3 where, in this case, we have employed the automated verifier ProVerif.
Two aspects are worth to be noted about the proposed protocol. First, it provides
security guarantees that are reasonable for many situations arising in current Internet-
based systems. Moreover, it does so without eroding usability and it is deployable by
means of already existing technologies. Secondly, it does not impose any requirement
on the structure or contents of the generated identities. Therefore, it is suitable for any
system independently on whether it uses X.509-like identities, GPG keys, username
and password pairs, etc.
As for possible further work, it would be determining to actually implement it us-
ing the suggested technologies and obtain actual measurements of the associated costs.
In this subject, a prototype of a variant of this protocol, based on (simulated) SMS in-
stead of email addresses as authenticators for the users, has already been implemented
using the Android platform as base system [73] (which certainly shows promising re-
sults). Note that, even though in the definition of the protocol we have used email
addresses for identifying users due to the strong relation with EBIA, mobile phones
numbers are also suitable for this task. Since SMS messages may be considered to pro-
vide roughly the same security as email messages [97], exchanging one for another is
possible. The additional requirement would be that the telephony company also im-
plemented a service similar to DKIM. Also, usable solutions including multiple-factor
authentication methods, like Pico15 [177] would certainly provide enhanced security.
Finally, note that we place complete trust in the Mail Server (MS) entity: if it is cor-
15www.mypico.org. Accessed on December 27th, 2014.
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rupted or somehow compromised, the security of the whole process cannot be guaran-
teed. Therefore, achieving a variant of this protocol in which this trust is reduced will
certainly imply a great improvement.
As was mentioned in Section 5.5, the protocol in this proposal allows the distribu-
tion of any kind of identity, where the identifying element (or the Subject ID in X.509
jargon [185] would be the verified email address) via the secure channel established
at the end of the protocol. Specifically, it would be possible to distribute anonymous
credentials like the ones used in the following chapters of this thesis. Note that imple-
menting this protocol for the distribution of anonymous credentials we are one step
further into the process of creating privacy respectful, practical and realistic solutions,
using the existing infrastructure and widely deployed technologies. Furthermore, as
we will discuss in Chapter 7, this a variant of this protocol could be used in the context
of privacy respectful e-commerce therein proposed.
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CHAPTER 6
X.509-based fair anonymity
management mechanisms
Chapter based on and supported by references [21, 78, 84].
Since its creation, the Internet has increased enormously both in volume of users
and number of services provided through it. This, jointly with the increase in the com-
puting and storage capabilities, has led to vast amounts of data being constantly pro-
cessed and stored by private companies and government agencies. As a consequence,
a claim for privacy has also begun to gain strength. However, while robust crypto-
graphic techniques have been successfully applied in real systems to enhance security
properties such as confidentiality and authenticity, their application to anonymity (as a
mean to endorse privacy) has not been sowidespread, nor the adoption of the proposed
solutions so common, considering the proportion of users of any kind of anonymizing
solution over the total number of Internet users. This, in spite of the fact that robust
cryptographic primitives for anonymity and privacy protection have been proposed.
For instance, as shown in Figure 6.1, cryptographic primitives such as, group signatures
[65] and blind signatures [64] operate at the information level in order to ensure (infor-
mation) anonymity; or, at the communications level, we find anonymizing networks
such as onion networks [107] and mix networks [63] which ensure anonymity of the com-
munications themselves. Among the latter, Tor [91] is worth to be noted due to its
popularity. It is shipped as an standalone executable that does not hinder usability at
all (besides the unavoidable perception of lower download/upload speeds).
We argue that this lack of success of anonymity based systems is based on twomain
facts. First, because anonymity is a double-edged sword, which improves the overall
privacy of the Internet users, but that may be employed by dishonest users as a means
to perform illegitimate actions. For instance, in [145] the authors run a Tor exit node
for gathering statistical evidence for a further analysis of Tor’s traffic. They conclude
stating that it is not uncommon to see “hacking attempts, allegations of copyright infringe-
ments, and bot network control channels” routed through Tor. Or the study in [35], where
the authors find evidence of substantial traffic generated through Tor hidden services
and related to the botnet Skynet1. Additional informal evidence supporting the claim
that the anonymity provided by anonymizing services can be (and is being) misused is
the fact that there already exist services, like BlockScript2, which include explicit func-
1https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2012/12/06 (accessed September 8th,
2014).
2http://www.blockscript.com/features.php (accessed September 8th, 2014).
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Figure 6.1: Cryptographic primitives like group and blind signatures ensure informa-
tion anonymity; systems like mix and onion networks allow anonymous
communications.
tionality for blocking traffic, including data coming from Tor and other anonymizing
networks (BlockScript, offers a commercial service for blocking “unwanted” traffic and
sells the raw blacklist data for $12,000 per year). Hence, it seems that in order for robust
anonymity to achieve a wide acceptance, suitable solutions for addressing misbehavior
must be found. Besides dishonest actions at the client side, server side illegitimate ac-
tions are being sheltered through anonymous networks. For instance, looking at what
has received the name of Deep web [157], several illegal sites such as drug dealing mar-
kets and sexual abuse web pages may be found in a matter of minutes. An excerpt of
drug related websites linked from the Hidden Wiki3 is shown in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Excerpt of drug markets linked from the Hidden Wiki.
However, there are cryptography-based systems that allow reaching the intermedi-
3Available at http://zqktlwi4fecvo6ri.onion/. Accessed 11th May, 2014.
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ate point. That is, systems where anonymity is still the main component, but that may
be revoked in case of misbehavior, thus incorporating fairness. This kind of anonymity
is referred to as fair anonymity (see Definition 10 for fairness).
At last, our second argument for the unsuccessful deployment of anonymity, is that
when comparing fair anonymity cryptosystems with their equivalents dealing with,
for instance, confidentiality or authenticity, there is a lack of supporting infrastructure.
Taking as example the X.509 standard [185], a wide spread infrastructure exists that
provides support for managing the trust relationship needed for incorporating authen-
ticity requirements, which eases its adoption into the Internet. However, there is no
equivalent and complete solution for the management of anonymity-based infrastruc-
tures.
In this chapter, we propose a complete solution to this task that allows a complete
management of anonymous identities, based on the widely deployed X.509 infrastruc-
ture, and extending previous work by other authors [31]. Note that, once we are able
to distribute anonymous identities by means of the protocol proposed in Chapter 5,
we will be able to manage them with the extensions proposed in the current chapter.
These extensions, in turn, will compose a building block for more complex anonymity
systems, like the ones proposed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.
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6.1 Related work
We may distinguish two areas of related work for this chapter. The first one encom-
passes the research performed in the subject of infrastructures for implementing fair
anonymity. That is, any system which aims to be capable of being deployed over an
existing anonymizing network or system in order to incorporate fairness into it. The
second one comprises the standardmechanisms or proposals that may be used in order
to deploy fairness in a standard friendly manner.
Fair anonymity systems. In the area of systems (with practicality in mind) for imple-
menting fairnessmechanisms, several approaches have been proposed based on black-
listing of misbehaving users. The first of this type of systems was Nymble [128, 181],
which implements an efficient infrastructure that can be layered on top of Tor-like plat-
forms, and enables blacklisting of users during predefined intervals of time. However,
it places too much trust into two trusted authorities (the Pseudonym Manager and the
Nymble Manager). Since then, many alternatives have been proposed in order to solve
this problem. In BLAC [180], Service Providers (SP) keep their own blacklists against
which users have to proof non-membership in order to gain access (hence eliminat-
ing the Nymble Manager authority). But in this case, given their construction, this
increases the computational costs with respect to Nymble. In PEREA [24], the linear
cost introduced in BLAC at the SP’s side is eliminated, but it is shifted to the users,
who must perform costly computations to demonstrate that they do not belong to the
SP’s blacklist. Jack [139], BNymble [140], Nymbler [114] and the extensions proposed
in [112, 113] further refine these first approaches, by reducing the trust placed on the
authorities while keeping the additional costs within manageable ranks. They also add
new features, for instance Jack [139] allows users to generate their own authentication
tokens, and allows the incorporation of objective blacklisting techniques (by means of
contracts) proposed in [172]. The work in [112] further refines this later extension by
making the revocation dependent on the specific contract that has been allegedly bro-
ken. However, the aforementioned blacklisting proposals are all highly customized
systems, which complicates their incorporation into existing infrastructures and their
adaptability to new specific needs that may arise even in the context for which they
have been designed. In this section, we make a first proposal for addressing this un-
adaptability issue, by providing a means for revoking anonymity (at any degree pos-
sible), in an standard-like manner. Subsequently, in Chapter 8, we propose an exten-
sion to the Tor system for endowing it with a flexible and practical mechanism for fair
anonymity.
Practical fairness management. The most extended PKI is undoubtedly X.509 [185],
which makes it also the basis for the majority of the identity-related management tasks
over the Internet. X.509 specifies standard formats for public key certificates and a va-
riety of extensions for managing them, abstracting out as much as possible the inner
cryptographic details. Among the most important associated mechanisms, Certificate
Revocation Lists or CRLs [185, Section 7.3]are data structures, in the shape of lists, con-
taining serial numbers of X.509 certificates that have been revoked for some reason
(compromise, expiration, etc.) and are thus no longer valid. This CRLs are static, in
the sense that the CAs responsible for managing them periodically publish CRLs with
updated information, but clients are not able to ask for specific certificates. For solving
this problems, the Online Certificate Status Protocol or OCSPwas created, [150] allowing
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clients to ask about the status of any concrete X.509 certificate, at any moment in time.
Given the above, it would seem wise to adopt it, if possible, as a baseline for in-
cluding functionality for anonymity management, in order to minimize costs and both
ease and increase its deployability. Actually, the possibility for extending X.509 in such
manner has already been done [31], using group signatures [65] as the underlying cryp-
tographic primitive. The specification of X.509 certificates includes extensions that can
be used to add functionality to the basic digital identity infrastructure. In [31], these
extensions to X.509 certificates were used to incorporate anonymous digital identities.
With the derived standard mechanisms, the ease of systems deployment increases no-
toriously. Certainly, anonymous certificates, i.e., certificates sustaining and endorsing the
private/public keys of the underlying group signatures (introduced in Section 2.4.1)
would be easy to incorporate into current infrastructures, and any required change
would possibly be done with minimal effort.
It also is worth emphasizing that the X.509 standard is not the only option to handle
anonymous digital identities. For instance, the ABC4Trust project [54] also promotes a
standardized infrastructure to deal with Privacy Attribute Based Credentials (Privacy-
ABCs). Like ABCs, X.509 also allows the use of attributes by means of Attribute Certifi-
cates (see [185, Section 3]). However, from the perspective of the SDLC it is convenient
to use solutions granting usability, reliability, and scalability. Since general accepted
standards have been thoroughly evaluated and subsequently validated with respect to
those commitments, we propose to use the standard and already accepted X.509 infras-
tructure [185]. In other words, according to the principles of the SDLC our approach
minimizes the impact on existing infrastructures by making use of currently deployed
technology. It is worth noting that several proposals exist aiming to adapt group sig-
natures into current standard infrastructures [52, 120–123], however they either do not
use the X.509 infrastructure (which, as stated, is the most extended one) or do not ex-
plicitly deal with the issue of revocation which, as we will see, is essential for providing
a complete functionality.
To conclude, it seems appropriate and necessary to develop a mechanism that al-
lows incorporating fair anonymity into current systems. Moreover, such mechanism
must not be dependable on any specific technology, like it is the case of the mecha-
nisms explained in the first part of this section. As stated, X.509 is a natural candidate.
However, even though quite useful X.509 extensions have been proposed in [31] for
creating anonymous certificates, no extension is available for revoking them in case
they are misused or compromised. Indeed, without suitable mechanisms for revoking
anonymous certificates, no fairness may be provided. In the following sections we de-
scribe CRL and OCSP extensions for supporting such functionality. Additionally, due
to the inherent properties of anonymity, and with the context set in [31], in order to re-
voke such an anonymous certificate, it does not suffice to just present the equivalent to
a public certificate, and additional information must be provided. For addressing this
issue, we also define in this chapter the Anonymous Certificate Fairness Protocol (ACFP ).
6.2 CRL and OCSP extensions for anonymous certificates
In the same manner than the X.509 standard allows extension mechanisms for incorpo-
rating additional functionality to X.509 certificates, the same is possible for Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs) and the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). By extending
thesemechanisms, which comprise the twomainmethods used for implementing revo-
cation within X.509, we match the functionality available for X.509 anonymous certifi-
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cates with that already being employed with conventional X.509 certificates. However,
when referring to revocation within an anonymous setting, two types of revocation are
possible: unlinkability revocation and anonymity revocation . The former type is applicable
for anonymity schemes that prevent different actions performed by a same anonymous
user to be linked among themselves. Thus, unlinkability revocation implies that those
actions will no longer be unlinkable. On the other hand, anonymity revocation directly
returns the real identity associated to the anonymous one. Therefore, it is a stronger
revocation type with respect to privacy. If fairness is to be implemented through re-
vocation, the two types must be accounted for. In this section we design extensions
to CRL and OCSP for implementing this functionality. ASN.1 like definitions of these
extensions are included in Appendix A.
6.2.1 Anonymity revocation with CRLs
A Certificate Revocation List is a list of X.509 certificates (more precisely, their identifiers)
that have been revoked and are thus considered as no longer valid for the usage they
were issued for. Whoever is interested in keeping an up to date list of these revoked
certificates, needs to regularly request updates on these lists to the proper certification
or revocation authority.
In order to extend the CRL mechanism for supporting revocation of unlinkability
and anonymity, we must make use of the CRL entry extensions [185, Section 8.5.2].
Specifically, we need to add means for indicating the type of revocation that a CRL
entry is dealingwith. Hence, within the CRL entry extension depicted revocationType
in Figure 6.3, we add a tag field for indicating the revocation type, which may take the
following values and intended uses:
• normal : Conventional X.509 certificate revocation.
• group : Revocation of a complete group.
• unlinkGroupMember : Unlinkability revocation of group members.
• anonGroupMember : Anonymity revocation of group members.
The first two types will usually be equivalent in terms of the information they con-
vey, but the group type emphasizes that it is dealing with a group certificate instead of
a conventional one. The last two values will be used for publishing a sequence of re-
vocation information of all the group members whose unlinkability or anonymity has
been revoked.
Entry Type
[ Optional ] Rev. Info.
Figure 6.3: revocationType extension for CRLs. The optional Rev. Info. field will
only be present when Entry type takes the values unlinkGroupMembers
or anonGroupMembers.
Note that, depending on the value of the revocation type field, the extension will
also include the information required for revoking the anonymity or unlinkability prop-
erty of the corresponding group member. The specific contents of the Rev. Info.
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field will vary according to the specific group signature scheme. For illustrative pur-
poses, Figure 6.4 shows a sample of how an extended CRL would look like.
Ce r t i f i c a t e Revocation L i s t (CRL ) :
Version 2 (0 x1 )
S ignature Algorithm : sha1WithRSAEncryption
I s sue r : C=US, ST=Sta te , L=Loca l i ty1 , O=Organization , OU=OrgUnit1 ,
CN=Admin/emailAddress=admin@org . org
Last Update : Jun 12 13 : 2 2 : 5 6 2012 GMT
Next Update : J u l 12 13 : 2 2 : 5 6 2012 GMT
CRL extens ions :
X509v3 CRL Number : 1
Revoked C e r t i f i c a t e s :
S e r i a l Number : 9B28ACA257136DE2
Revocation Date : Jun 12 12 : 5 8 : 5 2 2012 GMT
CRL entry extensions:
entryType: unlinkGroupMember
memberRevInfo: 7F:FF:FF:FF:FF:FE:30:E3
S e r i a l Number : 9B28ACA257136DE2
Revocation Date : Jun 12 13 : 2 1 : 2 5 2012 GMT
CRL entry extensions:
entryType: unlinkGroupMember
memberRevInfo: 7F:FF:FF:FF:FF:FE:29:F9
Signature Algorithm : sha1WithRSAEncryption
85 :7 c : e f : 4 6 : f c : 8 f : d5 : 0 4 : 7 5 : ba : 4 9 : 5 6 : a9 : 1 5 : c0 : f f : 3 1 : 8 7 : f1 : ed : 2 e : 1 7 : 8 4 : 3 c :
cc : 2d : c1 : 5 1 : c7 : 3 c : da : d2 : a8 : cb : 3 1 : e2 : 1 6 : 9 5 : f9 : bf : 9 2 : 0 d : 1 c : 0 3 : 4 3 : f2 : e f : 2 a :
2a : fa : fb : 6 5 : 8 c : 2 4 : 9 f : 8 c : d0 : 1 1 : cd : 3 0 : c3 : 3 6 : f9 : 0 3 : 2 a : 0 e : f3 : 5 4 : 4 5 : 1 0 : a1 : 30
Figure 6.4: A sample of an extended CRL (the parts in bold show the differences with
a classical CRL) based on the scheme in [132]. Note that the serial number
of the two revoked members is the same, since they are both related to the
same group.
Finally, it is worth to emphasize that this extension would allow the implemen-
tation, following current standard technologies, of the revocation techniques named
Verifier-local revocation in [45] and also suggested (and implemented) in [132].
6.2.2 Anonymity and unlinkability revocation with OCSP
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is a request-response protocol intended to
achieve a more agile acquisition of information about the status of certificates than that
provided by CRLs. Hence, it is necessary to extend both requests and responses to
bear the revocation of anonymous certificates. OCSP includes support for adding this
kind of extension using the singleRequestExtensions field [150, Section 4.1.1] for re-
quests and the singleExtensions field [150, Section 4.2.1] for responses. Our proposal
for the corresponding extension fields is sketched in Figure 6.5 and encompasses the
reqTypeInfo extension for requests and the rspTypeInfo extension for responses.
The Request Type specifies what kind of information the requester wants to obtain.
We include the following types for requesting different classes of status information:
• normal : for OCSP requests related to conventional X.509 certificates.
• group : to ask for the status of the group certificate (i.e. the group public key).
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Request Type
[ Optional ] ACFP ID ref
[ Optional ] Request Info
(a) reqTypeInfo extension for OCSP re-
quests. The ACFP ID ref field will
be present to reference evidence pro-
vided by means of ACFP. The Request
Info field must be present for Request
Types of unlinkability, anonymity or
groupSignature.
Response Type
[ Optional ] Status
[ Optional ] Revocation
Info
(b) rspTypeInfo extension for OCSP re-
sponses.The Status field must be
present for Response Types of unlink-
ability, anonymity or groupSigna-
ture. The Revocation Info will not
be present for requests of type normal,
group or groupSignature.
Figure 6.5: Extensions to OCSP requests and responses supporting anonymity and un-
linkability revocation.
• unlinkGroupMembers : to demand the revocation information for all members
with revoked unlinkability.
• anonGroupMembers : type for requesting the revocation information for all mem-
bers with revoked anonymity.
• unlinkability : type for requesting the unlinkability revocation information of
the issuer of a specific signature.
• anonymity : type for requesting the anonymity revocation information of the is-
suer of a specific signature.
• groupSignature : to request the status of the issuer of a specific (group) signature.
The first four types do not require any additional information other than a reference
to the group being asked about (which is already included in current OCSP requests).
The last three types, however, will require the inclusion of the optional field depicted as
Request Info in Figure 6.5a. Normally it would suffice to include a group signature,
although it might also be necessary to add some extra information. Hence, its internals
will depend on the specific group signature scheme and context. The ACFP ID ref field
will be used most frequently with requests of the three last types, when evidence exists
that may have recently caused a change in the status of the group signature included
within the Request Info. Its usage will become clearer when we explain ACFP in
Section 6.3. Figure 6.6 depicts a sample of an extended OCSP request.
For responses, depicted in Figure 6.5b, the corresponding response types need to be
added. Additionally, the Status field will be present when the response is of any of the
three last types in the previous list. Finally, the Revocation Info field may take differ-
ent shapes depending on the response type. It will not be present for normal, group or
groupSignature responses (they only inform about the status). For the unlinkGroupMembers
and anonGroupMembers types, it will be a sequence containing the revocation infor-
mation of all the members of the group whose unlinkability or anonymity has been
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OCSP Request Data :
Version : 1 (0 x0 )
Requestor L i s t :
C e r t i f i c a t e ID :
Hash Algorithm : sha1
I s sue r Name Hash : 49FB20671058982612F8CE969CC9070B3012DF6D
Is suer Key Hash : 87213371C00256ABEFF3CA6BB16078ED5499FC3B
S e r i a l Number : 9B28ACA257136FB7
Request Extensions :
OCSP Nonce : 0410221BC72A6359A7DBB8CCEB49AAF1F747
S ing le Response Extensions :
reqTypeInfo:
reqType: groupSignature
reqInfo:
33:82:0b:59:e2:1e:49:ef:e1:80:e6:e4:c7:7e:f5:cf:20:6a:72:b3:bd:8e:47:02:b5:9b:01:71:e8:
36:1b:0b:60:35:f0:d6:a0:cc:96:de:e6:77:e0:96:89:fc:47:6a:07:97:89:40:5d:02:9e:2b:31:52:
34:19:01:ae:94:f6:46:05:b7:d2:4b:f8:31:70:d1:5a:c9:00:65:94:e1:63:f6:03:98:8f:98:8e:7c:
46:f7:19:6f:8a:3a:9e:54:a2:d1:66:4f:f2:80:60:48:c5:26:df:ed:a6:a3:b1:50:25:64:05:64:b0:
e9:0c:f0:26:0e:fb:4f:31:97:b1:1c:dd:4e:f8:cb:84:69:e4:94:5a:d8:26:50:12:2a:c9:21:18:2c:
ca:57:be:28:b5:b8:98:62:b1:73:b3:45:7d:11:f1:e0:8a:a8:ba:7a:ae:9a:94:3f:ce:77:c6:76:ab:
fd:de:6b:a9:e5:5b:55:c9:2e:a2:72:b0:60:13:36:2d:aa:a2:24:3f:b3:04:72:06
Figure 6.6: A sample of an extended OCSP request of reqType groupSignature (the
parts in bold show the differences with a classical OCSP request).
revoked, respectively. For unlinkability and anonymity types, and in case Status
indicates that the associated member has been revoked, it will contain one single en-
try (instead of a sequence) with the corresponding revocation information. Again, the
contents of each specific revocation information token(s) will vary depending on the
related group signature scheme. Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 show samples of extended
OCSP responses for types groupSignature and groupMembers, respectively.
Response ve r i f y OK
0x9B28ACA257136FB7 : good
Request Extensions :
OCSP Nonce : DE64EFA69AC9E0B3984CADBF2B4E2F94E6D1
Sing le Extensions :
rspTypeInfo:
rspType: groupSignature
rspStatus: revoked
This Update : Jun 12 13 : 2 3 : 2 5 2012 GMT
Next Update : Jun 12 20 : 1 3 : 0 0 2012 GMT
Figure 6.7: A sample of an extended OCSP response of rspType groupSignature (the
parts in bold show the differences with a classical OCSP request). Note
that the status of the group certificate reflects that the group is still valid,
but the rspStatus field shows that the private key used to issue the given
signature has been revoked.
At last, note that it is possible to define new types of requests and responses as the
need arises, following the same structure, with the necessary new types definitions.
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Response ve r i f y OK
0x9B28ACA257136DE2 : good
Request Extensions :
OCSP Nonce : 78AE9E2F01E7C3E8A1031CADB7fB80E725B9
S ing le Extensions :
rspTypeInfo:
rspType: unlinkGroupMembers
Revoked members Information:
memberRevInfo: 7F:FF:FF:FF:FF:FE:30:E3
memberRevInfo: 7F:FF:FF:FF:FF:FE:29:F9
This Update : J u l 30 14 : 3 2 : 1 0 2012 GMT
Next Update : J u l 30 20 : 1 5 : 0 0 2012 GMT
Figure 6.8: A sample of an extended OCSP response of rspType groupMembers (the
parts in bold show the differences with a classical OCSP request). Note
that the status of the group certificate reflects that the group is still valid,
but one member revocation information field is added for each revoked
member key associated to that group.
For instance, it could be useful to include delta OCSPs4 for each of the GroupMembers
requests types.
6.3 ACFP: Anonymous Certificate Fairness Protocol
With the extensions to CRL and OCSP proposed in Section 6.2, we allow the revocation
of both anonymity and unlinkability using standard friendly mechanisms. However,
given the sensitivity of any kind of revocation in scenarios where anonymity is of im-
portance, it may be required to send additional evidence to an authority in order to
revoke either unlinkability or anonymity. To the best of our knowledge, no current
protocol exists supporting that functionality, which hinders the deployability of fair
anonymous systems [76]. To that end, we define here the Anonymous Certificate Fairness
Protocol (ACFP). Given the wide variety of contexts in which it could be applied, we
aim to define it as flexible as possible. This means that besides defining the necessary
information for guaranteeing its correctness, security and any other required meta in-
formation, we do not define the contents of any specific query, and just leave it as an
abstract field within a complete message. For that matter, different kinds of evidence
shall be required depending on the scenario and the specific policies to perform a re-
vocation.
The proposal of a completely new protocol could be read as a contradiction with
respect to our objective of reusing current technology as much as possible, according
to our pragmatism principle stated in Chapter 1. However, the well known encapsula-
tion and modularity principles for the design of protocols and programming interfaces
demand to identify functionalities and implement them independently [131]. In our
case, we could include the functionalities in ACFP to the current OCSP. Nevertheless,
this option makes OCSP a more complex protocol that addresses two different prob-
lems. In other words, we incur a violation of the previously commented principle for
the design of protocols and programming interfaces. In addition, as we will show next,
4That is, partial OCSP responses that contain only the information related to the group members that
have been revoked since the last query or a specified instant.
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we have followed the design principles of OCSP, what makes our proposal completely
suitable to be used within the same technological scenario based on X.509.
ACFP should allow clients to send any kind of evidence to a suitable authority.
Typically, a client (e.g. some service provider) that thinks that some misbehavior has
occurred related to an anonymous identity, will ask about the status of that identity
(through any means within those defined in Section 6.2). If the identity is not within
the revoked ones, then it will first send the required evidence to prove the misbehavior,
and then an OCSP request will be made by referencing the related ACFP conversation.
Note however that the client providing evidences does not need to be the same who
requests the status of a certificate. Alternatively, the ACFP authority could periodically
send revocation orders to CRL/OCSP authorities, related to group members for which
enough evidence has been provided recently.
Note that we are assuming that there is some kind of policy that enables authorities
to make a decision given a set of evidences. Thus, the client must also include a ref-
erence to a suitable policy, in order for the authority to be able to evaluate whether or
not a misbehavior has occurred according to that policy. In turn, this implies that dif-
ferent policies may require different types of evidences. Figure 6.9 shows our proposal
for transmitting specific evidences. The Evidence ID would be the same for all evi-
dences that are related to the same misbehavior, allowing to reduce costs and protocol
complexity by creating a “case” and reference it afterwards either from ACFP or from
OCSP requests (see Section 6.2.2). When no previous evidence has been sent, the ID
field can be left to NULL, and a new ID will be assigned in the associated response. The
Request type field and Policy ID fields establish a context for the current evidence:
the former indicates the aim of the current request, while the second specifies which
policy is related to it. For the Request type tag field, we define three possible values:
• evidence : type used for requests intended only to provide evidence of a misbe-
havior.
• unlinkability : used to ask whether or not there is enough evidence (for the
case specified in Evidence ID) to execute an unlinkability OCSP request.
• anonymity : to ask whether or not there is enough evidence (for the case specified
in Evidence ID) to execute an anonymity OCSP request.
The optional Evidence data field contains the evidence data itself, whose syntax
and semantics would vary depending on the specific group signature scheme and ap-
plication context. Additionally, it will only be present when the request is of type
evidence. Finally, the Single Evidence Extensions field is an optional field intended
to add any new functionality that may be required.
For instance, a real evidence structure for an unlinkability request might be as
shown in Figure 6.10. Upon receiving that evidence, and if deemed satisfactory, the
suitable authority would use the group signatures received within the evidence in or-
der to revoke the unlinkability property of the misbehaving signer.
One or more evidence structures may be included within a single ACFP request,
as shown in Figure 6.11. Besides them, a complete ACFP request is composed by: a
field indicating the protocol version; a field with the identity of the requester; optional
extensions; and a signature of the whole request. The signature for the requests is
made optional to enable any party to provide evidence of misbehavior in scenarios
that support it. However, it is up to the server to make it compulsory.
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Evidence ID
Request type Policy ID
}
Evidence
header
[ Optional ] Evidence data
[ Optional ] Single Evidence Extensions
Figure 6.9: Single evidence structure. The Evidence data field is present for requests
of type evidence. Extensions to the protocol may be included using the
optional field Single Evidence Extensions.
Evidence ID : 654887
Request type : Un l inkab i l i t y
Po l i cy ID : 57
Evidence data :
Group s ignature :
33:82:0b:59:e2:1e:49:ef:e1:80:e6:e4:c7:7e:f5:cf:20:6a:72:b3:bd:8e:47:02:b5:9b:01:71:e8:
36:1b:0b:60:35:f0:d6:a0:cc:96:de:e6:77:e0:96:89:fc:47:6a:07:97:89:40:5d:02:9e:2b:31:52
Group s ignature :
34:19:01:ae:94:f6:46:05:b7:d2:4b:f8:31:70:d1:5a:c9:00:65:94:e1:63:f6:03:98:8f:98:8e:7c:
46:f7:19:6f:8a:3a:9e:54:a2:d1:66:4f:f2:80:60:48:c5:26:df:ed:a6:a3:b1:50:25:64:05:64:b0
Group s ignature :
e9:0c:f0:26:0e:fb:4f:31:97:b1:1c:dd:4e:f8:cb:84:69:e4:94:5a:d8:26:50:12:2a:c9:21:18:2c:
ca:57:be:28:b5:b8:98:62:b1:73:b3:45:7d:11:f1:e0:8a:a8:ba:7a:ae:9a:94:3f:ce:77:c6:76:ab
Figure 6.10: Sample evidence structure.
Version Requester
} Request
header
Evidence
· · ·
Evidence


Evidence
sequence
[ Optional ] Request Extensions
[ Optional ] Signature
Figure 6.11: ACFP request composed by several evidences. Extensions to the protocol
may be included using the optional field Request Extensions. Servers
may demand signed requests, case in which the field Signature must
contain a valid signature of the whole request.
Responses to each individual request will follow the structure depicted in Figure
6.12. The Evidence ID field serves the same purpose than in the request (in case the
ID was set to NULL in the request, a new ID will be generated and included here). The
evidence response status field indicates the output obtained after processing the re-
quest, and it will depend on the specific type: the different combinations are shown
in Table 6.1. Basically, besides the conventional error statuses, an evidence response
status means that there is not enough evidence to either grant or deny any possible sub-
sequent OCSP revocation request (of anonymity or unlinkability type). On the other
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hand, the accepted and denied statuses accept or deny what is being requested, re-
spectively.
Evidence ID
Evidence Response Status
}
Evidence
header
[ Optional ] Single Response Extensions
Figure 6.12: Single evidence response structure. Extensions to the protocol may be
added by making use of the optional field Single Response Extensions.
A real ACFP single evidence response might look as shown in Figure 6.13.
S ing le Response :
Evidence Set ID : 654887
Evidence Response S ta tus : accepted
Figure 6.13: Sample single evidence response structure.
Req. type evidence anonymity unlinkability
R
es
p
on
se
St
at
u
s Malformation
UnknownID
UnknownPolicy
OK
evidence
accepted
denied
Table 6.1: Possible evidence response status depending on the request type. A shaded
cell indicates that the response status associated to that row is not possible
for the request type in the corresponding column.
In the same manner than ACFP requests, several single responses will be grouped
together, keeping the same relative ordering with respect to the associated request, in
order to conform a sequence of responses. A version field indicating the protocol
version, and a global response status (do not confuse with each single response status)
compose the response header. Also, optional response extensions and signature field
may be present. The complete structure is shown in Figure 6.14.
Once defined the functionality provided by ACFP, and knowing its relationship
with OCSP, we show in Figure 6.15 and Figure 6.16 the flow diagrams that server and
client (respectively) shall follow to solve typical requests. Note that, for simplicity, this
diagrams assume that the role of OCSP and ACFP authority is played by the same
entity. In a realistic scenario, this roles should be separated, and the communications
between them, secured.
For instance, an OCSP server receiving an request with the reqTypeInfo extension
with reqType set to groupSignature (see Section 6.2.2), where the associated key is not
already present in a CRL, and with a reference to an ACFP conversation with enough
evidence supporting the request, would act as follows:
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Version Response Status
} Response
header
Evidence response
· · ·
Evidence response


Evidence
response
sequence
[ Optional ] Response Extensions
[ Optional ] Signature
Figure 6.14: ACFP response composed by several individual responses. Extensions to
the protocol may be included using the optional field Response Exten-
sions. Servers may send signed requests, case in which the field Signa-
ture will contain a valid signature of the whole response.
Receive OCSP
reqTypeInfo
Involved
key
in CRL?
Respond accordingly
to CRL information
Contains
ACFP ID?
Search ACFP
conversation
Need more
evidence?
Send “Good”
Revoked?Send “Good”
Send “Revoked”
and update CRL
START YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO YES
Figure 6.15: Server flow diagram defining the relation between OCSP and ACFP for
evidence supported revocation requests.
1. Look up in the CRL (using the tracing functionality, see Section 2.4.1: fail.
2. Get the ACFP ID ref field of the request and search the associated conversation.
3. Check whether the referenced ACFP evidence is enough for granting the request.
4. Since there is enough evidence, update the CRLwith the signer’s tracing trapdoor
and answer the requestor with revoked.
From the client perspective, the relation between ACFP and OCSPmay be captured
as follows:
1. A client may directly perform an OCSP query, without referencing any ACFP
evidence. In that case, the server will see if the involved certificate has been
somehow revoked, or if there is any ACFP evidence related to it.
2. A client may first provide ACFP evidence concerning some misbehavior. When
it receives the ACFP identifier, the client may perform an OCSP query referenc-
ing that identifier. The server will perform the same actions as before, but also
considering the referenced evidence.
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Send new OCSP
reqTypeInfo with
received ACFP ID
Send new
OCSP reqTypeInfo
without ACFP ID
“Good”
rspStatus
received?
Revoked? End
Perform ACFP
conversation
with null
ACFP ID
Can
provide
further
evidence?
Can
provide
further
evidence?
End
Key
revoked?
Related
ACFP
conversation
exists?
Perform ACFP
conversation
with existing
ACFP ID
Can
provide
further
evidence?
Send OCSP
reqTypeInfo
with existing
ACFP ID
“Good”
rspStatus
received?
START
NO YES
YES NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
Figure 6.16: Client flow diagram defining the relation between OCSP and ACFP for
evidence supported revocation requests.
3. A client may just provide ACFP evidence to denounce some misbehavior, so that
the revocation authorities take the appropriate measures.
Finally, ASN.1 like definitions of request and responses in ACFP are given in Ap-
pendix A.
6.3.1 Policies
We have mentioned policies that take part into the decision on granting or denying a
specific revocation request. In light of [76], it is clear that policies take a central role
when it comes to provide fairness by the technological implementation of the legal re-
quirements that may arise in the specific application contexts. Naturally, some policies
are not subject to be processed in an automated way, and would have to be processed
manually5. However, many policies can be represented as a set of rules, procedures, or
some other method of automated reasoning. Authorities providing fairness can publish
the policies upon which they will accept requests for any of the revocation types they
support. If, according to some policy, enough evidence has been provided via ACFP,
5Note that, even in this case, ACFP is still required, since it is the way to provide (electronic) evidence
in an anonymized scenario.
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when anOCSP request arrives referencing that ACFP conversation, the revocation shall
be performed. Requests for which there is not enough evidence shall be discarded.
Example. Anonymous certificates and their revocation may be useful in any Internet
based communication system. For instance, a forum in a web platform. The forum ad-
ministrator could require its users to anonymously sign all the messages they post with
a fair traceable group signature scheme (e.g., [32]). In case it occurs some kind of mis-
behavior, the administrator could require a suitable authority to revoke the anonymity
or unlinkability of the author of a set of messages, if they were indeed sent by the same
signer. Using our protocols, this action would require the administrator to send the
evidences to a suitable ACFP authority. If there is enough evidence, the ACFP author-
ity asks the OCSP authority (probably referencing the previous ACFP conversation) to
revoke the misbehaving party.
The configuration of the revocation scheme has as a first step the publication of
a suitable policy by the ACFP authority. A simple policy is shown in Figure 6.17. It
states that, if there is evidence proving that the same signer has sent more than a pre-
defined threshold of messages within a predetermined time span, the unlinkability (or
anonymity) property of that member will be revoked.
# Input : array of s i z e n of messages
# ordered by date .
# Output : accepted , evidence or denied .
i f reqType = anon && n < ANON_N_LIMIT
return ‘ ‘ evidence ’ ’
i f reqType = unlink && n < UNLINK_N_LIMIT
return ‘ ‘ evidence ’ ’
i f have_same_signer
i f reqType = anon
i f timespan <= ANON_TIMESPAN_LIMIT
return ‘ ‘ accepted ’ ’
i f reqType = unlink
i f timespan <= UNLINK_TIMESPAN_LIMIT
return ‘ ‘ accepted ’ ’
re turn ‘ ‘ denied ’ ’
Figure 6.17: Sample policy for revocation due to spamming.
With this scenario in mind, take as example the case of combining the configura-
tion where only subsidiary authorities can trace misbehaving users (and other users
only learn the status of a certificate) and a group signature scheme offering the same
functionality as [32] is adopted. Suppose now that a service provider sends a set of
UNLINK_N_LIMIT messages, sent via the same SSL session, to an ACFP server. Since all
the messages come from the same SSL session, which was negotiated using an anony-
mous identity at the client’s side6, all the subsidiary authorities may conclude that
there is enough evidence to revoke the unlinkability of the originator. They conse-
quently send their shares to the master server, who will proceed to revoke the user’s
unlinkability property and contact the appropriate OCSP server for updating its CRL.
When the revoked user tries to establish a new connection with some service provider,
the latter would proceed to verify the associated private key, via the received group
6This would indeed be possible, using anonymous X.509 certificates!
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signature. Having the unlinkability of the former being revoked, the response would
be unlinkRevoked (or just revoked). Note that this does not even degrade the revoked
user’s anonymity to pseudonymity, since it is just associated to the revoked status.
6.4 Security considerations
An important step in the development of a security protocol is the identification of
the critical components along with the security properties required to each of these
elements. In our case, the information conveyed using the proposed extensions to
OCSP and with ACFP is highly sensitive. Thus, confidentiality. Moreover, confidential-
ity should be assured by impeding meaningful information leakage from the analysis
of the ciphertexts. Certainly, ciphertext indistinguishability is required since otherwise
an attacker could identify revoked users by comparing the transmitted revocation in-
formation (despite it being encrypted). Even though revoked users have seen their
privacy rights reduced due to policy execution, it may not be desired for outsiders to
learn which users are revoked. Additionally, the attacker would successfully differen-
tiate revoked users from non-revoked ones due to the different sizes in the responses
(issue solved with ciphertext indistinguishability).
Besides confidentiality, authenticity is at least desirable for responses. This is nec-
essary to avoid spoofing attacks in which an attacker introduces a fraudulent response
to specific requests (e.g. changing good for revoked in groupSignature requests and
thus, performing an effective Denial-of-Service on the victim, or by changing any of
the referenced identifiers in order to mislead the requester). For requests, the author-
ities may support receiving un-authenticated messages. This may be desirable when
they want anyone to provide evidence of a misbehavior. Note that this does not affect
the correctness of the system: if some provided information is not valid, the authority
just rejects it, being then the properties of the underlying group signature scheme used
to represent the anonymous identities responsible for ensuring the mentioned proper-
ties. Finally, for authenticity, ACFP supports optional signatures to be included in both
requests and responses. As for OCSP, it is possible for authorities to demand signed
requests too.
Besides these considerations, note that both OCSP and ACFP are implemented as
single exchange protocols (i.e., the protocol flow is composed just by a request and a
response). Thus, other than requiring confidentiality, authenticity and integrity, no fur-
ther requirement or formal proof seems necessary. For this purpose, we assume that
both OCSP and ACFP are layered on top of SSL/TLS with an adequate configuration.
As for additional security properties (e.g. robustness against misidentification or fram-
ing attacks [132] or distributed trust [32]), these would be directly inherited from the
chosen group signature schemes, as stated above, and our protocol does not impose
additional limitations on their adoption.
6.5 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we show some experimental results obtained with a simple setting. We
start by describing several possibilities for configuring a fairness infrastructure using the
proposed extensions. Next, we introduce the specific details of our testing environment
and the chosen cryptographic building blocks, which also have a direct impact in the
final computational and implementation costs. Then, we detail what information we
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have taken into account and how it is composed. Finally, we comment the obtained
results.
Based solely on the possible configurations of our proposal (i.e., ignoring the un-
derlying group signature primitive) several alternatives are possible. For instance, one
option would be for the ACFP server to be used just to store and process evidences:
the OCSP server would then ask about these specific evidences, when referenced by
common users, and use them to update the related certificates. On the other hand,
the ACFP authority could also hold the private information necessary to revoke mem-
bers. In that case, it would be the ACFP who actually revoked the certificates, and
then transmitted to the OCSP server only the status and all the tracing or identify-
ing information. Also, it is possible to offer different degrees of privacy by limiting the
supported types of request/responses depending on the originator of communications.
For instance, allowing anyone to obtain the revocation information of the members of
a group might be considered privacy threatening (even if there is enough evidence jus-
tifying revocation). Hence, the revocation authorities could decide to give that kind of
information only to trusted subsidiary authorities, while only responding requests of
type groupSignature (see Section 6.2.2) to the common public.
Even more flexibility (from the functionality perspective, and consequently from
the privacy perspective too) is provided by the fact that our proposal does not pose any
requirement on the underlying group signature technique, hence it directly supports
any privacy protecting technique compatible with group signatures. For instance, a
trust distribution strategy where authorities only own shares of the revocation keys
could be employed by making use of group signature schemes like the one proposed in
[32]. In that case, each authority holding a share of the revocation key must participate
in the revocation process in order for it to be completed. Using the ACFP protocol, this
“subsidiary authorities” would just have to send an ACFP request to the corresponding
“master ACFP server”, with the associated evidence and their corresponding share.
Other alternatives exist besides this trust distributionmechanisms. For example, group
signatures allowing unlinkability revocation, but not anonymity revocation, could be
applied if revealing the members’ identities is not admissible in some specific context.
Thus, systems can be configured on demand according to concrete legal/technological
needs in order to balance privacy and accountability.
Testing configuration. In short, we have implemented a simple OCSP server which
just responds to our extended requests, and a simple ACFP server that only knows
the policy shown in Figure 6.17. And of course, their corresponding clients. For the
tests, we used a group with 5000 members. 20% of these members were revoked from
the beginning (that is, not due to a policy execution)7. As specific values for the im-
plemented policy (Figure 6.17) we set ANON_N_LIMIT and UNLINK_N_LIMIT to 10 and 5,
respectively; and ANON_TIMESPAN_LIMIT and UNLINK_TIMESPAN_LIMIT both to 60 sec-
onds. In other words, 10 messages sent in less than 60 seconds are enough for granting
an anonymity revocation request, and 5 messages in less than 60 seconds are enough
for granting an unlinkability revocation request. As for the specific contents of the
requests and responses, for the OCSP extensions, reqInfo consists on messages and
their corresponding group signatures, and memberRevInfo is composed by an integer
for granted revocations. For ACFP, Evidence data is also a set of messages with their
group signatures, and the response is the appropriate code. All the tests have been per-
7This is important to be realistic, since in [132] the cost of signature verification is linear in the number
of revoked members, if we want to check if they have been issued by a non-revoked member.
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formed in a Quad Core Intel i7, with 3.40 GHz and 16 GB of RAM running Debian 7.5
with Linux kernel 3.2. Both servers (ACFP and extended OCSP) and the clients were
located in the same machine (hence, the communication time is negligible) and have
been implemented in C.
Cryptographic building blocks. In order to illustrate the flexibility of our proposal,
we have implemented a prototype supporting two different group signature schemes.
The first group signature scheme is the one defined in [132] and noted as KTY04,
whereas the second one is given in [67] and hereafter referred as CPY06. Both of them
have been incorporated into the prototype through the libgroupsig library described in
Chapter 4, and they both support tracing, required for handling privacy respectful un-
linkability requests. Note however that there are other schemes that may improve some
aspects of them, like the computational costs of the different operations (see the systems
described in [137, 138] as possible alternatives). An introduction to group signatures
is available in Section 2.4.1. Additionally, further experiments on different group sig-
natures are included in Chapter 4. As for their configuration, we have used a group
modulus of 1024 bits for KTY04 and a group order of 160 bits for CPY06 (according to
the NIST8 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) with 160-bit numbers provide roughly
the same security level than “non ECC” with 1024-bit numbers).
Experiments description. Several types of queries have been made, for testing both
the OCSP extensions and ACFP. The obtained results are shown in Table 6.2 and Table
6.3 where, within each cell, we include the following information:
• First line: average number of seconds required to attend a request.
• Second line: average number of bytes per request.
• Third line: average number of bytes per request that were used to transmit any
of the anonymous signatures included within the requests (including the request
signature itself). This is an important value to consider how much improvement
would be possible on the overall costs when using more efficient anonymous
signature schemes.
• Fourth line: average number of bytes per response. These responses include the
corresponding trapdoors in case of granted revocations.
In the case of OCSP, we are interested in measuring the additional costs introduced
by the extensions. For this purpose, we have performed the following queries, obtain-
ing the results shown in Table 6.2.
1. reqType equal to groupSignature for signatures issued by unrevoked members.
Therefore, these requests originated a response with rspStatus of good. During
these requests, a CRL look-up is performed.
2. reqType equal to groupSignature for signatures issued by previously revoked
members. These requests originated a response with rspStatus of revoked9. Dur-
ing these requests, a CRL look-up is performed.
8http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
9Our OCSP server does not differentiate anonymity and unlinkability revocations.
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3. reqType equal to unlinkability (resp. anonymity) for signatures issued by un-
revoked members, and providing an incompleteACFP conversation reference (i.e.
a conversation with not enough evidence). Hence, this requests were responded
with good. Within this OCSP requests, ACFP requests from the OCSP server to
the ACFP server were performed to check the validity of the referenced ACFP ev-
idence. For unlinkability requests, a CRL look-up is performed before consulting
the ACFP server.
4. reqType equal to unlinkability (resp. anonymity) for signatures issued by un-
revoked members, but providing a complete ACFP conversation reference (i.e. a
conversation with enough and valid evidences). This requests caused the signer
of the signature sent within the OCSP request to be added to the CRL (hence re-
voked), and where answered with a revoked rspStatus, along with the tracing
trapdoor (for unlinkability revocations) or the signer’s ID (for anonymity revo-
cations). Within this OCSP requests, ACFP requests from the OCSP server to the
ACFP server were performed to check the validity of the referenced ACFP evi-
dence. For unlinkability requests, a CRL look-up is performed before consulting
the ACFP server.
From the tables, two facts are worth to be emphasized. First, the communication
costs in terms of transmitted bytes decreases when using CPY06 to roughly 1/3 (and
sometimes even more). But secondly, the computational costs are worse, sometimes
even 25 times higher. These results are inherent to the employed schemes. CPY06
uses ECC, thus producing much smaller group signatures. However, while in KTY04
most of the operations are just performed using “simple” modular exponentiations, in
CPY06 some of them imply the muchmore time-consuming bilinear pairings. This also
shows the flexibility of different group signature schemes and, as mentioned above,
more crafted implementations of all the involved components will certainly produce
much better results. To establish a baseline with respect to conventional OCSP requests,
recent reports state10 that the latency of OCSP queries may be approximately in the in-
terval of 0.03 and 0.6 seconds. Looking at the results obtained for our extension to
OCSP, and keeping in mind that our experiments have been performed through a pro-
totype (thus, barely optimized), the comparison is promising. Depending on the type
of extended request, we have obtained an average latency time between 0.015 and 3.80
seconds (note however that our experiments did not take into account the roundtrip
time, as they were all performed locally). 0.015 seconds are basically in line with con-
ventional OCSP requests; as for the maximum latency of 3.80 seconds (obtained for
unlinkability requests with CPY06), it will probably be greatly reduced through an
optimization of the implementation of the underlying mathematical operations, and
through an optimization of the users’ groups and server equipment.
In order to evaluate ACFP by itself, we have performed the ACFP requests shown
below considering that the ACFP server first verified if the received evidence was cor-
rectly composed (the group signatures valid) and then applied the sample policy (Fig-
ure 6.17):
1. reqType equal to unlinkability (resp. anonymity), without providing any evi-
dence at all. Hence this requests were responded with an evidence rspStatus.
10See, for instance, the analysis by Symantec or Netcraft, at http://www.symantec.com/connect/
blogs/what-ocsp-0 (last access, March 23rd, 2015) and http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/
04/16/certificate-revocation-and-the-performance-of-ocsp.html, (last access, March 23rd, 2015)
respectively.
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OCSP
KTY04
rspStatus
good revoked
reqType
groupSignature
0.160 secs/request 0.084 secs/request
≈ 2734 bytes/request
≈ 2723 signature bytes
15 bytes/response 94 bytes/response
unlinkability
0.172 secs/request 0.241 secs/request
≈ 2742 bytes/request
≈ 2723 signature bytes
20 bytes/response 92 bytes/response
anonymity
0.015 secs/request 0.019 secs/request
≈ 2738 bytes/request
≈ 2723 signature bytes
16 bytes/response 21 bytes/response
CPY06
rspStatus
good revoked
reqType
groupSignature
≈ 2.23 secs/request
≈ 864 bytes/request
≈ 856 signature bytes
15 bytes/response 18 bytes/response
unlinkability
2.55 secs/request 3.80 secs/request
≈ 872 bytes/request
≈ 856 signature bytes
20 bytes/response 120 bytes/response
anonymity
0.03 secs/request 0.04 secs/request
≈ 868 bytes/request
≈ 856 signature bytes
16 bytes/response 21 bytes/response
Table 6.2: Experimental results for the extended OCSP tests using KTY04 (top) and
CPY06 (bottom). For requests of type groupSignature, we queried about
unrevoked keys for the data shown under the column good, and previously
revoked keys for the data shown under the column revoked. In both cases,
the field ACFPRef was unused. For requests of type unlinkability and
anonymity, we queried about unrevoked certificates, referencing enough
evidence for the tests shown in column revoked (hence, the corresponding
keys were revoked) and with not enough evidence for the tests in column
good (leaving the corresponding keys valid). All values are averaged over
1000 requests/responses.
2. reqType equal to unlinkability (resp. anonymity), providing UNLINK_N_LIMIT
(resp. ANON_N_LIMIT) evidences, but with timestamps of more than UNLINK_
TIMESPAN_LIMIT (resp. ANON_TIMESPAN_LIMIT) seconds away. Thus, this requests
were responded with a denied rspStatus.
3. reqType equal to unlinkability (resp. anonymity), providing UNLINK_N_LIMIT
(resp. ANON_N_LIMIT) evidences, with timestamps of less than UNLINK_TIMESPAN_
LIMIT (resp. ANON_TIMESPAN_LIMIT) seconds away. Thus, this requests were re-
sponded with an accepted rspStatus.
The obtained results are shown in Table 6.3. According to our protocol, all the ACFP
requests were signed anonymously (using either [132] or [67]). Note that the denied
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and accepted columnsmostly include the same information (except the bytes/response
row). Specifically, the same number of evidences (composed by messages and their
group signatures) are sent by the requester and processed by the responder. However,
only in those in the accepted meet the conditions in Figure 6.17 for granting a revoca-
tion.
ACFP
KTY04
rspStatus
evidence denied accepted
reqType
unlink.
0.015 secs/request ≈ 0.057 secs/request
2757 bytes/request ≈ 16500 bytes/request
2701 sign. bytes ≈ 14600 sign. bytes
26 bytes/response 24 bytes/response 26 bytes/response
anon.
0.016 secs/request ≈ 0.099 secs/request
2755 bytes/request ≈ 30225 bytes/request
2641 sign. bytes ≈ 24423 sign. bytes
26 bytes/response 24 bytes/response 26 bytes/response
CPY06
rspStatus
evidence denied accepted
reqType
unlink.
0.02 secs/request ≈ 0.09 secs/request
890 bytes/request ≈ 5290 bytes/request
856 sign. bytes ≈ 5136 sign. bytes
27 bytes/response 24 bytes/response 26 bytes/response
anon.
0.02 secs/request ≈ 0.16 secs/request
886 bytes/request ≈ 9687 bytes/request
856 sign. bytes ≈ 9416 sign. bytes
26 bytes/response 24 bytes/response 26 bytes/response
Table 6.3: Experimental results using KTY04 (top) and CPY06 (bottom) obtained for
ACFP requests of type unlinkability and anonymity for cases where no
evidence is sent (column evidence, where no evidence at all is sent), evi-
dence not satisfying the policy in Listing Figure 6.17 (column denied, where
5 group signatures are sent), and evidence satisfying the policy (column ac-
cepted, where 10 group signatures are sent). All values are averaged over
1000 requests/responses.
6.6 Chapter conclusion
In this chapter, we have outlined the necessity of the definition of standard friendly
mechanisms for themanagement of fair anonymity systems. The need of such auxiliary
but essential functionality stems from the fact that without practical means for revoking
anonymity, it will keep generating mistrust between service providers. These protocols
actually allow to incorporate the already existing cryptographic approaches for fair
anonymity, providing a means to reach an equilibrium in the balance between the right
of users to privately access information and the right of service providers to prevent
misuses of their services.
Moreover, with the extensions herein proposed to the X.509 for granting unlinka-
bility and anonymity revocations for anonymous certificates, we actually reach the same
functionality than was already available for normal X.509 certificates in a privacy re-
spectful manner that does not threaten legitimate users of anonymity. Further, we also
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create the necessary protocol (ACFP) for conveying any information that may be re-
quired to back up a revocation request. Instead of incorporating the functionality pro-
vided by ACFP into OCSP, we have chosen to create a new X.509-like protocol in order
to maintain a separation of each different functionality, for the sake of simplicity and
modularity. The combination of these new mechanisms enables the implementation of
fair anonymity via the X.509 infrastructure.
Moreover, the proposal of the mentioned mechanisms is accompanied by some ex-
perimental results via a prototype, showing its feasibility. This provides actual data
showing that the already proposed cryptosystems backing up the fairness functionality,
when implemented through our proposals, incur in bearable additional costs. More-
over, since our mechanisms are independent on the underlying cryptographic scheme,
switching between the existing alternatives is straightforward.
Regarding possible future work, an straightforward option is to implement these
protocols under the X.509 standard. This would allow them to actually be deployed in
current infrastructures, and get more insight of their behavior and limitations. Also,
we emphasize again that the three mechanisms (the extensions to CRL and OCSP,
ACFP) allow further extensions in order to incorporate additional functionality, may
the need arise. In fact, during the peer-review process of the work in [84], the exten-
sion of delta OCSPs (see Section 6.2.2) was suggested by a reviewer. Another possible
extension could be to differentiate what kind of privacy property has been revoked,
i.e., instead than just returning a revoked status, respond with additional anonRevoked
and unlinkRevoked literals. However, this may not be desired in some situations (e.g.,
provide this information only to authenticated clients). Additionally, if the costs of the
extensions to OCSP are considered unacceptable, exploring the compatibility with the
OCSP stapling extension [162] may constitute a good option. Through OCSP stapling,
the owner of the certificate (usually, a server) has to attach anOCSP response, signed by
the appropriate CA, to the message sent during the establishment of a connection. This
response (which may be fetched in advance) proves that the associated certificate was
valid at some recent time. Therefore, the latency time of an authentication is reduced
through “precomputation”. The contributions of the community (for instance, via an
RFC) would undoubtedly provide invaluable insight for any desirable extension. Fi-
nally, the key further action would be to actually implement the proposed extensions
and protocols, in order to enable the functionality they provide in real systems.
With the help of anonymity management mechanisms like the ones presented in
this chapter, fairness is actually possible in such systems using standard infrastruc-
tures which greatly eases their deployment. In Chapter 7, we propose a complete on-
line shopping solution where privacy provided through fair anonymity takes a central
role. Furthermore, Chapter 8 defines an extension to the Tor network based on anony-
mous identities. The identities in both systems could actually be managed with this
extensions, and implemented through the library in Chapter 4.
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Finally, in Chapter 7 of Part IV we compose a complete e-commerce system that
has been designed with privacy in mind. It is based on the advanced cryptographic
primitives introduced in Section 2.4. We also apply the security design methodology
of Part II in order to check that it meets the required security properties. Moreover,
with the help of the group signatures library also described in Part II, we show the
results of an experimental analysis we have performed to check that it does not incur
in unacceptable additional costs. Additionally, in Chapter 8 we outline an extension
for incorporating fairness into the Tor network. Both the e-commerce system and the
Tor extension are compatible with the registration protocol in Chapter 5 in order to
distribute robust cryptographic anonymous identities; and with the mechanisms and
protocols for anonymity management described in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 7
Caduceus: comprehensive fair
anonymous online shopping
Chapter based on and supported by references [87].
E-commerce, and accordingly online shopping, has been growing continuously (see
Figure 7.1), most likely due to the availability and convenience that it has brought to
consumers. Companies also enjoy e-commerce as they can improve sales by collecting
useful data from consumers, so as to serve consumers better and obtain greater profits.
However, at times, consumers may feel uneasy with these practices since user data
may be misused and thus may hurt aspects of their personal privacy [68, 72, 165]. Con-
sequently, a central question is whether a privacy supporting solution in this domain is
possible. A central challenge in this scenario is to find a good balance point so that not
only consumers but also companies (and other participating parties) find the system
useful. Considering that e-commerce mechanisms have to deal with various important
aspects of sales and payment processes, it is almost certain that any privacy-preserving
mechanism with poor support of some of these crucial features or processes would
simply be rejected in the real world.
In this chapter, we design a practical online shopping mechanism that provides
consumers with a viable choice to protect their privacy (when desired). Our proposal
constitutes a comprehensive system, meaning that it provides a functionality set equiv-
alent to that of currently deployed systems. Moreover, it does so while respecting the
privacy of its users. Furthermore, we provide some experimental results obtained by
means of a prototype of our proposal, showing that the additional costs are actually
reasonable. As mentioned in previous chapters, this system could directly benefit from
a variant of the registration protocol described in Chapter 5 and the anonymity man-
agement mechanisms introduced in Chapter 6.
Moreover, the security of this system has been verified using the methodology in
Chapter 3. Specifically, during the procedural verification stage this verification in-
cludes the formal and computational approaches. In this case, this is specially impor-
tant since the system is composed by complex cryptographic schemes and several com-
munication protocols. The formal verification assumes perfect cryptographic primi-
tives, and thus tries to break the system by automatically trying all the possibilities of
message alteration, replays and/or impersonation (by creating new “illegitimate” mes-
sages). The computational verification (done in [87]), on the other hand, deals with the
security of the system given the employed cryptographic primitives, and does not as-
sume that they are unbreakable. Instead, the security proofs are built on the grounds
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(a) E-commerce retail sales (in million dollars) in USA between 1998 and 2012. Data source
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Figure 7.1: Indicators of e-commerce growth in USA and EU-28.
of the properties that have been mathematically proved for the cryptographic blocks
that serve as a basis for our system. Thus, as we stated in Chapter 3, this combina-
tion offers further guarantees that our system provides the claimed security properties.
Actually the achieved Protocol Assurance Level, as defined in [142], would be the maxi-
mum, PAL4. We have called this system Caduceus, after the homonymous staff carried
by Hermes, the greek god for trade and commerce.
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7.1 Related work
The advantages that online shopping has brought to customers and retailers are straight
forward. To the former it has brought comfort, while to the latter it allows to increase
their target market and reduce costs. However, e-commerce has also brought the ben-
efits and drawbacks of big data. As studied in [72], payment information (specifically,
credit card metadata) is highly sensitive, allowing to easily identify customers from
pseudonymized data sets, requiring very few additional information. Moreover, this is
worsened by the circumstance that payment details may also be directly leaked from
merchants to payment providers and from payment providers to other data aggrega-
tors. While the minimum requirement for payment orders is to share the order total, re-
ceiving merchant and authenticated payment method, merchants seem to share much
more additional information, like products details, names, shipping costs and even the
customers’ names and addresses [165]. Thus, [72] states that few additional informa-
tion is necessary in order to reidentify customers from pseudonymized metadata sets,
and [165] shows that many times, this additional information may be leaked. This
certainly calls for online shopping and e-commerce systems that follow the privacy-
by-design principle, minimizing the risks of these threats as much as possible.
Privacy respectful online shopping has been divided in two types of systems de-
pending on the information hidden to the service providers [169]: private purchase
systems hiding the purchased items; and anonymous purchase systems, hiding buy-
ers’ identities. In [169], private purchase protocols are endorsed over anonymous pur-
chase ones, arguing that they allow customer management. These systems are based
on Priced Oblivious Transfer [10], and their anonymous access control mechanisms
are usually implemented through anonymous credentials [53, 69]. Also, according to
[169], anonymous purchase systems are incompatible with payment methods requiring
buyers’ authentication. In this case, they are usually based on e-cash [64], a powerful
primitive that has originated an extensive research in the context of payment systems
[58, 71, 152, 171], although real systems using it are yet scarce. In [125] an account-
based anonymous payment system is built upon mix networks (see Definition 8 for
mix networks), but it introduces extensive changes in the infrastructure. It is also signif-
icant the work on reputation systems [19] and signatures of reputation [33]. However,
these proposals only support monotonic aggregation of reputation, making it unsuit-
able when the reputationmay bemodified in any direction. There is also some previous
work about fair payment systems [56, 176]. However, as opposed to these e-cash based
schemes, ours is account-based, making it suitable for current infrastructures, natively
includes fraud prevention and marketing techniques, and allows the financial entities
to work with real identities.
7.2 Proposal overview
As stated, our system aims to provide an initial step towards privacy respectful alter-
natives to currently deployed and widely used e-commerce systems. As such, it must
incorporate functionality that may be comparable to them. For that matter, our system
incorporates the following features:
• Users opt-in to levels of privacy. Our system lets customers choose whether to use
anonymity for each transaction. Anonymous transactions are not linked to the
customer. Non-anonymous transactions (which are actually pseudonymous by
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design) update customers’ history so that they may get better deals in the future
(but this is the customer choice).
• Marketing tools. Our system supports marketing promotion/ affinity mechanisms
such as coupons, that are available for customers independently on whether they
purchase anonymously or not.
• Fraud prevention filters. Our system supports an appropriate set of tools to filter a
large set of fraud attempts from malicious customers, in a similar manner than it
is currently done in worldwide deployed systems.
• Dispute resolving. Our system has a procedure to resolve disagreements between
customers and merchants after a customer has paid for a product.
• Anonymous delivery. Our system is consistent with an anonymous delivery system
[18], and thereby suitable for both digital and physical goods.
As for the entities taking part in the system, in addition to the necessary customers
and merchants, we define two special parties: the payment system (PS), and the finan-
cial network (FN). PS is the mediator of every transaction: customers first pay for the
products to PS, which later settles the debt with merchants. Moreover, PS is responsi-
ble for providing customers with marketing promotions, performing fraud prevention
procedures, contacting with FN in order to request credit/debit card validation and
completing checkout orders. FN is an abstraction of the Acquirer Bank, Issuer Bank
and Card Associations bundled together. We assume that PS and FN are semi-honest,
i.e. they follow the protocol (since they model entities which are regulated and want to
stay in business).
It is worth to emphasize the fact that these four entities are precisely the same enti-
ties that intervene in typical online shopping systems.
7.2.1 Comparison with industry systems
In existing systems, a transaction starts when a customer C browses the online website
of some merchant M, fills up his shopping cart, and finally clicks on a checkout button.
Then M forwards the relevant purchase information to a Payment System (PS) such as
Amazon, Google Checkout and PayPal; PS processes it, applies marketing and fraud
prevention techniques (some of which may be applied by M instead), and contacts the
Card Network (for card-based payments) for verifying that C has provided valid pay-
ment information and has enough funds. If these checks are successful, M proceeds to
deliver the purchased goods. Simultaneously, PS, through the Card Network, instructs
M’s bank to reimburse M. In turn, M’s bank requests a reimbursement from C’s bank, who
bills C accordingly. Finally, if PS acted as intermediary for the payment, it eventually
settles the debt with M. This process, whichmay vary slightly depending on the context,
is depicted in Figure 7.2. A more detailed explanation is available at [27, pp. 94–97].
We stress that our system essentially respects the overall infrastructure, information flow,
and entities described above except we simplify the model by bundling up all financial en-
tities (Credit Card Network and banks) in a single entity, the Financial Network (FN);
this simplification would not affect security, since we are mainly concerned about cus-
tomer privacy against merchants, and we will assume that financial entities are honest-
but-curious. Moreover, while we assume card-based payments, this abstraction allows
us to easily adapt our system to alternative payment methods, as outlined in Section
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6. Ship
Figure 7.2: Payment process infrastructure and information flow.
7.4. As before, a transaction starts when Customers (C) interact online with merchants
(M), who forward orders to the Payment System (PS). PS performs certain fraud pre-
vention and also marketing techniques, which makes sense, since it is PS who has
complete visibility over every user actions with all the merchants. However, it is pos-
sible (as in current systems) to shift part of this load to merchants. For instance, M may
choose not to sell a product worth more than $1000 to customers in foreign countries
(fraud prevention) or grant $10 discounts to local customers for purchases in the local
store (marketing).
7.2.2 Building blocks
We make use of two important cryptographic primitives to improve privacy: group
signatures and partially blind signatures. The combination of these two primitives en-
ables the creation of privacy respectful but traceable (when needed) tokens of informa-
tion that allow users to perform purchases as if they were using a conventional system.
Both primitives, as well as additional ones that are also employed here, were described
in Section 2.4, along with the notation employed here for interacting with them.
7.2.3 Functionality
In this section, we introduce the main functionality of the system. In short, the overall
process may be divided in an initial setup stage in which every party performs the com-
putations required to obtain the cryptographic tokens and a subsequent stage in which
all the operations typical to an online shopping setting are run. In the latter, a customer
starts by retrieving a turn by interacting pseudonymously with PS. This turn entitles
her to complete a checkout, and it is in this phase when the user obtains the marketing
promotions she is eligible for. In addition, part of the fraud prevention mechanisms
are also run at this point. Subsequently, the checkout phase is initiated, by means of
which the user interacts with the merchant, who in turn interacts with PS who addi-
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tionally communicates with FN. In this checkout phase, where the previously obtained
turn acts as central token for the authentication process, the customer decides whether
she wants to act anonymously or pseudonymously. In the former case, the checkout
phase is unlinkable from the turn retrieval phase. However, in order to guarantee the
unlinkability, PS acts as an intermediary between customer and merchant, initially re-
ceiving the payment in stead of the latter1. Therefore, an additional settlement phase
is required, in which PS performs batch payments to settle the corresponding debts
with the merchants. Finally, in the case a dispute arises between any of the entities, a
dispute solving process, which also preserves the privacy of the previous phases, may
be launched.
In the following paragraphs, we give a more detailed definition of the mentioned
stages and the functions that compose them.
System setup. The system entities are initialized as follows:
• (pkFN, skFN) ← FNSetup(1k). Generate key pairs for FN.
• (pkPS, skPS) ← PSSetup(1k). Generate key pairs for PS.
• (pkMj , skMj) ← MSetup(1
k). Generate a key pair for a merchant Mj.
• 〈(Pi,mki), (Pi, ℓ′)〉 ← CSetup(pkFN)[Ci(si),FN(skFN, ℓ)]. Customer Ci contacts FN,
creates an account and obtains a membership key mki and pseudonym Pi using a
secret si. FN updates its membership database ℓ into ℓ′.
PS
Customer
1. Pi 2. τ
Customer Merchant
PS
FN
1. co
2. co
3. po
4. yes/no
5. yes/no
6. rc
Figure 7.3: Turn-retrieval (left) and Checkout (right) phases.
Turn-retrieval. In this phase, a customer contacts PS and retrieves a turn for the sub-
sequent checkout action.
• τ ← TurnRetrieval(pkPS, pkFN, Pi)[Ci(mki),PS(skPS)]. A customer Ci authen-
ticates with PS using Pi, and obtains a turn τ. The turn includes information of
marketing promotion, risks, and deadline. We denote those pieces of information
by τ.pr, τ.rk, and τ.dl. Figure 7.3 sketches this process.
The system provides the turn verification algorithm as well: VerifyTurn(pkPS, τ).
1Note that this is the usual behavior of current Payment Systems.
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Checkout. After receiving the turn, the customer completes the purchase by running
a pseudonymous (IssueCheckout) or anonymous (IssueAnonCheckout) procedure. Let
α be the product information including the product name, selling merchant, and so
on; let $ be the price of the product. In addition, let β be the customer’s billing in-
formation including the customer’s name, credit card number, card security number,
billing address, etc; moreover, β contains a random number to uniquely identify each
transaction of the customer. The checkout process is decomposed into the following
algorithms. For readability, we omit the public keys from their inputs.
• co ← IssueCheckout(mki, Pi, τ, α, $, β). Ci, with its private key mki, runs this
algorithm to generate checkout information to be sent to the merchant Mj. (The
merchant will pass the checkout co to the payment system PS.)
• co ← IssueAnonCheckout(mki, τ, α, $, β). The customer runs this algorithm for
anonymous checkout.
• po ← IssuePmtOrder(skPS, co). The payment system PS runs this algorithm to
generate a payment order to be sent to FN. (Then, FN checks if the order is valid,
and if so, FNwill process the order and let PS know when the process is finished;
in turn, PS will let the merchant know that the checkout process is successfully
completed.)
• rc ← IssueReceipt(skMj , co). When the checkout is successfully completed, mer-
chant Mj runs this algorithm to generate a receipt to be sent back to Ci.
In order to check the validity of the various pieces of information above, the system
supports public verification algorithms:
VerifyCheckout(co), VerifyPmtOrder(po), VerifyReceipt(rc, co).
Settlement and dispute resolution. PS periodically settles debts withmerchants. Dis-
putes are resolved by the client showing a receipt (or a checkout) and claiming its own-
ership.
7.2.4 A sample scenario
In order to consolidate the previous processes, we shortly give now a high level overview
of how a purchase process would be in a real world scenario. The description begins
at the moment in which a customer starts browsing some merchant’s website and ends
when she receives the purchased goods. We assume that all parties have the required
keys.
1. Initially, a customer C accesses Merchant’s M website. C produces a shopping
cart.
2. C then clicks a “Checkout now” button, which redirects her to a web service (or
equivalent) controlled by PS.
3. Within this session between C and PS, the process TurnRetrieval is run imper-
ceptibly to the customer, perhaps excluding the need to specify the keys to use
(also, if C is eligible for any marketing promotion, a selection menu may appear).
As a result of this process, C obtains a token (the turn) that:
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• Entitles him for performing exactly one checkout.
• Is linked to a specific risk estimation associated to the customer, whichwould
serve the merchant as a fraud prevention mechanism.
• It includes the marketing promotions that the customer has chosen.
• Is only valid for a predefined time interval.
• Furthermore, the previous properties cannot be modified once the turn has
been issued.
Finally, note that steps 2 and 3 may be exchanged in order, thus allowing C to
pick up promotions before filling the shopping cart.
4. After TurnRetrieval completion, the connection between C and PS is closed and
the DoCheckout process between C and M starts. Possibly, some random delay
may be introduced, to avoid time-based deanonymization.
5. At this point, C is asked whether to run the checkout process anonymously and
pseudonymously, and introduces the payment information. This choice has the
following consequences:
• In a pseudonymous checkout, the customer purchase history is updated
based on the pseudonym, which will be entitled for better marketing pro-
motions in the future.
• In an anonymous checkout, the customer purchase history is not updated
(since there is no way to link the purchase to the customer), but he will not
receive better marketing promotions in future purchases.
6. After making this decision, all the subprocesses included within DoCheckout are
run.
7. If DoCheckout succeeds, C obtains the checkout receipt. M ships or sends the
purchased goods and PS updates the settlement database.
8. In case of dispute, C can use the receipt to prove, anonymously, that he has actu-
ally paid for the purchased goods.
7.2.5 System requirements
We assume that all the communications in which a customer is involved are performed
in a sender-anonymous channel such as Tor [91]. The application level communications
are supposed to be layered on top of some security protocol providing confidentiality
such as TLS [89]. When customers join the system, they receive a smart card containing
their private keys in a secure manner2. For legal reasons, we assume that the financial
network FN needs to know the real identities of the parties involved in a transaction.
As for the entities assumptions, we start from the consideration that customers and
merchants can collude with everyone except FN. PS acts as a semi-honest party, but
can collude with everyone except FN. FN is semi-honest and cannot collude with any
other entity.
2The keys and infrastructure could be stored and managed as proposed in [31, 78]
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Entities
Ci A customer, with member key mki Mj A merchant
PS The Payment System FN The Financial Network
Information tokens
rk Account risk estimation pr Promotions set
dl Turn deadline τ Turn
$ Purchase price α Purchase information
β Billing information β˜ Billing information encrypted with pkFN
̺α Group signature of α ̺β˜ Group signature of β˜
ψ ZK proof for τ,̺α and ̺β˜ co Checkout order = (τ, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜,ψ)
po Payment Order = ($, β˜, AVS, ̺β˜) rc Receipt
AVS Address Verification System
Table 7.1: Summary of symbols.
7.3 System description
We now give a construction of the system outlined in Section 7.2.3 using the building
blocks of Section 7.2.2. For this construction, we use the notation described in the para-
graphNotation for cryptographic protocols in Section 2.2. Additionally, and for readability,
we sometimes assume that if any internal step fails, the overall process also fails and
stops. In order to serve as a quick reference summary, Table 7.1 contains the identifiers
employed to denote each entity, and all the miscellaneous symbols that are used in the
following definitions.
7.3.1 System setup
FN sets up the master key for group signatures and generates a public-key encryption
keypair. PS generates the keypairs for issuing partially blind signatures and digital
signatures. Each merchant Mj generates a keypair for digital signatures. Customers
join a group G by initiating a two-party process with FN. Customer Ci specifies some
secret si and obtains his private member key mki for group G. The pseudonym Pi is a
group signature on a random message created using his membership key mki; we let
Pi.r denote the randommessage and Pi.̺ the group signature on Pi.r. Refer to Figure 7.4
for the detailed procedures.
7.3.2 Turn-retrieval
The turn-retrieval phase is a two-party protocol between a customer and PS. The pro-
tocol starts by having the customer Ci send its pseudonym Pi. Then, PS retrieves the
information of how loyal this customer is (i.e., rk), whether (and how) the customer
is eligible for marketing promotions (i.e., pr), and the deadline of the turn to be is-
sued (i.e., dl), sends back (rk, pr, dl) to Ci. Ci chooses a subset pr′ from the eligible
marketing promotions pr. Finally, Ci will have PS create a partially blind signature
such that its common message is (rk, pr′, dl) and its blinded message is a commitment
com to its membership key mki. We stress that the private member key mki of the cus-
tomer Ci links the pseudonym (i.e., ̺Pi = GS.Signmki(Pi)) and the blinded message (i.e.,
com = Com(mki, rcom)). The customer is supposed to create a ZK-PoK φ showing this
link. Upon successful execution, the turn is set to τ. We use τ.rk, τ, pr, τ, dl, τ.com, τ.̺
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((pkFN , pkG), (skFN , skG)) ← FNSetup(1k)
(pkG, skG) ← GS.Setup(1k)
(pkFN , skFN) ← Gen(1k)
(pkMj , skMj) ← MSetup(1
k)
(pkMj , skMj) ← SGen(1
k).
((pkPS, pkPBS), (skPS, pkPBS)) ← PSSetup(1k)
(pkPBS, skPBS) ← PBS.KeyGen(1k)
(pkPS, skPS) ← SGen(1k)
〈(Pi,mki), (Pi, ℓ′)〉 ← CSetup(pkG)[Ci(si),FN(skG, ℓ)]
〈mki, ℓ′〉 ← GS.Join(pkG)[Ci(si),FN(skG)]
Ci chooses r ← {0, 1}
∗
Ci computes ̺← GS.Signmki (Pi,mki; sPi )
Ci sends Pi = (r, ̺) to FN
Figure 7.4: Setup procedures.
to denote the risk factor, marketing promotions, deadline, commitment to the mem-
ber key, and the resulting blind signature respectively. Refer to Figure 7.5 for pictorial
description. Turns are verified using the VerifyTurn process, defined as follows:
VerifyTurn(pkPS, τ) : return PBS.Verify(τ.̺, (τ.pr, τ.rk, τ.dl), τ.com, pkPS)
Ci PS
Pi
✲
Verify the signature Pi.̺ on Pi.r.
If verification fails, abort.
rk : account risk for Pi
pr : promotions for Pi
dl : turn deadline
✛
(rk, pr, dl)
com ← Com(mki; rcom)
( ˜com,π) ← PBS.Blind(com; s)
φ = ProveZK(x;w) where
x = ( ˜com,π, Pi, ̺Pi , pkG),w = (mki, rcom, s, sPi ) such that :
( ˜com,π) = PBS.Blind(Com(mki; rcom); s),
̺Pi = GS.Signmki (Pi; sPi ).
pr′ : customer’s choice from pr
(pr′, ˜com,π, φ)
✲
VerifyZK( ˜com,π, Pi, ̺Pi , pkG)
If verification fails, abort.
˜̺ ← PBS.SignskPBS((rk, pr
′, dl), ˜com)
✛
˜̺
̺← PBS.UnblindpkPBS( ˜̺, ˜com, s)
output τ = ((rk, pr′, dl), com, ̺))
Figure 7.5: Turn-retrieval process.
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7.3.3 Checkout
In this section, we describe the checkout phase procedures.
Step 1: Client issues a checkout object. A customer Ci enters the checkout phase
by creating a checkout object co by executing Issue(Anon)Checkout using the turn
τ obtained during the turn-retrieval phase. In either procedure, Ci generates two
group signatures: one signature ̺α on α, the other ̺β˜ on $ and β˜. Then, Ci gener-
ates a ZK proof ψ showing that the turn and the group signatures (and the pseudonym
for pseudonymous checkout) use the same member key mki. In summary, we have
co = (τ, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜,ψ).
co ← IssueCheckout(mki, Pi, τ, α, $, β):
̺α ← GS.Signmki (α; rα)
β˜← EncpkFN (β)
̺β˜ ← GS.Signmki (($, β˜); rβ)
ψ← ShowZK(x,w) with
x = (Pi, τ.com, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜)
w = (sPi ,mki, rcom, rα, rβ)
such that
Pi.̺ = GS.Signmki (Pi.r; sPi )
τ.com = Com(mki; rcom)
̺α = GS.Signmki (α; rα)
̺β˜ = GS.Signmki (($, β˜); rβ)
co ← (Pi, τ, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜,ψ)
return co
co ← IssueAnonCheckout(mki, τ, α, $, β):
̺α ← GS.Signmki (α; rα)
β˜← EncpkFN (β)
̺β˜ ← GS.Signmki (($, β˜); rβ)
ψ← ShowZK(x,w) with
x = (τ.com, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜)
w = (sPi ,mki, rcom, rα, rβ)
such that
τ.com = Com(mki; rcom)
̺α = GS.Signmki (α; rα)
̺β˜ = GS.Signmki (($, β˜); rβ)
co ← (τ, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜,ψ)
return co
Figure 7.6: IssueCheckout and IssueAnonCheckout processes run by customers for
initiating the checkout phase pseudonymously or anonymously, respec-
tively.
Step 2: Merchant sets up AVS fraud prevention. When merchant Mj receives the
checkout object co, Mj verifies co by running VerifyCheckout. If the verification suc-
ceeds, Mj passes this object by attaching an Address Verification Service value (AVS)
that will be subsequently used as reference for fraud prevention.
VerifyCheckout(co, pkPS, pkG):
Parse co into ([Pi], τ, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜,ψ)
VerifyTurn(τ, pkPS)
Check if (τ.rk, τ.pr, τ.dl) is acceptable.
GS.VerifypkG (̺α, α)
GS.VerifypkG (̺β˜, ($, β˜))
VerifyZK(([Pi], τ.com, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜),ψ)
If all the checks above pass, return 1
Otherwise return 0
Figure 7.7: VerifyCheckout process, run by merchants.
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Step 3: PS issues a payment order po. On receiving co and AVS from Mj, PS verifies
co, runs IssuePmtOrder and issues a payment order po with the minimum information
required by FN for processing the payment that is, po = ($, β˜, ̺β˜, AVS).
po ← IssuePmtOrder(skPS, co, AVS):
VerifyCheckout(co)
If verification fails, return 0
Parse co into ([Pi], τ, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜,ψ)
po ← ($, β˜, AVS, ̺β˜)
return po.
Figure 7.8: IssuePmtOrder process, run by PS.
Step 4-5: Payment confirmations. Given the payment order po, FN verifies it by run-
ning VerifyPmtOrder. If the verification succeeds, FN processes the order and notifies
PS of the completion; PS in turn sends the confirmation back to Mj.
VerifyPmtOrder(po, skG, skFN):
Parse po into ($, β˜, AVS, ̺β˜)
GS.VerifypkG (̺β˜, ($, β˜));
β = DecskFN (β˜);
Check if β has not been used before.
Check if GS.OpenskG (̺β˜) equals Ci in β.
Verify the other billing information in β.
Check if AVS filter on β has any issues.
If all the checks above pass, return 1
Otherwise return 0
Figure 7.9: VerifyPmtOrder process, run by FN.
Step 6: Mj issues a receipt. When merchant Mj receives the confirmation from PS, it
runs IssueReceipt, producing a signature on co, signed by Mj. Finally, Ci verifies that
this receipt is correct.
rc ← IssueReceipt(skMj , co):
rc ← SigskMj
(co)
return rc.
Figure 7.10: IssueReceipt process, run by FN.
7.3.4 Settlement
To avoid FN being able to link customer and merchant, PS becomes the payee during
checkout. After a predefined lapse of time (enough to get a volume of transactions
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making the subset-problem hard), PS settles its debts with merchants. This delay im-
proves, both, privacy and performance.
7.3.5 Dispute resolution
We define dispute as any disagreement between customers and merchants or PS oc-
curring after a customer has paid. With ShowReceiptZK and VerReceiptZK, defined in
Figure 7.11, the customer sends proofs of purchase and payment to a verifier (probably,
PS or some Mj). If the customer received a receipt rc, he shows rc along with the corre-
sponding checkout object co; then, using his membership keymki, he claims ownership
of a group signature contained in co. Even if he did not receive a receipt, he can show
co to PS and claim the ownership of a group signature contained in co; regenerating the
receipt on-the-fly.
ShowReceiptZK(co, [rc],mki):
Parse co into ([Pi], τ, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜,ψ)
π ← GS.Claimmki (̺α)
return (co, [rc],π)
VerReceiptZK(co, [rc],π):
Verify co succeeds.
Extract Mj from co.
If rc exists, VerpkMj (co)
GS.ClaimVerifypkG (π, ̺α)
If all the checks pass, return 1.
Otherwise return 0.
Figure 7.11: ShowReceiptZK and VerReceiptZK processes for dispute solving.
7.4 Additional functionality
We now give some insights into additional features supported by our system which,
despite not having been included within the main description, actually help to make it
richer and more flexible. It is actually this additional functionality which, based on the
privacy-enhancing design defined in previous sections, makes our system comparable
to current ones.
Fraud prevention filters. Our system supports the following fraud prevention filters.
Each filter is on the transaction-level (tx-level) or the account-level (acc-level), depend-
ing on whether it checks the information specific to transactions or to accounts.
• Pseudonym velocity filter (acc-level): It measures how many recent purchases have
been initiated by the same pseudonym (similar to PayPal’s IP velocity filter). It
can be applied during turn-retrieval.
• Suspicious shipment changes (acc-level): This filter can be added by making the
city/country of shipment visible, e.g., including it in the common message of
the partially blind signature obtained during turn-retrieval.
• Address verification system (AVS, acc-level): This filter is natively included in our
system. It is a verification typically performed by Credit Card companies match-
ing the billing address specified by customers with the billing address associated
to a credit card.
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• Billing/Shipping Address Mismatch Filter (tx-level): With Locality Sensitive Hash-
ing (LSH) [62, 158], this filter can be added as follows. C computes two hashes
b˜ ← H(b, r), s˜ ← H(s, r), where b and s are the billing and shipping address,
respectively, and r is a random value. Then it sends (r, b˜, s˜) to M during checkout,
who compares them. The probability of obtaining a match will be proportional
to the similarity of b and s due to the properties of LSH. Since FN later checks if
b˜ is equal to H(billing, r) using the actual billing address billing, the filter works
correctly.
• Maximum price per order (tx-level): This filter is trivial to apply by M or PS.
• Maximum number of items per order (tx-level): Trivial to apply by M or PS.
• Other filters: Filters like Currency type, Bank Identification Number, Transaction type
[127] may be directly applied.
Note that the account-level filters (excluding AVS by FN) are applied by PS during
the turn-retrieval phase. Thus, anonymous checkouts do not affect their effectiveness.
Transaction-level filters may be applied by either PS or merchants. Also, since an ac-
count risk estimation is passed to the checkout phase as part of the turn, both account
and transaction risks may be considered jointly.
Marketing techniques. In our system, PS issues marketing promotions during turn-
retrieval, consulting the pseudonym’s history. In [133], promotions are classified de-
pending on for how long they can be applied (limited or unlimited) and the intended
recipient (targeted or untargeted). Untargeted and unlimited (UU) marketing promo-
tions are trivial. The other three combinations may be achieved as follows:
• Targeted and unlimited (TU). C creates a group signature on the marketing promo-
tion and includes it in the blindly signedmessage at turn-retrieval. At checkout, C
includes this group signature in the ZK proofs (VerifyZK in the VerifyCheckout
process above).
• Untargeted and limited (UL). Simply include a deadline in the marketing promo-
tion.
• Targeted and limited (TL). Add a group signature as in TU promotions, specifying
the target and deadline.
Our system also supports merchant-issued marketing promotions. To do this, a
group of merchants should be set up, and each merchant Mj should have a policy
prMj for marketing promotions issuance. Before initiating turn-retrieval, Mj would send
(prMj , SigskMj (α)) to customer Ci. Ci would then include prMj within the common mes-
sage and SigskMj (α) within the blinded message, both to be signed by PS during turn-
retrieval. After verifying the group signature, PS would just grant the marketing pro-
motions that Ci is eligible for, based on prMj . During checkout, Mj would also verify
SigskMj
in order to prevent Ci using prMj with another Mi.
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Anonymous delivery of physical goods. The proposed online shopping solution di-
rectly supports purchasing digital goods (e.g. merchants can send the purchased good
along with the receipt). However, it is also desirable to enable it for handling physical
goods. In this respect, despite all the data anonymization, if the physical address of
the customer is sent to merchants or PS, anonymity is completely broken. A solution is
proposed in [18] offering precisely this functionality by creating APOD, implementing
a physical mix network. In [18], a central authority, named APODA, creates a group for
Delivery Companies (DCs) for issuing blind group signatures, and a group for Mail
Stations (MSs), who issue conventional group signatures. Each DC creates a group
of merchants with which it collaborates. Customers are identified pseudonymously
when interacting with merchants, and anonymously and unlinkably with respect to
their pseudonym with DCs, MSs and the APODA. The integration of our online shop-
ping solution with APOD could be easily performed. In APOD, the first interaction
occurs between customers and merchants, where the former authenticate pseudony-
mously to the latter. In our system, this occurs naturally during checkout, where cus-
tomers are authenticated either anonymously or pseudonymously, according to their
own choice3. Hence, after completing a successful checkout, customers and merchants
can initiate the APOD protocol straight away. The rest of the APOD protocol can be
applied without modifications. Alternatively, in order to ease the deployment costs
on the merchants’ side, merchants could shift this functionality to PS (who would just
have to forward the received tokens to the merchant).
Contact customer. Thismight be necessary in extraordinary situations. For pseudony-
mous checkouts, a pseudonymous email address associated with the customer’s ac-
count may be used. For anonymous checkouts, one-time email addresses should be
employed, e.g. using an anonymous email service, like Bitmessage.ch4. Alternatively,
customers could prove in ZK ownership of a receipt, and then receive any notification
related to it. However, this requires an active behavior from customers instead of just
receiving an email.
Customer opinions. In order to add an opinion about a specific purchase, the cus-
tomer may just generate a group-signed opinion and create a ZK proof (similar to those
sent during checkout) covering this group signature and a claim (like in Figure 7.11) of
the receipt obtained during checkout. Any valid opinion would then just be shown in
the corresponding website.
Subscriptions. If fees are paid in advance, this is easily solved. For physical goods
(e.g., using APOD), customers may initially set up multiple shipment information, one
for each delivery. For periodic digital goods, M may request C to claim ownership of the
checkout group signatures as in Figure 7.11 (adding a ZK proof with the same member
key depending on some varying value for preventing pre-computations) to send the
periodic digital good.
For recurring payments, the associated instruction could be sent to FN within the
payment information. Also, if customer consent is required to renew the subscription,
a notification could be sent to him (see Contact customer above).
3Allowing anonymity (besides pseudonymity) does not conflict with APOD.
4https://bitmessage.ch. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
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Refunds. Customers may make use of the dispute solving mechanisms to prove in
ZK that they have paid some good (see Figure 7.11). If the proof succeeds, a refund
order may be placed to FN via PS.
Taxation. Assuming that revealing the city, province, state or country of shipment is
not privacy threatening, and including it within the common message of the turn, our
system provides all the typically necessary information for tax calculation by either PS
or merchant. That is, customer (destination) locality, merchant (source) locality and
type of good.
Alternative paymentmethods. Wehave focused our explanation in credit card-based
payments, which are the most frequent in the real world. However, our framework is
also compatible with alternative payment methods such as Bitcoin [88, 151] and Rip-
ple5. Given the popularity that crypto-currencies and alternative payment methods
have gained recently, it seems reasonable to perform a preliminary analysis of how
would our online shopping system behave under this new type of payments model.
Note that, since we have abstracted out the details of the payment method through
our FN entity, all major modifications derived from a modification in the payment
method will be restrained to this entity. Actually, the other entities will just be af-
fected in that they will have to handle different types of payment information, but the
information flow and processes will remain exactly the same.
In the specific cases of Bitcoin and Ripple, the entity FN would actually see its role
is reduced, mainly acting as an entry point to the payment system. In particular, the
payment information that FN may have in its database related to each customer, may
not include the real identity of a client, or the billing address. Thus, FNwill not be able
to compare the identity of the issuer of the received group signature with the one stored
in its database; instead, in Bitcoin and Ripple, clients will indirectly prove ownership
of an account (represented by a public key) by demonstrating that they control the
corresponding private key.
However, group signatures are still useful for enabling privacy respectful fraud
prevention and marketing techniques during the rest of the process. Additionally, in
Bitcoin/Ripple, the balance of each account is public given the account identifier, and
verifying that the customer has enough funds is straightforward. Still, due to lack of
certain pieces of information (e.g., billing addresses), some FN-owned filters for veri-
fying other aspects (e.g., the AVS test) may not be applicable. Nevertheless, merchants
not willing to accept alternative payment methods may just reject them by using the
Bank Identification Number filter (Bitcoin/Ripple “acting” as banks).
Combined with Ripple, our system will have greater payment flexibility, while still
maintaining good privacy guarantees. With Bitcoin, the degree of trust placed in FN
can be greatly reduced, due to the nature of Bitcoin guaranteeing verifiable payment
transactions. Moreover, Bitcoin itself does not guarantee anonymity nor unlinkability
robustly [20], so the privacy guarantees in our system are beneficial for improving Bit-
coin’s since, in our system, it is not possible by design to link merchant and customer.
Finally, both Bitcoin and Ripple would benefit from the rich set of useful features men-
tioned above, as this allows them to be native part of a comprehensive online shopping
system.
5 https://ripple.com/ (accessed on March 31st, 2015). Ripple is an open system for interoperation
between different payment methods, e.g., Bitcoin, real currencies, or account-based transactions.
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7.5 Security requirements
In this section, we informally state the security requirements of our proposal. A formal
verification of these properties and detailed proofs in the computational model are
included in Appendix B.
The security of our system is based on the following properties. Recall that we
make the assumptions stated in Section 7.2.5.
Correctness. Suppose every party behaves honestly. If a customer obtains a turn and
then runs checkout with a merchant using the turn, then the customer will receive the
purchased good(s) and the receipt proving the checkout; at the same time he will be
charged the corresponding amount.
Privacy. The system possesses the following customer protecting requirements.
• Customer anonymity. If a customer creates an anonymous checkout co, then no
coalition of merchants, PS, and other customers should be able to determine the
identity or pseudonym of the customer from co.
• Unlinkable turn-retrieval and checkout. If a customer creates an anonymous check-
out co, then no coalition of merchants, PS, and other customers should be able to
link co to the corresponding turn-retrieval procedure.
• Transaction privacy against FN. The financial network FN should not be able to de-
termine the detail of a customer’s transaction beyond what is necessary, i.e., the
customer identity and the amount of payment; in particular, the product infor-
mation of each transaction should be hidden from FN.
Unforgeability. The system ensures the following robustness properties.
• Turn unforgeability. A customer should not be able to forge a valid turn that con-
tains a risk factor or a marketing promotion or a deadline set by his own choice.
• Checkout unforgeability. When Ci receives a turn from PS, it cannot be used by
other customer Cj to create a valid checkout co, even if they collude.
• Receipt unforgeability. No coalition of customers, merchants (other than the target
merchant M), and PS should be able to forge a valid receipt that looks originating
from M.
• Receipt claimability. For any valid receipt issued to an uncorrupted customer, no
other customer should succeed in claiming ownership of the receipt.
7.6 Practical aspects
In this section, we first discuss how could the previous proposals made in this the-
sis help in the actual deployment of Caduceus. Subsequently, we will present some
preliminary results that we have obtained through a prototype of our system.
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7.6.1 Identity distribution and anonymity management
It stands out that group signatures are the cornerstone of the privacy properties of our
system. Therefore, in order for our proposal to be practical and deployable in real
systems, these tokens need to be compatible with the existing infrastructure. This is
actually what was achieved in Chapter 6, by extending the previous work on X.509
anonymous certificates [31] in order to support anonymity and unlinkability revoca-
tion.
Consequently, the group member’s keys should be distributed in X.509 anonymous
certificates, which could then be managed used the revocation mechanisms studied in
Chapter 6. In case a customer is proven to be misbehaving, then his anonymity would
be revoked, preventing him from using the system. Still, the choice of the underlying
group signature scheme would be critical. As we showed in Section 6.5, this choice
has an unavoidable impact on the system’s performance and, more importantly, in the
provided functionality. Of course, the chosen group signature scheme should support
both anonymity and unlinkability revocation, which is why in our tests we have used
both KTY04 [132] and CPY06 [67], although other schemes could be also considered
and may of course provide additional and desirable properties.
Concerning the distribution of the identities, we have stated in Section 7.2.5 that
we assume customers to receive a smart card by first physically visiting the bank. This
smartcard would contain their anonymous digital identities. However, note that an al-
ternative method could be used, thanks to the protocol proposed in Chapter 5. Namely,
during the physical visit of the customer to the bank6, the bank staff could give her
a random single-use activation code (associated to her bank account). This random
single-use activation code would in fact be a perfectly secure implementation of the
token named ticketSSL in Chapter 5. By means of this slight modification to the SEBIA
protocol presented in Chapter 5, it could be employed for the remote distribution of the
anonymous digital identities required by our online shopping system. Additionally, in
this manner, the customer could actually obtain a much more flexible identification
token, not requiring a smartcard reader (although keeping it secure would probably
require higher security awareness from the customers).
7.6.2 Experimental results
In order to demonstrate the applicability of our approach, we show the results obtained
through a prototype incorporating all the described functionality. We then compare
them with current industry (working) systems. Note however that the latter systems
are highly optimized ones, using distributed infrastructures. The building blocks we
have used are: BFPV13 [43] for blind signatures, CPY06 [67] as group signatures (more
exactly, a traceable signature scheme), and Pedersen commitments [161] and SKREP as
defined in [57] for proving correctness in ZK of the commitments and the various ZK
proofs.
As testing environment, we have used a laptop (Intel Core i5-480M, 4GB DDR3,
with Debian Wheezy) and a desktop PC (Intel Core i7-2600, 16GB DDR3, with De-
bian Wheezy). We center our attention in the most frequent actions: anonymous and
pseudonymous checkouts. For RSA keypairs we used a module of 1024 bits, while
for ECC we used 160 bit elements. Additionally, our prototype included a MySQL
database where both PS and FN keep the necessary data. We also run the following
6Physical presence is unavoidable at some point, if high security needs to be achieved.
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fraud prevention andmarketing procedures: Each time a turnwas requested, PS issued
a $5 discount for customer having already spent over $100; it also checked that no more
than 10 purchases were made during the same day and ran the AVS test. Additionally,
during checkout, PS rejected any transaction of more than $1000, and FN performed
billing/shipping matching. During turn-retrieval, the customer role was played by the
laptop (with 4 parallel threads), and the PS role by the desktop PC (with 8 parallel
threads). During checkout, the laptop ran as a customer and merchant (each process
spawning 2 threads), with the desktop PC acting as PS and FN (each process spawning
4 threads). Note that the PS throughput measures the average time intervals between
the time PS receives a request and the time it has processed the response, ignoring the
time taken to transmit them. Finally, at the moment the tests were performed, each ma-
chine was in a different network, with the traceroute command showing a route of 16
hops between them, and average roundtrip time of 44 ms. The results are summarized
in Table 7.2.
Action
AL TPS Bytes
(secs) (reqs/sec) (sent/recv)
Turn-retrieval 1.26(±0.49) 1.03
C: 4426/793
PS: 793/4426
Checkout
Anon. 1.68(±0.47) 3.01
C: 4212/291
M: 4133/4358
PS: 1549/3908
FN: 66/1403
Pnym. 1.83(±0.43) 2.95
C: 5850/291
M: 6828/5996
PS: 1549/6603
FN: 66/1403
Table 7.2: Summary of results. AL stands for round-trip Absolute Latency: total time
since the customer starts the request until she receives the response. TPS
stands for Throughput at the Payment System’s side: total number of re-
quests successfully answered, per second (in real time, including time spent
in data transfers). Bytes indicates the average size in bytes of the messages
sent/received during the action, for each involved entity. All results are
averaged over 1000 transactions of the corresponding type.
According to the Scalability targets section of the Bitcoin Wiki 7, PayPal handles
roughly 46 transactions per second (TPS) on the average, with peaks of 100 TPS. Also,
in PayPal’s website8, it is said that PayPal has 2.6 million top customers performing
98 average purchases per year (or ∼ 8.08 purchases per second). For mobile devices,
PayPal claims to receive 3 TPS9. As for Bitcoin, there is an artificial limit of 7 TPS 7 . Also,
specializedMagento installations are claimed to achieve 550 TPS using a load-balanced
web server cluster [154]. Taking into account the limitations of our experiments, it is
quite notable that we achieved a rate of 1.03 TPS for turn-retrieval and a rate of roughly
3 TPS for checkout (a bit higher for anonymous ones and a bit lower for pseudony-
mous). While quite far from the optimized Magento setting, the performance numbers
7https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Scalability, accessed on January 13th, 2014.
8PayPal User Statistics and Trends 2012, https://www.paypal.com/webapps/mpp/ent-online-
attract-shoppers. Accessed January 13th, 2014.
9PayPal: Mobile commerce: your customers just can’t wait, https://www.paypal.com/ie/webapps/mpp/
sell-mobile. Accessed January 13th, 2014.
139
CHAPTER 7: CADUCEUS: COMPREHENSIVE FAIR ANONYMOUS ONLINE SHOPPING
of, both, PayPal’s top and mobile customers, and also Bitcoin’s rates seem both achiev-
able for our system. Even the 46 TPS global transactions from PayPal seem reachable
using an optimized and distributed setting.
As for the communication costs, we may take as reference the Bitcoin data also
included in its Wiki [36], where it is said that transactions vary from 0.2 to 1 KB, aver-
aging to roughly 0.5 KB. As seen in Table 7.2, the heavier load is taken by PS and FN.
PS sends roughly 793+ 1549 = 2342 Bytes and receives roughly 4426+ 3908 = 8334
(anonymous checkouts) and 4426+ 6603 = 11029 (pseudonymous checkouts) Bytes.
FN sends roughly 66 Bytes and receives 1403 during checkout. Hence, PS supports
approximately 10 times more communication overload than Bitcoin’s peers in the best
comparison. This is not bad, given the overhead of cryptography used heavily in pri-
vacy oriented communication, and further, this proportion can probably be improved
by further optimization.
7.7 Chapter conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented and analyzed in detail a proposal for privacy re-
spectful online shopping. As pointed out in recent works [72, 165], this is a field that
calls for robust privacy respectful solutions. Our proposal gives customers the choice
to act either pseudonymously or in a completely anonymous manner. Still, customers
may benefit from marketing techniques (such as marketing promotions), but cannot
use this anonymity to their advantage in order to perform illegitimate actions or fraud.
One of the most important features of the proposed system, in line with the require-
ments of this thesis, is that it is fully compatible with the already existing infrastructure
employed in actual e-commerce. As shown in Section 7.2.1, our system is composed by
the same entities and follows (almost) the same information flow than in currently de-
ployed solutions. It also includes a rich set of additional functionality that would allow
merchants to configure their own online services provided via our system, also just like
actual platforms. Moreover, the core cryptographic components used for creating the
anonymous identities employed in the system may be directly managed through the
standard-friendly mechanisms and protocols in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Specifically,
a prototype of the system has been tested by means of the library described in Chapter
4.
This system has been analyzed using both the formal and computational approaches,
as advised in previous chapters in order to obtain a maximum level of security. More-
over, since producing practical systems is a main concern in this work, the efficiency
and costs of the core functionality have been measured through an experimental pro-
totype, concluding that it bears reasonable additional costs. Furthermore, while the
additional costs have an impact on usability (and seem to be reasonable), other aspects
need to be taken into account for this subject. In Section 7.2.4, we have outlined how a
typical transaction using our system would resemble those of current online shopping
systems. In addition, in Section 7.6 we have discussed about how to make the distribu-
tion of the required credentials more intuitive. Namely, through applying a variation of
our SEBIA protocol (Chapter 5). Although a final proof would require evaluations by
end users, these observations seem to point that a usable implementation is possible.
Concerning possible future work, note that the online shopping system proposed
in this chapter stands out for the combination it provides of privacy for customers
and flexibility for merchants. In fact, it supports many of the functionality available
in current online shopping systems, while greatly enhancing its privacy. Still, the ex-
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periments performed to measure its feasibility cover only the core of the system. Of
special interest are the extensions for merchant-issued marketing promotions and al-
ternative payment methods. Actually implementing these additional functionality and
analyzing their impact (with respect to the additional computational and communica-
tion costs) would provide definitive proof of their applicability. Also, more detailed
analysis, including measurements of other properties like power consumption would
also help in further optimizing the system. Finally, and concerning the obtained results,
note that while we assume customer originated communications are routed through
Tor (or some equivalent anonymizing network), this has not been measured. Taking
this into account would help produce more realistic estimations.
In addition, we emphasize that despite having used this turn-retrieval and checkout
framework in the context of e-commerce, it may be suitable to other scenarios requiring
anonymity, but where some kind of traceability or additional information associated to
system users is necessary. An almost straightforward application is to e-voting. In this
setting, the turn-retrieval phase could be used (probably among many other tasks) to
see if the voter is actually eligible for voting (checking her age, whether she belongs to
the district she is trying to vote in, etc.); after succeeding in the turn-retrieval phase,
the voter could then make use of her turn for running checkout, which in this case
would mean actually casting the vote. Nevertheless, an e-voting setting certainly im-
plies many subtle issues that would need to be carefully studied.
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CHAPTER 8
Fair anonymity for the Tor network
Chapter based on and supported by references [81].
Tor anonymizes communications by avoiding origin and recipient to be linked.
Moreover, even the recipient cannot learn the IP address of the originator by analyzing
the received packets. This is achieved by re-routing the data through several inter-
mediaries, the Onion Routers, and adding an extra layer of encryption with each one.
Nevertheless, this also reduces the protection available for the addressee, since it can-
not denounce the originator in case of misbehavior. This is certainly a factor hindering
any wide acceptance of anonymizing networks (cf. the discussion in the introduction
of Chapter 6). Moreover, it causes users acting legitimately to be affected by the illegit-
imate actions of others. For instance, in some situations legitimate users cannot access
a site through Tor because that site directly bans Tor-originated traffic. This risk has al-
ready been identified by the Tor Project and, consequently, solutions are being explored
for increasing the trust in traffic coming through Tor 1.
In this chapter we show how group and blind signatures could be used to extend
the functionality of Tor’s entry and exit nodes in order to enable the tracing and block-
ing of misbehaving users. This being the case, we design an access control mechanism
for Tor which does not deteriorate the normal use of the Tor network by users acting
legitimately, nor their privacy. Complemented with the mechanisms in Chapter 6, this
privacy respectful access control mechanism could allow, for instance, blocking a user
having exceeded the number of maximum connections per second (i.e., being respon-
sible for a denial of service attempt, spam, etc.). Similarly, through the definition of
suitable policies (as those studied also in Chapter 6), more general illegitimate uses
could be defined when necessary and according to the needs of each specific applica-
tion accessible through Tor.
As a consequence of this fairness mechanism, service providers would probably
increase their trust in Tor, since illegitimate actions coming from Tor would presumably
be reduced. For constructing such extension in an practical and flexible manner, we
make its core compatible with the (anonymous) identity distribution an management
mechanisms in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
1https://blog.torproject.org/blog/call-arms-helping-internet-services-accept-
anonymous-users. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
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8.1 Related work
Recall from the fair anonymity systems paragraph at Section 6.1 that there are several
systems providing anonymity revocation capabilities to Tor-like systems. However, as
it was therein stated, those systems usually require complex and completely new in-
frastructures in order to function properly, they are usually suited for specific types
of misbehavior. Also, they introduce many times prohibitive costs which, in order to
reduce them, would require a complete modification of the underlying cryptographic
primitives. But again, given that their infrastructure is tightly associated to this cryp-
tographic building blocks, it would require a big effort to adapt it. On the other hand,
our preliminary proposal just seems to require minimal additions to the negotiation
process with entry and exit nodes in the shape of added group signatures. Thus, with
the extensions proposed in Chapter 6 to the X.509 infrastructure, it would be easily
deployable. And more importantly, it would inherit the flexibility derived from mak-
ing the cryptographic functionality independent of the technological details and vice
versa. Consequently, different group signature schemes with distinct functionalities
and efficiency features could be seamlessly incorporated when required.
8.2 Incorporating fairness into Tor
In order to endow Tor with fairness capabilities, the entry and exit nodes take a central
role, since they are the only nodes who learn the IP addresses of the user entering the
network and that of the final destination, respectively. Hence, their knowledge would
be necessary to determine whether the IP trying to access the network has already
been blocked, or to demonstrate that a given origin IP has accessed certain destination
IP. However, when proposing modifications of those nodes we must avoid enabling
attacks based on establishing a connection between them. For that purpose, we take
advantage of both the way the user negotiates keys with the Tor nodes, and the prop-
erties of group and blind signatures.
Hereafter, we assume that a group has already been set up, and that there is a suit-
able policy established for fairly managing revocation (see Section 8.3). Similarly, we
assume that the blind signature scheme has also been set up. Table 8.1 summarizes
the notation used throughout the rest paper, along with some notation inherited from
the description of the Tor network [91] and the notation defined for group and blind
signatures and the additional cryptographic primitives in Section 2.4.
PKORi Public key of Onion Router i.
enc(·)Tor Layered encryptions following the Tor protocol.
H(·) Application of a cryptographic hash function.
gx· The user’s Diffie-Hellman share.
gy· The Diffie-Hellman share corresponding to a Tor node.
hsK A transcription of the handshake for key K.
A|B A concatenated with B.
σ1 Group signature of gx1 sent to entry node.
σ2 Group signature of gx2 sent to exit node.
β Blinded version of σ2
β˜ Blindly signed version of β
σ3 Blind signature of σ2
Table 8.1: Notation summary.
Our approach works by introducing variations in the way a user negotiates the
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symmetric keys with the entry and exit nodes. In short, we will require the user to
group-sign the message sent during negotiation with the entry and exit nodes. In ad-
dition, in order to prevent the user to employ one identity for negotiating with the
entry node, and a different one with the exit node (see Section 8.3), the entry node
has to blindly sign the message that the user will send to the exit node. The resulting
modified handshake schemes (see [91, p. 6]) are shown below, where Ui denotes any
arbitrary user, EN denotes the entry node and EX the exit node. During the handshake
with EN, Ui first group-signs gx1 and gx2 , sends gx1 to EN and also requests EN to blindly
sign a group signature of gx2 . If all the operations succeed, ENaccepts the connection.
Entry Node Handshake:
Ui: σ1 ← GS.Sign(gx1 ,mki)
Ui: σ2 ← GS.Sign(gx2 ,mki)
Ui: com ← Com(σ2, r1)
Ui: (β,π) ← BGS.Blind(com, r2)
Ui: φ← ShowZK(x,w) where
x = (β,π, σ1),w = (mki, r1, r2) such that:
σ2 ← GS.Sign(g
x2 ,mki),
(β,π) ← BGS.Blind(Com(σ2, r1), r2)
Ui→ EN: gx1 , σ1, β,π, φ
EN: VerifyZK(β,π, φ, σ1)
EN: GS.Verify(σ1, gx1 )
EN: β˜← BGS.Sign(β, sbk)
EN: K1 = gx1y1
EN← Ui: gy1 , β˜,H(K1|hsK1 )
Ui: σ3 ← BGS.Unblind(β˜, r2)
Ui: K1 = gx1y1
When Ui initiates the handshake with EX, she sends the group signature on gx2 that
was blindly signed by EN, along with the blind signature itself. If all the verifications
succeed, then EX accepts the connection.
Exit Node Handshake:
Ui→ EX: gx2 , σ2, σ3
EX: GS.Verify(σ2, gx2)
EX: BGS.Verify(σ3, σ2)
EX: K2 = gx2y2
EX→ Ui: gy2 ,H(K2|hsK2)
Ui: K2 = gx2y2
It is important to note that the group signatures are encrypted using the public
keys of either the entry or exit nodes. Hence, only the entry and exit nodes learn them.
Moreover, the group signature sent to the exit node is blindly signed by the entry node.
Thus, even if both nodes collude, they would not be able to determine by themselves
that the group signatures they have received have been issued by the same user, due to
the unlinkability property of the group signature scheme and the blindness property
of the blind signature scheme. Moreover, since the group signature sent to the exit
node has been blindly signed by the entry node, it is not possible for a user Ui to frame
another user Uj.
The modified key negotiation with the entry node is depicted in Fig. 8.1, and the
one corresponding to the exit node is depicted in Fig. 8.2.
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User OR1 = EN
1. enc(gx1 , σ1, β,π, φ)PKOR1
2. gy1 , β˜,H(K1|hsK1 )
Figure 8.1: The user sends to the entry node a group signature of her share of the key,
encrypted with the node’s public key, and a blinded version of the group
signature to be sent to the exit node. The entry node returns a blindly
signed version of the latter.
User
OR1 = EN
OR2
ORn−1
ORn = EX
1. enc(gx2 , σ2, σ3)Tor
2. enc(gx2 , σ2, σ3))Tor
3. enc(gx2 , σ2, σ3)Tor
4. enc(gy2 ,H(K2|hsK2 ))Tor
5. enc(gy2 ,H(K2|hsK2 ))Tor
6. enc(gy2 ,H(K2|hsK2 ))Tor
Figure 8.2: The user sends to the exit node a group signature of her share of the key,
encrypted with the node’s public key and the blind signature issued by the
entry node.
8.2.1 How to block misbehaving users
Let us assume that some user Ui has been revoked due to some illegitimate behavior.
When Ui tries to establish a circuit, he/she will need to perform a handshake with
the chosen Tor entry node. Hence, upon receiving the first message with the group
signature, the entry node will verify the received group signature, checking whether or
not the member who issued it has been revoked. Given that the member key of Ui has
been revoked, the verification will fail, and the entry node will reject the connection.
Note that if the user has not been revoked, the privacy guarantees provided by Tor are
not diminished.
8.2.2 How to denounce misbehaving users
In this case, we assume that Ui has already established a circuit and she is commu-
nicating with some server S (external to Tor). Also, let us suppose that eventually,
Ui performs some illegitimate action. When that happens, S denounces this behavior
following some predefined method. If deemed appropriate, the group signature re-
ceived by the exit node during the handshake may be used to retrieve Ui’s identity, or
to trace her. Specifically, the exit node provides the following information:
• enc(msg)K, where msg is the message received and denounced by S, and K is the
symmetric key negotiated between Ui and the exit node.
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• (K = gx2y2 , gx2), where gx2 is Ui’s share of the handshake and gy2 is the share
created by the exit node.
• σ2, i.e., a group signature of gx2 issued by Ui.
In order to verify that the received denounce is valid, it is necessary to check that
themessage received from S,msg, corresponds to the encryption {msg}K received from
the exit node. Also, σ2 must be a valid group signature over gx2 . Finally, the exit node
may be required to prove that it knows the discrete logarithm y2 of gx2y2 to the base
gx2 . If these checks succeed, then the member with key mki (Ui) is responsible of msg.
Hence, Ui’s key can be consequently revoked, and the circuit may be closed by the exit
node. Note that subsequent attempts made by Ui to establish a circuit would be blocked
by the entry node, since the member key of Ui has been revoked.
8.2.3 Additional remarks
A few remarks are worth to be made, concerning “special” situations and subjects that
should be taken into account.
Tor bridges Our proposal is directly extensible to support Tor bridges, considering Tor
bridges as the entry nodes to the Tor network.
Leaky pipe topology This approach allows a client to output some packets through a
node other than the negotiated exit. In order to adapt our approach to this excep-
tion, the node leaking the packet should follow ad-hoc the procedure defined for
exit nodes.
Logging Since hosts being accessed through these fair Tor extension might want to
issue denounces against traffic originated from Tor, logging the information nec-
essary for solving disputes is required. Hence, the exit nodes need to keep the
information specified in Section 8.2.2 (this also applies to the leaky pipe exten-
sion). An appropriate policy for logging should be established.
Denunciation time span Considering that our proposal requires Tor exit nodes (and
circumstantially other nodes) to log several pieces of information, it would com-
prise a serious scalability problem if this logging would be expected to last too
much time. Hence, it seems appropriate to establish a predetermined time span
for accepting denounces. Upon expiration of that time span, all the logged infor-
mation could be removed, and any subsequent denounce related to that informa-
tion rejected. This would require possible complainants to be aware of this time
limitation.
8.3 Open issues
In the scheme given in Section 8.2 we just use the general definitions of the build-
ing blocks for defining our system. The analysis of which specific variants should be
employed is left as future work. Note that this is a very delicate decision, since differ-
ent options offer different privacy properties. Moreover, we may even need different
schemes depending onwho issues the signatures (e.g. group signatures are issued both
by users and entry points in our proposal). Thus, given the sensitivity of the informa-
tion managed by Tor, this is an issue that needs to be studied in depth by itself. For
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that matter, the extensible group signatures library libgroupsig presented in Chapter
4 may offer interesting features. In addition, concerning the blind signatures, it would
probably be necessary to use some of its variant to prevent circumventing the controls
explaining above. Namely, with the previous bare scheme, a user could use the same
blind signature indefinitely. This may simply be solved by using partially blind signa-
tures, and having the entry node introduce a lifetime value for the blind signature as
common message.
Another important issues are determining when misbehaving users should be re-
voked, and by whom. The former question would probably depend on the websites
(or service) being accessed through Tor. For the latter, a probably good solution given
Tor’s infrastructure would be to apply threshold schemes to the revocation procedures
(see [32]), such that a majority of the authorities participating in the network consensus
need to agree for revoking users.
Finally, note that Sybil attacks [94] are partly addressed by forcing users to use the
same member key for the group signature sent to the entry node and for the group
signature sent to the exit node (and having the latter to be blindly signed by the entry
node). However, some additional mechanism should be included for preventing users
from arbitrarily generating new member keys. Since asking users to register may not
be well received (it may be seem as a threat to anonymity), requesting them to perform
some proof of work [95] during the generation of the member keys may be a good
alternative.
8.3.1 Further work
While this extension would help in reducing the mistrust that service providers might
have in the Tor network and the traffic coming from it, there are several aspects that
need to be very carefully studied.
First, the main objective of Tor is to ensure privacy (through anonymity). Thus,
adding revocation capabilities would probably not be well received, even if it is aimed
to provide a better service to legitimate users. In this subject, a detailed analysis for
choosing the most suitable group and blind signature schemes for ensuring that the re-
vocation functionality cannot be misused too. Specifically, techniques such as objective
blacklisting [112] and trust distribution [32] would certainly reduce the controversy.
Additionally, the task for creating and distributing the member keys employed for is-
suing the group signatures is a critical task. The protocol in Chapter 5 can be used for
this, but defining when and how to create new identities is necessary for maintaining
an adequate balance between anonymity and costs.
Second, a formal analysis of the trust and attackmodels, and themain use cases (e.g.
stating the basic misbehaviors) would help locating additional required functionality
and provide further security guarantees.
Also, although the same principle for misuse detection might be applied for Tor
Hidden Services2, in depth analysis of the use case scenario is necessary in order to
add support for these services. This would actually be an important addition since,
as we discussed in the introduction of Chapter 6, Tor Hidden Services are many times
used for hosting illegitimate activities.
Finally, once the previous open issues are satisfactorily addressed, experimental
measurements of the additional costs introduced by our proposal would be necessary
2https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en. Last access on March 31st, 2015.
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in order to meet the efficiency requirements of a low-latency anonymity network such
as Tor.
8.4 Chapter conclusion
The extension to the Tor network proposed in this chapter would endow it with the
functionality for preventing misbehaving users to access the network. We expect such
functionality to increase the trust of websites in Tor and thus prevent them to block
users coming from it.
This extension follows the design of Tor, and does not require any modification to
its infrastructure. It works by including group signatures in the key negotiation pro-
cesses with the entry and exit nodes and having the entry node blindly sign the group
signature to be sent to the exit node. The group signature sent to the exit node allows
service providers to denounce illegitimate actions without learning their identity. Once
the unlinkability of a user has been revoked as a consequence of some illegitimate be-
havior, any entry node would be able to block that specific user just by checking if it is
included in an (unlinkability) Revocation List.
While the specific details on how to create and distribute the member keys required
for the group signatures has been left as future work, this task can certainly be solved
using the protocol in Chapter 5. Also, the mechanisms in Chapter 6 compose the neces-
sary framework for managing anonymity in a fair manner. Finally, the implementation
of this extension would certainly be eased through the library in Chapter 4.
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Conclusion and summary of
contributions
Throughout this work, we have followed an incremental approach for addressing our
main goal of easing the deployment of privacy respectful systems through anonymity.
Specifically, we have first proposed a set of basic elements and protocols that jointly
compose a framework suitable for achieving a reasonably high level of privacy and se-
curity within current technological infrastructures. Moreover, we have given examples
of specific systems that may be built with the help of this framework. While further
work is certainly necessary in order to refine the additional costs introduced by our
proposals and in order to keep extending the privacy respectful functionality achiev-
able through them, we have also included empirical results showing its feasibility by
means of prototypes developed by ourselves.
Next, we describe in finer detail each of the main contributions of this thesis.
Summary of results
Recalling the main objectives of this work, our major goal was to help easing the task
of designing and implementing privacy respectful but deployable (and thus practical)
systems. Specifically, this has been addressed as follows. In Part II of this thesis we
have tackled the first two objectives as stated in Section 1.1:
1. Design methodology. The methodology in Chapter 3 does help in the design
of secure systems and in their subsequent verification. Specifically, it is aimed
to help in the “translation” of informal requirements into formal ones. We have
employed it in most of the protocols and systems introduced in this thesis.
2. Implementing privacy through anonymity. Through the contribution of the C
library for group signatures in Chapter 4, we have overcome one main difficulty
for actually implementing all our subsequent proposals, which address privacy
through anonymity. Moreover, since it is an open source and extensible library,
providing a unified API, we expect it to be used by the community as a building
block for this kind of systems.
In Part III and Part IV, we have addressed the remaining objectives, which are actu-
ally based in the previous results. We have proposed protocols and mechanisms deal-
ing with anonymous identities management in fair anonymity systems, and further de-
signed privacy respectful systems compatible with them in the context of e-commerce
and Tor, the anonymous communications network. Specifically, our results have been:
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3. Secure and usable distribution of identities. This is directly achieved through-
out SEBIA, the protocol in Chapter 5. Moreover, it follows the design principles
of EBIA, the most widely deployed online registration protocol. Additionally, it is
implementable with current technologies and within the existing infrastructures.
4. Mechanisms for managing privacy enabling identities. This functionality is di-
rectly provided by the mechanisms in Chapter 6, which allow anonymous iden-
tities to match the managing options of conventional identities. Since they are
based on the X.509 infrastructure, the costs for actually deploying them in exist-
ing systems would be kept to a reasonable minimum.
5. Also, in Part IV, we have proposed two systems that are fully compatible with the
previous proposals. More concretely:
(a) Caduceus. A privacy respectful online shopping framework following the
infrastructure and information flow of current industry systems. Through
anonymity, achieved using group and blind signatures, the system is com-
patible with the typical marketing and fraud prevention techniques. We
implement a prototype of this system with the help of libgroupsig (Chap-
ter 4). Both the anonymous identity distribution and management proce-
dures could be implemented in practice with the protocols and mechanisms
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, respectively. Finally, the security of this system
is verified using the methodology in Chapter 3, both with the formal and
computational approach.
(b) Fairness extensions to Tor. Also based in group and blind signatures, we
propose an extension to the handshake procedures with entry and exit nodes
in the Tor network that allow to block misbehaving users in a privacy re-
spectful manner. The core parts of this systemwould thus be implementable
with the library in Chapter 4, and the distribution and management of the
anonymous identities through the proposals in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
The verification of its security properties (with Chapter 3) is left as future
work.
Thus, summarizing, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 we have first set the grounds for
designing and implementing privacy respectful and secure systems through a secure
design methodology and a library for group signatures, which we use as a core for pro-
viding anonymity; subsequently, we have proposed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 several
protocols for addressing the most common tasks; and finally, in Chapter 7 and Chapter
8, we have described two systems that may be built based on our previous proposals.
These worksmay act as fundmental building blocks for privacy respectful e-democracy
applications such as e-voting, online surveys, open data, but also providing fairness
(accountability) when necessary. Moreover, the technology upon which our protocols
and systems (or any application derived from them) may be implemented, outlined in
Table 8.2, is already in wide use, which actually eases our proposals’ deployment.
Future work
We have outlined specific further work within each of the chapters of this thesis. How-
ever, some concrete lines stand out, given the main goal of this work. In more detail,
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Proposed Technology for
Description Chapter
protocol/system implementation
SEBIA EBIA
Secure email-based
Chapter 5
registration protocol
Anonymity management X.509
CRL extension
Chapter 6OCSP extension
ACFP protocol
Caduceus
SEBIA Privacy respectful
Chapter 7
X.509 online shopping
FairTor
SEBIA Fair anonymous
Chapter 8
X.509 access control in Tor
Table 8.2: Technology upon which the proposed protocols and systems may be built.
there is a lack of support (through actual implementations) of advanced privacy en-
hancing cryptographic primitives, as we have pointed out in [23]. While we have pro-
vided a library for group signatures in Chapter 4, implementations for the primitives
reviewed in [23], following the same design principles as libgroupsig would certainly
constitute a good contribution to the computer science and cryptographic communi-
ties. Specially, taking into consideration the challenges summarized in [21].
Regarding the extensions to X.509 in Chapter 6, the next step should be to submit
the proposal to a standardization body, which would certainly help in gaining insight
into possible additional extensions or refinements. Subsequently, actually implement-
ing X.509 anonymous identities (through, for instance, ligroupsig) and our proposals
for extending the X.509 management capabilities would undoubtedly suppose a big
contribution towards our main goal of easing the deployment of privacy respectful
systems.
Finally, a major line of future work is related to the work in Chapter 7. It is our
opinion that the design of the system therein described is of special interest by it-
self and worth further study for finding useful applications into contexts other than
e-commerce. Specifically, the separation of the overall transaction in two unlinkable
but interdependent pseudonymous and anonymous phases may prove to be a useful
construction3 when it is necessary to perform sensitive actions that require both user
profiling and user privacy. For instance, in contexts such as e-voting, social networks,
surveys or cloud services. Furthermore, its derivation towards the scenario studied in
Chapter 8, where the initial pseudonymous phase is substituted by another anonymous
phase4 also seems promising when pseudonymity is not acceptable, yet access con-
trol mechanisms are advisable. In this latter case, while both phases are anonymous,
different verifications are necessary in each of them, what still makes unlinkability a
requirement.
Altogether, providing further support in the shape of source code for more ad-
vanced cryptographic primitives and our X.509 extensions, as well as for our SEBIA
protocol, would certainly contribute towards the development of privacy respectful
systems. Specifically, through facilitating the creation and distribution of anonymous
digital identities and their subsequent management. Additionally, applying them to
systems adopting the pseudonymous-anonymous (or anonymous-anonymous) con-
structions would probably constitute a powerful and flexible combination. And last,
3We may refer to it as a pseudonymous-anonymous two-phase transaction.
4This special case could be referred to as an anonymous-anonymous two-phase transaction.
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using our security verification methodology (Chapter 3) in order to ensure the security
of the resulting proposals would, on one hand, raise the achieved security level and, on
the other hand, help in the refinement and further development of our methodology.
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Conclusión
En este trabajo, hemos seguido una aproximación incremental para alcanzar nuestro
objetivo de facilitar el despliegue de sistemas respetuosos con la privacidad, a través
del anonimato. Específicamente, hemos propuesto primero un conjunto de elementos
básicos y de protocolos que, conjuntamente, permiten crear un marco de trabajo apro-
piado para conseguir unos niveles de privacidad y seguridad razonablemente altos,
utilizando infraestructuras tecnológicas actuales. Más aun, hemos dado ejemplos de
sistemas específicos que pueden ser diseñados e implementados gracias a estemarco de
trabajo. Aunque es necesario trabajo adicional para refinar los sobrecostes introducidos
por nuestras propuestas y con el fin de seguir ampliando las funcionalidades respetu-
osas con la privacidad que proporcionan, hemos incluido también medidas empíricas,
obtenidas a través de prototipos implementados por nosotros mismos, mostrando que
los costes adicionales son razonables.
A continuación, describimos en más detalle cada una de las contribuciones de esta
tesis.
Resumen de resultados
Recordando los principales objetivos de la tesis, la principal meta era facilitar las tareas
de diseño y desarrollo de sistemas respetuosos con la privacidad, que al mismo tiempo
fueran fácilmente desplegables (y por lo tanto, prácticos). Específicamente, para este
fin, en la Parte II de esta tesis hemos tratado los dos objetivos iniciales establecidos en
la Sección 1.1.
1. Metodología de diseño. La metodología en Capítulo 3 ayuda durante el diseño
de sistemas seguros y su posterior verificación. En concreto, está destinada a
ayudar en la “traducción” de requisitos informales en requisitos formales. Hemos
utilizado esta metodología en muchos de los protocolos y sistemas introducidos
en esta tesis.
2. Implementando privacidad a través de anonimato. Con la contribución de una
librería de firmas grupales, en el Capítulo 4, hemos solucionado una de las princi-
pales dificultades para la implementación de nuestras propuestas en los capítulos
posteriores, que proporcionan privacidad a través de anonimato. Esta librería se
ha publicado como código abierto, es fácilmente extensible, y proporciona una
API unificada, con lo que esperamos que sea de utilidad como pilar básico para
la implementación de este tipo de sistemas en la comunidad criptográfica.
En la Parte III y la Parte IV, hemos tratado los objetivos restantes, que a su vez se
basan en los resultados anteriores. Hemos propuesto protocolos y mecanismos para
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poder distribuir y gestionar las identidades anónimas necesarias en sistemas de anoni-
mato justo. Además, hemos diseñado sistemas respetuosos con la privacidad, compati-
bles con dichos protocolos y mecanismos, en el contexto de comercio electrónico y Tor,
la red de comunicaciones anónimas más popular. En concreto, nuestros resultados son:
3. Distribución segura y usable de identidades digitales. Esto se consigue directa-
mente a través de SEBIA, el protocolo diseñado en el Capítulo 5. Además, SEBIA
sigue los principios de diseño de EBIA, el protocolo para registro online más des-
plegado en la actualidad. SEBIA es implementable con tecnologías actuales y
utilizando infraestructuras ya existentes.
4. Mecanismos para gestionar identidades digitales respetuosas con la privaci-
dad. Esta funcionalidad la proporcionan directamente losmecanismos en el Capí-
tulo 6, que permiten alcanzar el mismo conjunto de funcionalidades disponibles
para la gestión de identidades digitales convencionales, pero para el caso de iden-
tidades digitales anónimas. Además, al estar basadas en la infraestructura X.509,
los costes necesarios para desplegar estos mecanismos en los sistemas actuales se
mantienen en un mínimo razonable.
5. Además, en la Parte IV, hemos propuesto dos sistemas que son totalmente com-
patibles con las propuestas anteriores. Específicamente:
(a) Caduceus. Un sistema que proporciona unmarco de trabajo para desarrollar
plataformas de compras online respetuosas con la privacidad, que se adapta
a las infraestructuras y al flujo de información de los sistemas actuales. Uti-
lizando el anonimato como base, conseguido gracias a firmas grupales y
firmas parcialmente ciegas, el sistema es compatible con las típicas técnicas
de marketing y prevención de fraude. Además, hemos implementado un
prototipo de este sistema con la ayuda de libgroupsig (Capítulo 4). Los
procedimientos tanto para la distribución como para la gestión de las iden-
tidades anónimas necesarias podrían implementarse con los protocolos y
mecanismos en el Capítulo 5 y el Capítulo 6, respectivamente. Por último,
la seguridad de este sistema se ha comprobado utilizando la metodología en
el Capítulo 3, tanto en el modelo formal como en el modelo computacional.
(b) Extensiones de anonimato justo para Tor. Basándonos también en firmas
grupales y firmas ciegas, proponemos una extensión sobre los mecanismos
de negociación de claves con los que los nodos de entrada y salida de la
red Tor podrían bloquear a usuarios que actuasen deshonestamente, pero
respetando la privacidad del sistema. Los componentes principales de este
sistema se pueden implementar con la librería en el Capítulo 4, y la dis-
tribución y gestión de identidades anónimas a través de las propuestas en el
Capítulo 5 y el Capítulo 6. La verificación de sus propiedades de seguridad
(utilizando la metodología en el Capítulo 3) se deja como trabajo futuro.
Resumiendo, en el Capítulo 3 y el Capítulo 4 hemos establecido las bases para
el diseño y la implementación de sistemas seguros y respetuosos con la privacidad,
mediante una metodología para diseño seguro y una librería de firmas grupales, que
utilizamos como componente principal para proporcionar anonimato; a continuación,
hemos propuesto en el Capítulo 5 y el Capítulo 6 varios protocolos y mecanismos que
permiten resolver, de manera respetuosa con la privacidad, las tareas más comunes en
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sistemas basados en Internet; finalmente, en el Capítulo 7 y el Capítulo 8, hemos des-
crito dos sistemas que se pueden construir a partir de nuestras propuestas anteriores.
Además, las tecnologías sobre la que se basan nuestros protocolos y sistemas, resumida
en la Tabla 8.2, ya se encuentra ampliamente extendida, lo cual facilitaría el despliegue
de nuestras propuestas.
Protocolo/sistema Tecnología para
Descripción Capítulo
propuestos su implementación
SEBIA EBIA
Protocolo para registro seguro
Chapter 5
basado en emails
Gestión de anonimato X.509
Extensión a CRL
Chapter 6Extensión a OCSP
Protocolo ACFP
Caduceus
SEBIA Compras online respetuosas
Chapter 7
X.509 con la privacidad
FairTor
SEBIA Control de acceso respetuoso
Chapter 8
X.509 con la privacidad en Tor
Table 8.3: Tecnología en la que se basan nuestros protocolos y sistemas.
Trabajo futuro
En cada capítulo de esta tesis hemos indicado posibles líneas de trabajo futuro específi-
cas. No obstante, algunas de ellas son especialmente relevantes, teniendo en cuenta el
objetivo principal de esta tesis. Con algo más de detalle, se ha visto que hay una falta
de soporte (en forma de implementación de sistemas) para primitivas criptográficas
avanzadas destinadas a mejorar la privacidad, como hemos indicado en [23]. En esta
tesis hemos introducido una librería de firmas grupales en el Capítulo 4. Siguiendo los
mismos principios de diseño que dicha librería, proporcionar implementaciones de las
primitivas revisadas en [23] supondría sin lugar a dudas una importante contribución
a las comunidades criptográficas e informáticas. Especialmente, teniendo en cuenta los
desafíos enumerados en [21].
En cuanto a las extensiones a X.509 en el Capítulo 6, el siguiente paso sería en-
viar la propuesta a algún organismo de estandarización, lo cual ayudaría sin duda a
obtener mayor feedback acerca de posibles mejoras o extensiones. A continuación, la
implementación de identidades anónimas basadas en X.509 (a través de libgroupsig,
por ejemplo) y de nuestras propuestas para la gestión de las mismas, supondría una
importante contribución hacia nuestro objetivo de facilitar la implantación de sistemas
respetuosos con la privacidad.
Por último, una importante línea de trabajo futuro se centraría en el trabajo descrito
en el Capítulo 7. En nuestra opinión, el diseño del sistema propuesto es de especial in-
terés. En concreto, la separación de la transacción global del sistema en dos fases (una
pseudónima y otra anónima), no enlazables entre sí pero interdependientes, probable-
mente sea una arquitectura5 útil para contextos en los que es necesario realizar acciones
sensibles que requieran al mismo tiempo incorporar controles de los perfiles de los
usuarios y medidas de privacidad. Por ejemplo, en sistemas de votación electrónica,
redes sociales, encuestas o sistemas basados en la nube. Más aún, su derivación hacia el
5Podemos referirnos a ella como una transacción pseudónima-anónima en dos fases.
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escenario estudiado en el Capítulo 8, donde la fase pseudónima inicial se sustituye por
otra fase anónima6 también parece interesante para los casos en los que la pseudonimia
no sea aceptable. En concreto, en este caso, aunque las dos fases son anónimas, cada
una de ellas requiere distintas verificaciones, siendo también necesario que no sean
enlazables entre sí.
En conjunto, proporcionando mayor soporte en forma de código fuente para pri-
mitivas criptográficas avanzadas, y nuestras extensiones a X.509, así como el protocolo
SEBIA, sin lugar a dudas contribuiríamos al desarrollo de sistemas respetuosos con la
privacidad. En concreto, facilitando la creación y distribución de identidades digitales
anónimas y su posterior gestión. Además, aplicando estas propuestas sobre sistemas
con arquitecturas de tipo transacción en dos fases pseudónima-anónima (o anónima-
anónima) supondría una combinación potente y flexible. Por último, utilizando nues-
tra metodología de verificación (Chapter 3) con el fin de alcanzar mayores garantías de
seguridad ayudaría también a refinar y seguir desarrollando la propia metodología.
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APPENDIX A
Definitions of CRL and OCSP
extensions and ACFP messages
This appendix includes an ASN.1-like definition of the proposed CRL and OCSP ex-
tensions, and the Anonymous Certificate Fairness Protocol (ACFP). The definitions are not
intended to be fully ASN.1 compliant, but just to give a more concise view of the ex-
tensions than what have been explained in the main body of this work.
A.1 CRL revocationTypeInfo extension
The proposed CRL extension revocationTypeInfo, is a CRL entry extension [185, Sec-
tion 8.5.2]. Specifically, it is constructed as follows:
entryType ::= ENUMERATED {
normal (0)
group (1)
unlinkGroupMembers (2)
anonGroupMembers (3) }
memberRevInfo ::= CHOICE OPTIONAL {
unlinkGroupMembersRevInfo ::= SEQUENCE { unlinkRevInfo
UNLINKREVINFO }
anonGroupMembersRevInfo ::= SEQUENCE { anonRevInfo ANONREVINFO }
}
A.2 OCSP reqTypeInfo and rspTypeInfo extensions
The OCSP request extension reqTypeInfo, which should be included in the single-
RequestExtensions field of a request [150, Section 4.1.1] is defined as follows:
177
APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS OF CRL AND OCSP EXTENSIONS AND ACFP MESSAGES
reqType ::= ENUMERATED {
normal (0)
group (1)
unlinkGroupMembers (2)
anonGroupMembers (3)
unlinkability (4)
anonymity (5)
groupSignature (6) }
ACFPref INTEGER OPTIONAL
reqInfo REQUESTINFO OPTIONAL
The associated OCSP response extension rspTypeInfo, which should be included
in the singleExtensions field of a response [150, Section 4.2.1] is defined as follows:
rspType ::= ENUMERATED {
normal (0)
group (1)
unlinkGroupMembers (2)
anonGroupMembers (3)
unlinkability (4)
anonymity (5)
groupSignature (6) }
rspStatus ::= CHOICE OPTIONAL {
"good"
"unknown"
"unlinkRevoked"
"anonRevoked"
"revoked"}
memberRevInfo ::= CHOICE OPTIONAL {
unlinkGroupMembersRevInfo ::= SEQUENCE { unlinkRevInfo
UNLINKREVINFO }
anonGroupMembersRevInfo ::= SEQUENCE { anonRevInfo ANONREVINFO }
unlinkRevInfo UNLINKREVINFO
anonRevInfo ANONREVINFO }
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A.3 Definition of ACFP
ACFP requests, named tbsACFPRequest have the following structure:
version INTEGER
requester GeneralName
evidences ::= SEQUENCE {
ACFPEvidenceID ::= CHOICE {
NULL
INTEGER }
policyID INTEGER
reqType ::= ENUMERATED {
evidence (0)
unlinkability (1)
anonymity (2) }
evidence EVIDENCE
singleEvdExtension SINGLEEVDEXTENSION OPTIONAL }
reqExtensions REQUESTEXTENSION OPTIONAL
signature SIGNATURE OPTIONAL
And the associated responses, named tbsACFPResponse, are structured as follows:
version
rspStatus ::= CHOICE {
"Malformation"
"UnsupportedVersion"
"sigRequired"
"OK"}
responses ::= SEQUENCE {
ACFPEvidenceID INTEGER
evRspStatus ::= CHOICE {
"Malformation"
"UnknownID"
"UnknownPolicy"
"OK"
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"evidence"
"denied"
"accepted"}
singleRspExtensions SINGLERSPEXTENSION OPTIONAL }
rspExtensions RESPONSEEXTENSION OPTIONAL
signature SIGNATURE OPTIONAL
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Security analysis and proofs for
Caduceus
Next, we apply the methodology shown in Chapter 3 to the protocols in Caduceus de-
scribed in Chapter 7. Moreover, in the second stage of the methodology, we include
both formal and computational approaches. This exercise, besides being necessary for
ensuring that the required security properties are achieved, serves us to exemplify the
usefulness of combining both approaches, since each one provides additional guaran-
tees.
In this verification process we focus ourselves in the main parts of the system. That
is: turn-retrieval and checkout. As we mentioned in Section 7.6.1, being this a setting
where high security is necessary, it is unavoidable to require physical presence of the
customer when at least once when first joining the system, although, after that, the pro-
tocol in Chapter 5 may be incorporated. However, since we already formally proved
the security of this protocol in Chapter 5, we omit it here.
Like we did for the registration protocol SEBIA in Chapter 5, for the sake of brevity,
we initiate themethodology having a design candidate, which is the system introduced
in Chapter 7.
B.1 Informal analysis
The first task is to perform the initial informal analysis. The five steps comprising this
stage are as follows.
Step 1. Goals of the system. The goals correspond to the privacy and unforgeability
security requirements described in Section 7.5.
Step 2. Attacker capabilities and security model. For the formal verification, we
adopt the Dolev-Yao model. In the computational verification we will grant the at-
tacker additional capabilities, like the ability to corrupt customers. The latter are de-
fined in Section B.3.
Step 3. Entities assumptions, design candidate and channels abstraction.
• Design candidate. In this case we start from the design depicted in Figure 7.3
and described in detail in Section 7.3. For the sake of clarity, we summarize the
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transmitted messages in the sequence diagrams in Figure B.1 (turn-retrieval) and
Figure B.2 (checkout) .
Ci PS
>
1. Pi
<
2. (rk,pr,dl)
>
3. (pr’, ˜com, π, φ)
<
4. ˜̺
Figure B.1: Sequence diagram for turn-retrieval in Caduceus. See Section 7.3 for more
details on how is each token produced.
Ci Mj PS FN
>
1. co = ([Pi], τ, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜,ψ)
>
2. co = ([Pi], τ, α, $, β˜, ̺α, ̺β˜,ψ)
>
3. po = ($, β˜, AVS, ̺β˜)
<
4. yes/no
<
5. yes/no
<
6. rc
Figure B.2: Sequence diagram for checkout in Caduceus. See Section 7.3 for more de-
tails on how is each token produced.
• Entities assumptions. The entities taking part in the system may act as follows:
– Customers are potentially dishonest. Thus, they may collude with any other
entity.
– Merchants are also potentially dishonest and may collude with any other
entity.
– PS acts as a semi-honest party but can collude with everyone.
– FN is a semi-honest party and cannot collude with any other entity.
• Communication channels. All the communications performed during the pro-
tocols in the system are assumed to be confidential. Also, merchants, PS and FN
authenticate their end in a conventional manner (i.e., with conventional digital
certificates).
In addition, all communications originated by a customermust be routed through
sender-anonymous channels, like those provided by the Tor network [91]. Cus-
tomer (anonymous) authentication must be provided by the system (i.e., not by
the communication channels).
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Step 4. Informal requirements. Table B.1 shows the result obtained step by step for
the turn-retrieval protocol and Table B.2 shows the result for the checkout process. For
brevity, we omit the checks performed between the different message exchanges and
assume that if a message at step n is sent, then all the previous checks have been suc-
cessful. We refer to Section 7.3 for the detailed processes. In this analysis, besides
authenticity and confidentiality, we add properties for anonymity and pseudonymity
with respect to a token issued by an entity E, that will be denoted AnE and PnE, respec-
tively. Note that these are special types of authenticity.
Step in Figure B.1 Pi rk,pr,dl pr’, β˜,π, φ ˜̺
1. Ci → PS : Pi none
2. PS→ Ci : rk,pr,dl none APS
3. Ci → PS : (pr’, β˜,π, φ) none APS none
4. PS→ Ci : ˜̺ C, PnCi APS, PnCi ,C APS, PnCi ,C APS, PnCi ,C
Table B.1: Informal requirements table for the turn-retrieval protocol. The rows under
column Step in Figure A.1 reference the corresponding step in Figure B.1.
Step in Figure B.2 co po$,AVS poβ˜,̺β˜ yes rc
1. Ci → Mj : co none
2. Mj → PS : co none
3. PS→ FN : po none none none
4. FN → PS : yes
AnCi/PnCi , APS,FN,C
AnCi/PnCi , AFN,C
AMj ,PS,FN,C AMj ,PS,FN,C
5. PS→ Mj : yes
AnCi/PnCi , APS,FN,C AnCi/PnCi , AFN,PS,C
AMj ,PS,FN,C AMj ,PS,FN,C
6. Mj → Ci : rc
AnCi/PnCi , APS,FN,C AnCi/PnCi , AFN,PS,C AMj ,C
AMj ,PS,FN,C AMj ,PS,FN,C
Table B.2: Informal requirements table for the checkout protocol. The rows under col-
umn Step in Figure A.2 reference the corresponding step in Figure B.2. For
messages composed by several components (e.g., po), we use subindexes to
specify subcomponents that require different properties. E.g., poβ˜ refers to
the component β˜ of po. Note that we assume that yes is sent in steps 4 and
5; otherwise, the process stops.
For the formal verification of this properties, in this case the two approaches are
necessary. That is, we use the formal approach, with ProVerif, for ensuring that the pro-
tocol keeps the required informal requirements as stated in the previous tables. In this
case, this approach guarantees that no intentional manipulation of the messages may
cause a security flaw. Moreover, this protocols have a high load of cryptographic prim-
itives, including complex relationships between the different tokens produced during
the protocols. Thus, even though we include abstractions of them in our ProVerif mod-
els, the Dolev-Yao model does not provide enough guarantees, and a computational
verification is needed.
Therefore, for the formal verification, we use ProVerif, since it allows to verify both
confidentiality, authenticity and anonymity (through observational equivalence) prop-
erties. The computational verification is described in Section B.3.
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Step 5. Informal verification. We proceed, for each protocol, to informally verify
the properties assigned to the message components at step 4, considering the attacker
model and the channels abstraction produced at steps 2 and 3, respectively.
Turn-retrieval protocol :
Message 1. Pi. We expect the customer’s pseudonym to be kept confidential and
to authenticate her pseudonymously. However, at this point we cannot as-
sume any of these properties, since as far as PS is concerned, the message
may come from a dishonest customer (or directly from the attacker). Thus,
we place none requirement in the tokens at this point.
Message 2. rk,pr,dl. The three tokens (risk, promotions and deadline, respec-
tively) are produced and sent by PS after searching Pi in its database. There-
fore, they should provide authenticity on the side of PS. Still, we cannot
expect confidentiality, for the same reason as in Message 1. Since the chan-
nel provides authenticity on the side of PS, this is correct.
Message 3. pr’, β,π, φ. As in Message 1, we cannot place any requirement on
this message, since it may come from a dishonest user or the attacker.
Message 4. ˜̺. If this message is sent, means that all the checks performed by
the cryptographic operations have succeeded. Thus, the customer must be
the legitimate owner of Pi, and all the previously sent messages “inherit”
the pseudonymity authentication requirement and also confidentiality. Ad-
ditionally, the message ˜̺ is also assumed to be authenticated by PS, since
it originates from it. Given the properties of the underlying cryptographic
primitives, and those of the communication channels, all properties are sat-
isfied.
Checkout protocol :
Message 1. co. As before, we cannot assume anything about this message, since
it may come from the attacker.
Message 2. co. Since, for checkout, Mj may be acting dishonestly, we cannot
place any requirement at this step either.
Message 3. po. PS might also be behaving dishonestly during checkout. There-
fore, following the same reasoning as in Message 2, we cannot place any
requirement on po at this step, nor modify those of co.
Message 4. yes. If FN accepts the previous cryptographic tokens, answering
with a yes, it means that they are correct. Hence, co is required to be anony-
mously or pseudonymously authenticated at the customer’s side (depend-
ing on whether she chose to checkout anonymously or pseudonymously).
Furthermore, since FN received the information directly from PS, and the
channel requires authenticity by PS, all the previous tokens inherit also au-
thenticity by PS. A similar reasoning applies to Mj, given that we already
know at this point that PS is acting honestly (or FN has evidence enough to
make it liable). Additionally, for the same motives, confidentiality may also
be required. As for the yes message itself, it is confidential (since PS is hon-
est) and authenticated by FN. Given that all the communication channels
involved up to this point are assumed to provide authenticity (or anonymi-
ty/pseudonymity for the customer) and confidentiality, ensures that all the
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properties are kept. As for the components within po that originated from Ci
(poβ˜,̺β˜), they receive the same requirements as co. po$,AVS, that was included
by PS, also receives the same except AMj . For the same reasons as above,
these properties are kept.
Message 5. yes. This message does not modify the previous requirements fur-
ther than ensuring authenticity by PS to the yes message. Since PS is known
to be acting honestly at this point, and the involved channel ensures confi-
dentiality, and authenticity on PS side, the requirement is met.
Message 6. rc. When the merchant Mj sends this message (and after the cus-
tomer verifies it, step omitted in Table B.2 but assumed here), we may re-
quire authenticity (on the merchant’s side) and confidentiality on it, since
all steps are assumed to have been run correctly. Given that all entities are
trusted to be behaving honestly, and the channels meet all the requirements,
there is no inconsistency up to this point.
After performing the informal analysis of the protocols in Caduceus, we have not
found any design flaw. Therefore, we may proceed to the formal analysis phase, which
in this case will be performed in the following sections using both the formal model
and the computational model.
B.2 Procedural verification: formal model
In this section, we formally verify the system, following the informal verification phase.
However, rather than including an exhaustive account of all the properties to be veri-
fied that were obtained in the informal phase, we focus on themost important ones, and
in introducing the equational theory employed for group signatures, partially blind sig-
natures and the other cryptographic primitives used in the system. Nevertheless, all
the properties are verified in the ProVerif source code available online1, and the pseu-
docode, required as the initial step of this phase, corresponds to the processes described
in Section 7.3.
Note also that, while the computational verification is included in Section B.3, here
we additionally try to determine whether or not an attacker would be able to break
them by sniffing the communications, replaying or modifying messages, or somehow
altering the legitimate behavior of the protocol. The combination of the guarantees
provided by both approaches certainly ensures a higher level of security.
Finally, throughout this section, and in order to ease the explanation of the code
snippets that will be included, we temporarily drop the notation used in the preceding
chapters with respect to cryptographic functionality and information tokens. We now
proceed to explain the model for ProVerif, including these temporary notation.
B.2.1 ProVerif model
The entities, channels and overall process have already been defined in Section 7.3.
Here, we describe how we have modeled it for ProVerif2.
1http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz
2The complete source code is available at http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz.
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Equational theory. Next, we define the equational theory, in terms of constructors
and destructors, for allowing ProVerif to reason about the cryptographic primitives that
take part in our system. Below, constructors are denoted with conventional teletype
font, and include types for its variables. Destructors are denoted with bold teletype
font, and for readability, we do not specify the types of its variables, since it will be
clear from the context.
Group signatures. The types defined for the primitives related to group signatures
are MgrKey, GrpKey and MemKey for manager, group and member keys, respec-
tively. Member keys are associated to a name3 of type Id, and group signatures
are of type bitstring.
gsgetgrpM(mgr : MgrKey) = GrpKey
gsjoin(id : Id, grp : GrpKey,mgr : MgrKey) = MemKey
gssign(m : bitstring,mem : MemKey, grp : GrpKey) = bitstring
gsverify(m,
gssign(m, gsjoin(id, gsgetgrpM(mgr),mgr), gsgetgrpM(mgr)),
gsgetgrpM(mgr)) = true
gsopen(gssign(m, gsjoin(id, gsgetgrpM(mgr),mgr), gsgetgrpM(mgr)),
mgr,
gsgetgrpM(mgr)) = id
Note that we only define the join, sign, veri f y and open functions. The group cre-
ation functionality (setup) would be implicitly performed by creating the man-
ager key (from which the rest of the keys are derived). Additionally, we define a
helper function getgrpM that allows to obtain the group key associated to a given
manager key. As for the claiming-related functionality, it is not implemented in
the model, since we focus the analysis on the two main phases: turn retrieval and
checkout.
Partially Blind Signatures. For this primitive, we use PbsPrvKey and PbsPubKey as
types for private and public keys, and use variables of type Nonce for blinding
and unblinding. The different tokens (blinded messages, signatures and proofs)
are all of type bitstring.
pbsgetpub(prv : PbsPrvKey) = PbsPubKey
pbsblind(msg : bitstring, cmn : bitstring, n : Nonce, pub : PbsPubKey) = bitstring
pbsblindmsg_verify(cmn,
pbsblind(msg, cmn, n, pbsgetpub(prv)),
prv) = true
pbssign(cmn : bitstring, bmsg : bitstring, prv : PbsPrvKey) = bitstring
pbsblindsig_verify(msg, cmn, n,
pbssign(c,
pbsblind(msg, cmn, n, pbsgetpub(prv)),
prv), pbsgetpub(prv)) = true
pbsunblind(bsig : bitstring, n : Nonce, pub : PbsPubKey) = bitstring
pbsverify(msg, cmn,
pbsunblind(pbssign(cmn, pbsblind(msg, cmn, n, pbsgetpub(prv)), prv),
n, pbsgetpub(prv)),
pbsgetpub(prv)) = true
3A name is an atomic value in ProVerif, similar to a constant in a “conventional” programming lan-
guage.
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Commitments. In the context given by our online shopping proposal, commitments
are made over a group member key, using a nonce to blind it. Being the member
key what is being committed, we do not include the open functionality, since
it would de-anonymize the customer, and we are just interested in making the
customer requesting the turn prove that he is the same thanwill later use it during
checkout.
commit(n : Nonce,mem : MemKey) = bitstring
Zero-knowledge proofs. Zero-knowledge proofs are used to demonstrate equality of
the secrets included within commitments (which are, in turn, the blindly signed
messages of the partially blind signatures) and group signatures. They do not
require new types definitions.
zkpeqprove(comm : bitstring, gs1 : bitstring,
gs2 : bitstring,mem : MemKey) = bitstring
zkpeqverify(zkpeqprove(commit(n, gsjoin(id, gsgetgrpM(mgr),mgr)),
gssign(m1, gsjoin(id, gsgetgrpM(mgr),mgr), gsgetgrpM(mgr)),
gssign(m2, gsjoin(id, gsgetgrpM(mgr),mgr), gsgetgrpM(mgr)),
gsjoin(id, gsgetgrpM(mgr),mgr))
gsgetgrpM(mgr)) = true
Pseudonyms. We recall that a pseudonym for a given customer is implemented as a
group signature on a random message created using his membership key. Thus,
the functions related to pseudonyms are basically those of group signatures. Ad-
ditionally, we define the type Pseudonym for managing pseudonyms.
pnymget(n : Nonce,mem : MemKey) = Pseudonym
pnymget_nonce(pnymget(n, gsjoin(id, gsgetgrpM(mgr),mgr))) = n
pnymverify(n,
pnymget(n, gsjoin(id, gsgetgrpM(mgr),mgr)),
gsgetgrpM(mgr)) = true
Communication channels. As has already been pointed out, we assume that SS-
L/TLS is used over some anonymizing network (like Tor). For keys distribution, in-
stead of modeling it like we did in Chapter 5, which would certainly make the model
more complex, we just make the session initiator create a symmetric key and securely
send it to the receiver via a private channel. Note that this is the opposite approach to
the one we used in Chapter 5, where we assumed that the attacker was able to initiate
SSL sessions impersonating a registering user. Here this is not the case, since the cus-
tomer uses from the beginning her member key to authenticate (via zero-knowledge
proofs). Therefore, if the attacker obtains a member key, then it behaves exactly as the
legitimate customer. However, we recall that, by assumption, these member keys are
securely distributed. Hence, the attacker is not allowed to steal member keys and use
them to attack the required properties. Still, this kind of dishonest members will be
dealt with in the computational analysis performed in Section B.3, when taking into
account possible collusion scenarios.
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1 (∗∗ The customer process . ∗∗ )
2 (∗∗ Receives the symmetric key for communicating with PS ( note that ,
3 in prac t i c e , i t could j u s t be negot ia ted using SSL ∗∗ )
4 l e t customer ( pbspub : PbsPubKey , pubfn : PubKey , grp : GrpKey ) =
5
6 (∗ Creates a member key ∗ )
7 new id : Id ;
8 out ( prvjoin , ( msgjoin1 , id ) ) ;
9 in ( prvjoin , (=msgjoin2 , mem:MemKey ) ) ;
10
11 (∗ Creates the pseudonym ∗ )
12 new npnym: Nonce ;
13 l e t pnym = pnym_get (npnym, mem) in
Figure B.3: Customer process for ProVerif: initialization.
Entities modeling. We create one entity per party involved in the protocol, plus a
group manager process in charge of adding new group members. We separate this
functionality in order to allow arbitrary new member additions without forcing it to
happen at the beginning of the FN process. Customers receive as parameter the group
key, the public key of FN, and the public key for partially blind signatures. PS receives
the private key for partially blind signatures and the group key. FN receives the group
manager key and its private key. Note that merchants do not receive any keying mate-
rial as parameter. This is because they basically act as forwarders in this simple model.
In the listings included below, showing the code of each entity, the functions that have
been described above are written (e.g., for the group sign function) gs_sign instead of
gssign, following the notation used in the source code available online
4.
Customers process. We show the code for the customer process in three separate list-
ings. Figure B.3 shows the initialization. Specifically, it is worth noting how the
member key is created (lines 7 through 9, included). The customer first creates a
fresh identity (id variable) and sends it over the private channel prvjoin, which
is only used for adding new members. This message will be received by the
process gm, the Group Manager, which basically executes the gsjoin and returns
the result via prvjoin. Afterwards, she creates her pseudonym (lines 12 and 13)
using the received member key and a fresh nonce, npnym.
Figure B.4 shows the first half of the turn retrieval phase. Concretely, the cus-
tomer sends her pseudonym to PS (line 6), via the public channel, but encrypted
with the secret key kcps, shared with PS (“negotiated” in lines 2 and 3). As a
result, the customer receives from PS a risk factor rk, set of promotions pr and
deadline dl (lines 9 and 10).
In the second half of the turn retrieval process, depicted in Figure B.5, customer
and PS jointly produce a partially blind signature, where the common message
will be the tuple (rk,pr,dl) and the blindly signed message a commitment to the
customer’s member key. First, the customer commits to her member key in line
5, and then blinds the result invoking pbs_blind in line 8. Subsequently, the cus-
tomer creates a proof showing in zero-knowledge the correctness of the blinded
message. The blinded message and the ZK proof are sent to PS in line 14, along
4htpp://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz
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1 (∗ Symmetric key shared with PS − e . g . negot ia ted using SSL ∗ )
2 new kcps : Key ;
3 out ( prvnetcps , (msgprv1 , kcps ) ) ;
4
5 (∗ Sends to PS : pnym, fo r i n i t i a t i n g the turn r e t r i e v a l ∗ )
6 out ( net , senc ( (msg1 , pnym) , kcps ) ) ;
7
8 (∗ Receives from PS : r i sk , promos , deadline ∗ )
9 in ( net , cmsg2 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
10 l e t (=msg2 , rk : b i t s t r i ng , pr : b i t s t r i ng , dl : b i t s t r i n g ) =
11 sdec ( cmsg2 , kcps ) in
Figure B.4: Customer process for ProVerif: first half of turn retrieval.
with the chosen promotions (in this model, the customer always sends pr back,
which may be interpreted as if she always accepts all promotions). After receiv-
ing and decrypting the response from PS (lines 17 and 18), the customer verifies
the blinded signature by calling pbs_blindsig_verify (line 21) and, if the veri-
fication succeeds, unblinds it with pbs_unblind, using the same nonce that was
used for blinding the message (n2, created in line 2).
The customer behavior during checkout is shown in Figure B.6. This phase begins
with the customer issuing group signatures of the purchase information (lines 2
and 3), the payment information (lines 6 and 7) and creating a zero-knowledge
proof showing that both group signatures have been issued using the samemem-
ber key (line 10). Note that we simplify the payment information by making it
depend on the member key (which in turn depends on the customer’s real iden-
tity). This models the fact that, in case this information was learned by the at-
tacker, she will also learn the customer’s real identity. Additionally, this informa-
tion is encrypted with FN’s public key (also in line 6). These tokens are sent to the
merchant (line 18), along with the turn obtained during the turn retrieval phase.
After several messages between the merchant, PS and FN, the customer will be
sent the checkout receipt (lines 22 and 23). The customer then verifies the receipt
in lines 26 and 27 and ends. The final lines are just to test reachability, i.e., that
this part of the code actually executes, preventing non-termination due to typos
or other coding errors (and ensuring that the last event is also executed).
Merchants process. In this model, the merchant process is quite simple. Actually, it
basically forwards the information received during checkout from the customer,
and sends it back, signed, when the payment is executed by FN. In the real world,
instead than just forwarding it, the merchant may add some additional tokens,
like the AVS value (see Section 7.3.3). However, this additional information does
not actually alter the information flow, and we may ignore it. Therefore, for read-
ability, we omit the merchants process. The complete source may is available
online5.
PS process. Figure B.7 shows the code for PS during turn retrieval. Initially, PS re-
ceives a pseudonym from a customer willing to obtain a turn (lines 7 and 8). It
then fetches the promotions and risk factor associated to that pseudonym (here,
we just create fresh names for these values), as it is done for the turn deadline.
5http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz
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1 (∗ Sends to PS : blinded s ignature ( commitment and ZK proofs ) ∗ )
2 new n1 : Nonce ; new n2 : Nonce ;
3
4 (∗ Commit to the member key ∗ )
5 l e t com = commit ( n1 ,mem) in
6
7 (∗ Bl indly sign the commitment ∗ )
8 l e t blindcom = pbs_blind (com , ( rk , pr , dl ) , n2 , pbspub ) in
9
10 (∗ Get the ZK proof of co r r e c tne s s of the blinded message ∗ )
11 l e t zkblindcom = turn_getzkp ( blindcom ,npnym,pnym, grp ,mem, n1 , n2 ) in
12
13 event CustomerRequestsTurn (pnym, mem, rk , pr , dl ) ;
14 out ( net , senc ( (msg3 , pr , blindcom , zkblindcom ) , kcps ) ) ;
15
16 (∗ Receive from PS : turn ∗ )
17 in ( net , cmsg4 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
18 l e t (=msg4 , b l inds ig : b i t s t r i n g ) = sdec ( cmsg4 , kcps ) in
19
20 (∗ Veri fy bl ind s ignature ∗ )
21 i f pbs_b l inds ig_ver i fy (com , ( rk , pr , dl ) , n2 , b l inds ig , pbspub ) = true then (
22
23 event CustomerAcceptsTurn (pnym, mem, rk , pr , dl ) ;
24
25 (∗ Unblind the bl ind s ignature to produce the f i n a l turn ∗ )
26 l e t turn = pbs_unblind ( b l inds ig , n2 , pbspub ) in
Figure B.5: Customer process for ProVerif: second half of turn retrieval.
These values, which will compose the commonmessage of the partially blind sig-
nature, are sent to the customer in line 12. If the customer agrees to these values
(which she always does in our model), PS will receive the blindedmessage in line
15. Subsequently, the zero-knowledge proof sent to prove its correctness is ver-
ified (line 20) and finally the blinded message itself is checked (line 24). If these
verifications succeed, PS blindly signs the received message, running pbs_sign
and sends the result back to the customer (lines 27 and 29, respectively).
Figure B.8 shows the verifications performed by PS during checkout. After receiv-
ing the checkout order in line 6 (and decrypting it in line 7), PS verifies the group
signatures corresponding to the purchase and encrypted payment information
(lines 12 and 14). Subsequently, it verifies the zero-knowledge proof showing
that both group signatures and the commitment included associated to the turn
(variable com) have all been issued by the same customer (lines 17 and 18). Fi-
nally, the turn, which is actually a partially blind signature, is verified in lines
21 and 22. There, the message that was blindly signed is com and the common
message was the tuple (rk, pr, dl).
When the verification succeeds, PS sends a payment order to FN as shown in
Figure B.9. Just after sending the actual order (line 5), PS receives from FN the
result of the operation (line 8). If it has succeeded (in our model, if the execution
arrives at this point, we assume it has), then PS informs the merchant (lines 14
and 15).
FN process. FN is also a simple process. Upon receiving a payment order from PS
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1 (∗ Create purchase item and group sign i t ∗ )
2 new pur : b i t s t r i n g ;
3 l e t gs_pur = gs_sign ( pur , mem, grp ) in
4
5 (∗ Encrypt banking information with FN’ s publ ic key
6 and group sign i t ∗ )
7 l e t cbank = aenc ( banking (mem) , pubfn ) in
8 l e t gs_cbank = gs_sign ( cbank , mem, grp ) in
9
10 (∗ I s sue ZK proof of equa l i ty of group s igna tures ∗ )
11 l e t zkpeq = zkpeq_prove (com , gs_pur , gs_cbank , mem) in
12
13 (∗ Create symmetric key for communications with Merchant ∗ )
14 new kcm : Key ;
15 out ( prvnetcm , (msgprv2 , kcm ) ) ;
16
17 event CustomerInitCheckout (pnym, turn , com , pur , cbank ,
18 gs_pur , gs_cbank , zkpeq ) ;
19 out ( net , senc ( (msg5 , com , ( rk , pr , dl ) , turn ,
20 pur , gs_pur , cbank , gs_cbank , zkpeq ) , kcm ) ) ;
21
22 (∗ Receive checkout r e c e i p t ∗ )
23 in ( net , cmsg10 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
24 l e t (=msg10 ,pubm: PubKey , r e c e i p t : b i t s t r i n g ) = sdec ( cmsg10 , kcm) in
25
26 (∗ Veri fy the r e c e i p t ∗ )
27 i f v e r i f y ( r ece ip t , pubm,
28 ( turn , pur , cbank , gs_pur , gs_cbank , zkpeq ) ) = true then (
29
30 event CustomerAcceptsReceipt (pnym, turn , com , pur , cbank ,
31 gs_pur , gs_cbank , zkpeq ) ;
32
33 (∗ Dummy message −− fo r t e s t i ng r e a ch ab i l i t y ∗ )
34 new dummy : b i t s t r i n g ;
35 out ( net , senc (dummy, kcm ) )
36
37 )
38
39 ) .
Figure B.6: Customer process for ProVerif: checkout.
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1 l e t ps ( pbsprv : PbsPrvKey , grp : GrpKey ) =
2
3 (∗ Receive from customer a shared key ∗ )
4 in ( prvnetcps , (=msgprv1 , kcps : Key ) ) ;
5
6 (∗ Receive a pseudonym from a customer i n i t i a t i n g turn r e t r i e v a l ∗ )
7 in ( net , cmsg1 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
8 l e t (=msg1 , pnym: Pseudonym) = sdec ( cmsg1 , kcps ) in
9
10 (∗ Creates r i sk , promos and deadline , and sends them ∗ )
11 new rk : b i t s t r i n g ; new pr : b i t s t r i n g ; new dl : b i t s t r i n g ;
12 out ( net , senc ( (msg2 , rk , pr , dl ) , kcps ) ) ;
13
14 (∗ Receives blinded s ignature ( commitment and ZK proofs ) ∗ )
15 in ( net , cmsg3 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
16 l e t (=msg3 , =pr , blindcom : b i t s t r i ng , zkpblindcom : b i t s t r i n g ) =
17 sdec ( cmsg3 , kcps ) in
18
19 (∗ Veri fy ZK proof of co r r e c tne s s ∗ )
20 i f turn_verzkp ( blindcom , zkpblindcom , pnym_get_nonce (pnym) ,
21 pnym, grp ) = true then (
22
23 (∗ Veri fy blinded message ∗ )
24 i f pbs_blindmsg_verify ( ( rk , pr , dl ) , blindcom , pbsprv ) = true then (
25
26 (∗ I s sue bl ind s ignature and send i t ∗ )
27 l e t b l inds ig = pbs_sign ( ( rk , pr , dl ) , blindcom , pbsprv ) in
28 event PSIssuesTurn (pnym, rk , pr , dl ) ;
29 out ( net , senc ( (msg4 , b l inds ig ) , kcps ) ) ;
Figure B.7: PS process for ProVerif. Turn retrieval phase.
1 (∗ Receive symmetric key from Merchant −− Simulates SSL ∗ )
2 in ( prvnetmps , (=msgprv3 , kmps : Key ) ) ;
3
4 (∗ Receive the checkout order . Here , pr might be d i f f e r e n t to
5 the previous one sent before , but we assume i t i s the same ∗ )
6 in ( net , cmsg6 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
7 l e t (=msg6 , com : b i t s t r i ng , ( = rk , =pr , =dl ) , turn : b i t s t r i ng ,
8 pur : b i t s t r i ng , gs_pur : b i t s t r i ng , cbank : b i t s t r i ng ,
9 gs_cbank : b i t s t r i ng , zkpeq : b i t s t r i n g ) = sdec ( cmsg6 , kmps) in
10
11 (∗ Veri fy the group s igna tures ∗ )
12 i f g s_ver i fy ( pur , gs_pur , grp ) = true then (
13
14 i f g s_ver i fy ( cbank , gs_cbank , grp ) = true then (
15
16 (∗ Veri fy the ZK proof of equa l i ty ∗ )
17 i f zkpeq_veri fy ( zkpeq , gs_pur ,
18 gs_cbank , grp ) = true then (
19
20 (∗ Veri fy the turn (Remember : i t i s a bl ind s ignature ) ∗ )
21 i f pbs_ver i fy (com , ( rk , pr , dl ) , turn ,
22 pbs_getpub ( pbsprv ) ) = true then (
Figure B.8: PS process for ProVerif. Checkout phase: verification.
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1 (∗ Send the payment in fo to FN ∗ )
2 new kpsfn : Key ;
3 out ( prvnetpsfn , (msgprv4 , kpsfn ) ) ;
4
5 out ( net , senc ( (msg7 , cbank , gs_cbank ) , kpsfn ) ) ;
6
7 (∗ Receive the payment conf i rmat ion ∗ )
8 in ( net , cmsg8 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
9 l e t (=msg8 , =cbank ) = sdec ( cmsg8 , kpsfn ) in
10
11 event PSacceptsCheckout ( turn , com , pur , cbank , gs_pur ,
12 gs_cbank , zkpeq ) ;
13
14 (∗ Send ACK to merchant ∗ )
15 out ( net , senc ( (msg9 , turn , pur , cbank ,
16 gs_pur , gs_cbank , zkpeq ) , kmps ) )
17 )
18 )
19 )
20 )
21 )
22 ) .
Figure B.9: PS process for ProVerif. Checkout phase: execution.
(line 8), it initially verifies the group signature corresponding to the encrypted
payment information (line 12). If it succeeds, it then decrypts the payment infor-
mation (line 15), from which it can extract the identity of the payer. This identity
is compared with the result of gs_open in line 19. If both identities are the same
(and the customer has enough funds, etc., which is ignored here), then the pay-
ment is executed. At last, FN informs PS of the outcome of this operation (line
29) and terminates.
B.2.2 Formal security proofs
Using the model explained above, the authenticity and privacy properties verifiedwith
ProVerif are as follows.
Authenticity. We show authenticity of the system in three stages. First, we show
that the created turns are authentic, which gives legitimacy to the turn-retrieval phase.
Then, we show authenticity of the checkout process jointly with authenticity of the
generated receipts. These properties will be proven using ProVerif’s correspondence
assertions. As we saw in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, these assertions are used to prove
that some specific action has not beenmanipulated by the attacker (who cannot execute
events).
The events defined to prove turn authenticity are as follows6:
• event CustomerRequestsTurn(pnym,mem,rk,pr,dl).
This event signals that a customer, owner of pseudonym pnym and member key
mem, has requested a turn associated to the terms specified with the risk factor rk,
promotions pr and deadline dl.
6We use descriptive variable names instead of types for readability.
193
APPENDIX B: SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PROOFS FOR CADUCEUS
1 (∗∗ The FN process ∗∗ )
2 l e t fn ( prvfn : PrvKey , mgr : MgrKey ) =
3 (∗ Receive a symmetric key from PS −− s imulates SSL ∗ )
4 in ( prvnetpsfn , (=msgprv4 , kpsfn : Key ) ) ;
5
6 (∗ Receive payment order ∗ )
7 in ( net , cmsg7 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
8 l e t (=msg7 , cbank : b i t s t r i ng , gs_cbank : b i t s t r i n g ) =
9 sdec ( cmsg7 , kpsfn ) in
10
11 (∗ Veri fy group s ignature ∗ )
12 i f g s_ver i fy ( cbank , gs_cbank , gs_getgrpM (mgr ) ) = true then (
13
14 (∗ Decrypt the banking information ∗ )
15 l e t bank = adec ( cbank , prvfn ) in
16
17 (∗ Check tha t the i s sue r of the group s ignature and the owner of
18 the banking account are the same ∗ )
19 i f gs_open ( gs_cbank ,mgr , gs_getgrpM (mgr ) ) = banking_getid ( bank ) then (
20
21 (∗ Addit ional ly , the payment amount in cbank and the one sent
22 separa te ly by PS ( e l iminated here ) should match , but we ignore
23 i t in t h i s model : see o r i g i n a l paper fo r d e t a i l s ∗ )
24
25 event FNacceptsPayment ( cbank , gs_cbank ) ;
26
27 (∗ Everything OK. Here FN would t r an s f e r the appropriate funds
28 from the customer to the PS ∗ )
29 out ( net , senc ( (msg8 , cbank ) , kpsfn ) )
30
31 )
32
33 ) .
Figure B.10: FN process for ProVerif.
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• event PSIssuesTurn(pnym,rk,pr,dl).
Indicates that PS has issued a turn, intended for the owner of the pseudonym
pnym, and associated to the conditions stated in (rk,pr,dl).
• event CustomerAcceptsTurn(pnym,mem,rk,pr,dl).
Shows that a customer, owner of pnym and mem, has accepted the turn associated
to (rk,pr,dl).
With respect to checkout, the events used for the correspondence assertions are:
• event CustomerInitCheckout(pnym,turn,com,pur,cbank,gs_pur,gs_cbank,
zkpeq).
Indicates that a customer with pseudonym pnym has initiated a checkout using
turn turn, for commitment com and purchase pur with group signature gs_pur,
where the encrypted payment information is cbank and its group signature is
gs_cbank. The zero-knowledge proof showing equality of the group signatures
and the commitment is zkpeq.
• event FNacceptsPayment(cbank,gs_cbank).
Is the event for showing that FN has accepted the payment order related to the
payment object cbank, with group signature gs_cbank.
• event PSacceptsCheckout(turn,com,pur,cbank,gs_pur,gs_cbank,zkpeq).
Signals the event in which PS accepts the payment for the same tokens as in
CustomerInitCheckout, except the pseudonym, since we are in an anonymous
checkout.
• event MerchantIssuesReceipt(turn,com,pur,cbank,gs_pur,gs_cbank,zkpeq).
It is the equivalent to PSacceptsCheckout, although at themerchant’s side, which
also implies that the merchant has issued the associated receipt.
• event CustomerAcceptsReceipt(pnym,turn,com,pur,cbank,gs_pur,gs_cbank,
zkpeq).
Means that the customer has accepted the receipt associated to the previously
defined tokens.
Turn authenticity. This property is proven with the following correspondence asser-
tion:
inj-event(CustomerAcceptsTurn(pnym, mem, rk, pr, dl))
==> (inj-event(PSIssuesTurn(pnym, rk, pr, dl))
&& inj-event(CustomerRequestsTurn(pnym, mem, rk, pr, dl))).
That is, the turn will be authentic if the event by means of which a Customer
accepts a turn associated to the tokens specified in the left hand side of the impli-
cation is always preceded by:
• The event with which PS signals that it has issued a turn for the same tokens.
• And the event with which the customer has requested a turn associated to
the same tokens.
Specifically, note that pseudonym and member key are included in both sides of
the implication.
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Checkout authenticity. For proving checkout authenticity, the chain of events is as de-
picted below:
inj-event(CustomerAcceptsReceipt(pnym, turn, com, pur, cbank, gs_pur, gs_cbank, zkpeq))
==> (inj-event(MerchantIssuesReceipt(turn, com, pur, cbank, gs_pur, gs_cbank, zkpeq))
&& inj-event(PSacceptsCheckout(turn, com, pur, cbank, gs_pur, gs_cbank, zkpeq))
&& inj-event(FNacceptsPayment(cbank, gs_cbank))
&& inj-event(CustomerInitCheckout(pnym, turn, com, pur,cbank, gs_pur,gs_cbank, zkpeq))).
In detail, the left hand side of the implication shows the event by means of which
a customer accepts a receipt associated to the specified tokens. This event must
be preceded by:
• The event MerchantIssuesReceipt, invoked by the merchant, proving that
she has issued a receipt associated to the same tokens.
• The event PSacceptsCheckout, indicating that PS has accepted the checkout
order also related to the same tokens.
• The event FNacceptsCheckout, run by FN, shows that FN has accepted the
payment associated to cbank and its group signature, gs_cbank.
• The event CustomerInitCheckout, executed by the customer, which signals
that the same customer has initiated a checkout, associated to the previously
specified tokens.
Again, note that the pseudonym is the same in the two events launched by the
customer. Moreover, the commitment, which links in zero-knowledge this pseu-
donym (via the member key) with both group signatures, is present in all the
events, except in the one run by FN, which only includes gs_cbank.
Receipt authenticity. This property is also considered in the previous correspondence
for checkout authenticity. Specifically, observe that all the tokens involved in
event CustomerAcceptsReceipt are those used to generate a receipt. Moreover,
these tokens come directly from the merchant who issued the receipt, given that
the event MerchantIssuesReceipt has been invoked for the same tokens.
Finally, compared to the unforgeability properties defined at the beginning of Sec-
tion 7.5, note that here the approach is in the opposite direction. Instead of proving that
it is not possible to forge a turn, checkout or receipt, with ProVerif we have shown that
it is only possible to create turns that follow the predefined requirements (and are thus
valid and authentic).
Customer anonymity. Roughly, this property ensures that no entity should be able to
identify the customer involved in a checkout process. That is, an anonymous checkout
by customer A should be indistinguishable from an anonymous checkout by customer
B, even for the merchant and PS. It is possible to prove this with ProVerif using its func-
tionality for showing observational equivalence . In short, two processes are observation-
ally equivalent, or indistinguishable, if an active attacker cannot tell them apart after
observing their execution [42, Sec. 4.3.2][40]. In ProVerif, there are a few variations for
testing different kinds of observational equivalence: strong secrecy, off-line guessing
attacks and differences by terms. In our case, we will be verifying the latter. Specifi-
cally, it means that, in a given process, and given two variables X and Y within it, if the
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occurrences of the former are substituted by the latter (or conversely), the result will
be observationally equivalent from the original one. ProVerif can be asked to test this
by specifying choice[X,Y]. In this case, what we do is to create two checkout objects,
each one of them issued under a different member key. However, for convenience, we
make the same customer process create both checkout objects (although using different
member keys, as required, and thus acting as two different customers). Subsequently,
we use the choice command to test their observational equivalence. This is included
in the source code available online7 at the moment in which the customer sends the
checkout object to the merchant, using the following instructions:
let co1 = (msg5, com, (rk, pr, dl), turn, pur, gs_pur, cbank, gs_cbank, zkpeq) in
let co2 = (msg5, com2, (rk, pr, dl), turn2, pur2, gs_pur2, cbank2, gs_cbank2, zkpeq2) in
out (net, choice[senc(co1,kcm), senc(co2,kcm)]);
Where the tokens in co1 and co2 are created using a different member key for each
of them. As a result, ProVerif informs that:
RESULT Observational equivalence is true (bad not derivable)
Which means that the attacker is not able to differentiate protocol runs in which co1
is chosen from those in which co2 is chosen instead.
Unlinkable turn-retrieval and checkout. This property ensures that no entity should
be able to, given a checkout object, determine the turn-retrieval process that produced
the turn used during checkout. The way of proving this with ProVerif is similar than
the approach for showing customer anonymity. However, in this case, what we are
interested in is in the specific case in which the two different checkouts have been
issued by the same customer, instead of different customers. Hence, for this property,
we just make use of the same choice, but use the same member key for both co1 and
co2. ProVerif’s output indicates that this property is also maintained:
RESULT Observational equivalence is true (bad not derivable)
Transaction privacy against FN. This property captures the fact that FNwill not learn
any information concerning either the contents or the purchase or who is the related
merchant. This directly follows from the fact that none of that information is included
in the message received by FN, who is also a semihonest entity.
B.3 Procedural verification: computational model
In this section, we include a computational analysis of the security properties that our
system preserves. As it will remain patent, this analysis complements the formal one
in the sense that it deals with the possibility of the cryptographic primitives not being
perfect (as is assumed in the Dolev-Yao model).
For this analysis, included in detail in [87], we start by giving game-based defini-
tions to the security properties informally stated at the beginning of this section. Within
this definitions, we use the following oracles to give the adversary additional powers
when necessary.
7http://www.ii.uam.es/~gnb/thesis-jdv.tgz
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• (Add clients) This oracle, written AddC, allows the adversary to add a new client.
The public/private key, pseudonym, and payment information of the client will
be recorded. Finally, it returns the public key and pseudonym of the client.
• (Add merchants) This oracle, written AddM, allows the adversary to add a new
merchant. However, the adversary does not observe any secret information of
this merchant. The public/private key of the merchant will be recorded. Finally,
it returns the public key of the merchant.
• (Corrupt clients) This oracle, writtenCorC, allows the adversary to corrupt a client
in the system, i.e., the adversary will have all information about the target client.
• (Corrupt merchants) This oracle, written CorM, allows the adversary to corrupt a
merchant in the system, that is, the adversary will have all the information about
the target merchant.
• (Process checkout) This oracle DoCheckout is given as input a checkout co, and if
co is valid, it will process the checkout (as would be done by PS and FN.) For
simplicity, we ignore AVS filters.
B.3.1 Game-based definitions
By using the previous oracles, and recovering the symbols used for depicting each
token (see Table 7.1), the definitions are as follows:
Customer Anonymity. Customer anonymity requires that if a customer creates an
anonymous checkout co, then no coalition ofmerchants, PS, and other customers should
be able to determine the identity or pseudonym of the customer from co. We describe
this requirement by using the following game.
Experiment ExpCAA [b, k]:
(pkFN, skFN) ← FNSetup(1k).
(pkPS, skPS) ← PSSetup(1k).
(C0,C1,M, α, $) ← A(pkFN, pkPS, skPS : AddC,CorC,AddM,CorM,DoCheckout)
If C0 or C1 is corrupted, return 0.
Let (β0, P0) and (β1, P1) be the billing info and pseudonym of C0 and C1.
τ0 ← TurnRetrieval(pkPS, pkFN, P0)[C0(mk0),A]
τ1 ← TurnRetrieval(pkPS, pkFN, P1)[C1(mk1),A]
If τ0 and τ1 have different (risk, promo, deadline)s, return 0.
co ← IssueAnonCheckout(mkb, τb, α, $, βb).
b˜ ← A(co : DoCheckout).
return b˜.
We say that a private payment system has customer anonymity if, for any stateful PPT
algorithm A,
∣∣Pr[ExpCAA [0, k]− Pr[ExpCAA [1, k]∣∣ is negligible in k.
Unlinkable Turn-Retrieval and Checkout. Unlinkable turn-retrieval and checkout
requires that if a customer creates an anonymous checkout co, then no coalition of
merchants, PS, and other customers should be able to link co to the corresponding
turn-retrieval procedure. We describe this requirement by using the following game.
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Experiment ExpUTCA [b, k]:
(pkFN, skFN) ← FNSetup(1k).
(pkPS, skPS) ← PSSetup(1k).
(C,M, α, $) ← A(pkFN, pkPS, skPS : AddC,CorC,AddM,CorM,DoCheckout)
If C is corrupted, return 0.
Let (β, P) be the billing info and pseudonym of C respectively.
τ0 ← TurnRetrieval(pkPS, pkFN, P)[C(mk),A]
τ1 ← TurnRetrieval(pkPS, pkFN, P)[C(mk),A]
If τ0 and τ1 have different (risk, promo, deadline)s, return 0.
co ← IssueAnonCheckout(mk, τb, α, $, β).
b˜ ← A(co : DoCheckout).
return b˜.
We say that a private payment system has unlinkable turn-retrieval and checkout if, for
any stateful PPT algorithmA, it holds that
∣∣Pr[ExpUTCA [0, k]− Pr[ExpUTCA [1, k]∣∣ is negligi-
ble in k.
Transaction Privacy Against FN. According to this requirement, the financial net-
work FN should not be able to determine the detail of a customer’s transaction beyond
what is necessary, i.e., the customer identity and the amount of payment; in particu-
lar, the product information and the merchant identity of each transaction should be
hidden from FN. We describe this requirement by using the following game.
Experiment ExpTPA [b, k]:
(pkFN, skFN) ← FNSetup(1k).
(pkPS, skPS) ← PSSetup(1k).
(C,M0,M1, α0, α1, $) ← A(pkFN, pkPS, skFN : AddC,AddM)
Let (β, P) be the payment information, and pseudonym of C.
τ ← TurnRetrieval(pkPS, pkFN, P)[C(mk),PS(skPS)]
co ← IssueCheckout(mk, τ, αb, $, β).
po ← IssuePmtOrder(skPS, co).
b˜ ← A(po).
return b˜.
We say that a private payment system has transaction privacy against FN if, for any
stateful PPT algorithm A, it holds that
∣∣Pr[ExpTPA [0, k]− Pr[ExpTPA [1, k]∣∣ is negligible in
k.
TurnUnforgeability. A customer should not be able to forge a valid turn that contains
a risk factor or a promotion or a deadline set by his own choice. We describe this
requirement by using the following game.
Experiment ExpTUA [k]:
(pkFN, skFN) ← FNSetup(1k).
(pkPS, skPS) ← PSSetup(1k).
τ ← A(pkFN, pkPS : AddC,CorC,TurnskPS)
If VerifyTurn(pkPS, τ) = 1 and (τ.rk, τ.pr, τ.dl) was never observed by TurnskPS
return 1; otherwise return 0.
We say that a private payment system has turn unforgeability if, for any stateful PPT
algorithm A, it holds that Pr[ExpTUA [k] = 1] is negligible in k.
Checkout Unforgeability. With a valid turn τ issued for a customer, no coalition of
other customers, merchants, and PS should be able to forge a valid checkout co con-
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taining τ. We describe this requirement by using the following game.
Experiment ExpTCUA [k]:
(pkFN, skFN) ← FNSetup(1k).
(pkPS, skPS) ← PSSetup(1k).
(C, co) ← A(pkFN, pkPS, skPS : AddC,AddM,CorC,CorM,Transaction)
If co has been processed before, return 0.
If VerifyCheckout(co) = 0, return 0.
If C has never got risk/promotion in co, but co deducts C’s balance
return 1; otherwise return 0.
We say that a private payment system has checkout unforgeability if, for any stateful PPT
algorithm A, it holds that Pr[ExpTCUA [k] = 1] is negligible in k.
Receipt Unforgeability. No coalition of customers, merchants (other than the target
merchant M), and PS should be able to forge a valid receipt that looks originating from
M. We describe this requirement by using the following game.
Experiment ExpRUA [k]:
(pkFN, skFN) ← FNSetup(1k).
(pkPS, skPS) ← PSSetup(1k).
M ← A(pkFN, pkPS : AddC,AddM,CorC,CorM,DoCheckout)
If merchant M is corrupted, return 0
(co, rc) ← A(pkFN, pkPS : AddC,AddM,CorC,CorM,DoConfirm)
If the merchant M is corrupted, return 0
If co was queried to DoCheckout, return 0
If VerifyReceipt(rc, co) = 0, return 0
return 1
We say that a private payment system has receipt unforgeability if, for any stateful PPT
algorithm A, it holds that Pr[ExpRUA [k] = 1] is negligible in k.
Receipt Claimability. For a valid receipt from an uncorrupted customer, no other
customer should be able to successfully claim the ownership of the confirmation.
Experiment ExpRCA [k]:
(pkFN, skFN) ← FNSetup(1k).
(pkPS, skPS) ← PSSetup(1k).
(co, rc,π) ← A(pkFN, pkPS, skPS : AddC,AddM,CorC,CorM,Transaction)
If rc is never issued by Transaction, return 0
If the owner customer of (co, rc) is corrupted, return 0
If VerReceiptZK(rc, co,π) = 0, return 0
return 1
We say that a private payment system has receipt claimability if, for any stateful PPT
algorithm A, it holds that Pr[ExpRCA [k] = 1] is negligible in k.
B.3.2 Computational security proofs
We base our proofs in the security properties of the underlying building blocks. Specif-
ically, we mainly refer to the blindness and unforgeability properties of partially blind
signatures (see e.g. [156]); the anonymity, misidentification security and framing security
properties of group signatures [132]; the zero-knowledge and unforgeability properties
of zero-knowledge proof systems (see e.g. [100]); the unforgeability property of digital
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signatures (see e.g. [109]); and the property of protection against identity compromise of
pseudonym systems (see e.g. [141]).
Theorem 1. Our system is customer anonymous.
Proof. Recall that in ExpCAA [b], (Pb, τb,mkb, βb) was used (other unimportant elements
were omitted). We define hybrid games as follows:
Hybrid 0. This is the actual game ExpCAA [0].
Hybrid 1. It’s the same as Hybrid 0 except that all ZK proofs are simulated by ZK
simulator. From ZK properties for the ZK proofs, Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 1 are indistin-
guishable.
Hybrid 2. It’s the same as Hybrid 1 except that in the first turn-retrieval (to generate
τ0), it uses com ← Com(mk1; rcom) instead of com ← Com(mk0; rcom). From the hiding
property of the commitment scheme, Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 are indistinguishable.
Note that at this moment, the two turns τ0 and τ1 are identically distributed.
Hybrid 3. It’s the same asHybrid 2 except that it generates co by running IssueAnonCheckout
using τ1 (and mk0, β0) instead of τ0. Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3 are indistinguishable due
to blindness of the underlying partial blind signature scheme. Note that the adver-
sary (against blindness property) first generates a key pair for the blind signature and
two different messages; after signing two messages in a randomly chosen order by the
game environment (for the blindness), the adversary should guess the message order
(i.e., reversed or not). See [43] for more detail. We show the reduction. That is, we con-
struct an adversary B breaking the blindness of the underlying partial blind scheme
given an adversary distinguishing the two hybrids as follows:
B runs key generation algorithm for PBS to generate a key pair, and sends
out the pair to the outer environment. At the same time B works as Hy-
brid game (2 or 3). In particular, whenA chooses two customers, B chooses
com0 = Com(mk1; r0) and com1 = Com(mk1; r1) as the two messages to dis-
tinguish and sends out (com0, com1) to the outer environment. Once the
outer environment gives the blind signature ̺, B uses it to generate co. Fi-
nally, B outputs whatever A outputs.
When the signature ̺ is on com0, the simulation is identical to Hybrid 2; on the other
hand, when ̺ is on com1, to Hybrid 3. Therefore, if A distinguishes the two hybrids
with non-negligible probability, B also breaks the blindness property of the underlying
signature with non-negligible probability.
Hybrid 4. It’s the same asHybrid 3 except that it generates co by running IssueAnonCheckout
using (τ1,mk1, β0) instead of (τ1,mk0, β0). Hybrid 3 and Hybrid 4 are indistinguishable
due to anonymity of the group signature scheme. The reduction is straightforward.
Hybrid 5. It’s the same asHybrid 3 except that it generates co by running IssueAnonCheckout
using (τ1,mk1, β1) instead of (τ1,mk1, β0). Hybrid 4 and Hybrid 5 are indistinguishable
due to semantic security of the public key encryption. The reduction is straightforward.
Hybrid 6. It’s the same as Hybrid 5 except that in the first turn-retrieval (to generate
τ0), it uses com ← Com(mk0; rcom) instead of com ← Com(mk1; rcom). From the hiding
property of the commitment scheme, Hybrid 5 and Hybrid 6 are indistinguishable.
Hybrid 7. It’s the same as Hybrid 6 except that ZK proofs are actually done instead
of using simulations. From ZK properties for the ZK proofs, Hybrid 6 and Hybrid 7
are indistinguishable. Observe that Hybrid 7 is indeed ExpCAA [1], which concludes the
proof.
Theorem 2. Our system has the property of unlinkable turn-retrieval/checkout.
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Proof. The proof is the same as showing indistinguishability of Hybrid 3 and 4 in the
previous proof.
Theorem 3. Our system has transaction privacy against FN.
Proof. Our system simply drops all information about α when PS creates a payment
order, and this guarantees transaction privacy against FN, information-theoretically.
Theorem 4. Our system satisfies turn unforgeability.
Proof. Turn unforgeability simply follows from unforgeability of the partial blind sig-
nature scheme.
Theorem 5. Our system satisfies checkout unforgeability.
Proof. Checkout unforgeability follows from soundness of ZK proofs. In particular,
τ.com should be the commitment to mki due to the soundness of the proof in the turn-
retrieval. Moreover, the soundness of ZK proof ψ in the checkout object makes sure
that all of τ.com, ̺α and ̺β˜ use the same member key mki.
Theorem 6. Our system satisfies receipt unforgeability.
Proof. Receipt unforgeability holds immediately from unforgeabilty of underlying the
digital signature scheme.
Theorem 7. Our system satisfies receipt claimability.
Proof. Receipt unforgeability holds immediately from security against framing attacks
of the underlying group signature scheme.
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Using libgroupsig
In this section we explain how to configure, compile and make use of the library
through a few simple code snippets for the main actions. libgroupsig requires glib
(version 2.33 or compatible), openssl (version 1.0.1e-2 or compatible) for hashing func-
tions, libgmp (version 2:5.0.5 or compatible) and the PBC library1 (0.5.12 or compati-
ble). Therefore, in order to use it, these libraries must be installed in the system. Also,
the library uses the GNU build system2. Thus, in order to check the environment and
generate the proper compilation scripts, the configure script must be run. Afterwards,
the library is compiled with make and optionally installed with make install. A min-
imal set of auxiliary tools (located under the tools folder) for testing the library may be
compiled with make check. Below we include a few code snippets, mostly extracted
from the mentioned tools programs, showing some of the main functionality of the li-
brary. A detailed API documentation is available within the library’s home page at
Bitbucket3
Group creation The code snippet in Figure C.1 shows how to create a group. Specif-
ically, it creates the group andmanager keys and an empty GML, using predefined con-
figuration values for each supported group signature scheme. The initial groupsig_init
call sets up library-wide structures (currently, it seeds random number generators).
Subsequently, the group andmanager keys, and GML are initialized. Finally, the group
is created by filling up the initialized cryptographic tokens and setting scheme-wide
data structures (e.g., PBC data structures for pairing based group signature schemes).
Adding group members This operation typically requires some precomputation by
the new member and a finalization by the group manager. Thus, we have divided it
accordingly. The result of each operation may just be transmitted over the network.
However, for brevity, we include it in the snippet in Figure C.2 as part of the same pro-
gram. After successfully adding a new member, the GML (required parameter to the
groupmanager side of the process) will be updated with the newmember information.
Signing messages and signature verification Figure C.3 shows the process for cre-
ating a group signature. It is worth emphasizing the last parameter which, in case of
being other than UINT_MAX, specifies that the random number generator must be re-
1http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_build_system
3https://bitbucket.org/jdiazvico/libgroupsig/
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1 /∗ I n i t i a l i z e environment ∗/
2 i f ( g roups ig_ in i t ( time (NULL) ) == IERROR) { re turn IERROR ; }
3
4 /∗ Set group s ignature scheme conf igura t ion parameters . ∗/
5 i f ( cfg−>scheme == GROUPSIG_KTY04_CODE) {
6 KTY04_CONFIG_SET_DEFAULTS ( ( k ty04_conf ig_ t ∗ ) cfg−>config , key_format ) ;
7 } e l s e i f ( cfg−>scheme == GROUPSIG_BBS04_CODE ||
8 cfg−>scheme == GROUPSIG_CPY06_CODE) {
9 CPY06_CONFIG_SET_DEFAULTS ( ( cpy06_conf ig_t ∗ ) cfg−>config , key_format ) ;
10 }
11
12 /∗ I n i t i a l i z e the group key , manager key and GML var i ab l e s ∗/
13 i f ( ! ( mgrkey = groupsig_mgr_key_init ( cfg−>scheme ) ) ) { re turn IERROR ; }
14 i f ( ! ( grpkey = groupsig_grp_key_ini t ( cfg−>scheme ) ) ) { re turn IERROR ; }
15 i f ( ! ( gml = gml_ in i t ( cfg−>scheme ) ) ) { re turn IERROR ; }
16
17 /∗ ‘ ‘ Construct ’ ’ the group ∗/
18 i f ( groupsig_setup ( cfg−>scheme , grpkey , mgrkey , gml , c fg ) == IERROR) {
19 return IERROR ;
20 }
Figure C.1: Group creation.
1 /∗ I n i t i a l i z e member key s t ruc tu r e ∗/
2 i f ( ! (memkey = groupsig_mem_key_init ( cfg−>scheme ) ) ) { re turn IERROR ; }
3
4 /∗ Member s ide of j o i n ∗/
5 i f ( groupsig_join_mem (memkey, grpkey ) == IERROR) { re turn IERROR ; }
6
7 /∗ Group manager s ide of j o i n ∗/
8 i f ( groupsig_join_mgr ( gml , memkey, mgrkey , grpkey ) == IERROR) {
9 re turn IERROR ;
10 }
Figure C.2: Addition of new group members.
seeded using the specified value. Verification of a group signatures is shown in Figure
C.4.
Opening signatures With the open function, the real identity of the signer of a group
signature is obtained. It requires the group signature itself and the group member-
ship list besides, of course, the group manager key. Figure C.5 shows how to call the
function. Once obtained the identity of the signer, its member key may be revoked by
including it in a CRL which, in turn, may be used to trace dishonest users, and even
made public.
Other functions The previous functions represent the core of group signature schemes.
However, specific schemes may implement additional functionality, like tracing dis-
honest users and claiming group signatures. For implementing these functions, the
library provides handlers following the same style than the already introduced ones.
Also, miscellaneous functionality is provided for importing, exporting and copying
keys and signatures.
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1 /∗ I n i t i a l i z e the group s ignature ob j e c t ∗/
2 i f ( ! ( s ig = groups ig_s igna ture_ in i t ( scheme ) ) ) {
3 f p r i n t f ( s tderr , " Error : f a i l e d to i n i t i a l i z e the group s ignature .\n " ) ;
4 re turn IERROR ;
5 }
6
7 /∗ Sign the message : s e t t i n g the seed to UINT_MAX for ce s to
8 get a new pseudo random number fo r t h i s s ignature ins tead
9 of using a pre−f i xed random number . ∗/
10 i f ( groupsig_sign ( sig , msg , memkey, grpkey , UINT_MAX) == IERROR) {
11 f p r i n t f ( s tderr , " Error : s igning f a i l u r e .\n " ) ;
12 re turn IERROR ;
13 }
Figure C.3: Issuing group signatures.
1 /∗ Veri fy group s ignature ∗/
2 i f ( groups ig_ver i fy (&bool , s ig , msg , grpkey ) == IERROR) {
3 f p r i n t f ( s tderr , " Error : v e r i f i c a t i o n f a i l u r e .\n " ) ;
4 re turn IERROR ;
5 }
6 i f ( ! bool ) { f p r i n t f ( stdout , "WRONG signature .\n " ) ; }
7 e l s e { f p r i n t f ( stdout , "VALID s ignature .\n " ) ; }
Figure C.4: Verifying group signatures.
1 /∗ Open group s ignature ∗/
2 i f ( ( rc = groupsig_open ( id , s ig , grpkey , mgrkey , gml ) ) == IERROR) {
3 f p r i n t f ( s tderr , " Error opening s ignature .\n " ) ;
4 re turn IERROR ;
5 }
Figure C.5: Opening group signatures.
C.1 Extending libgroupsig
The library includes a script, named libgroupsig.sh and located under the tools di-
rectory, which allows the automated creation of the skeleton of a new group signa-
ture scheme. This option is invoked with the command ./libgroupsig.sh addscheme
<scheme name>, and creates a new subdirectory $libroot/groupsig/<scheme name>
containing this “empty” skeleton and updating a few library wide data structures. Af-
ter running this command, the programmer would have to implement the actual func-
tionality within the files created inside the new subdirectory (e.g. setup.c, sign.c,
etc.).
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